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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with expertise in problem solving. An
expert solution can be distinguished from simple success by virtue
of the fact that such solutions are tempered by considerations of
economy and transferability. On this latter point, two
characterisations of expertise have emerged in the literature. The
first views expertise as the ability to use domain specific
knowledge in order to develop highly efficient solutons but
solutions applicable to only a narrow class of problems. The
second views expertise as the ability to deploy „< problem solving
heuristics which, while now necessarily providing the most
efficient solution are applicable to a diverse range of problem
solving tasks.
While the psychological literature abounds with studies of problem
solving there has been very little work on the transferability of
problem solutions, and what little work there is fails to
distinguish between these two characterisations of expertise„
Recent work in artificial intelligence on the other hand has made a
clear distinction between the two characterisations but offeres no
empirical evidence for such distinctions.
The experiments reported in this thesis demonstrate that both forms
of expertise are observable in the laboratory but that task
specific expertise produces by far the most dramatic transfer
effects. In attempting to investigate the psychological mechanisms
underwriting such expertise, it is argued that a clear distinction
must be made between representation and strategy. Experti.se
consists in the subject being able to identify a problem, or class
of problems as solvable by recourse to seme general
representational resource and being able to deploy task-specific
information processing strategies dedicated to interpreting novel
problems with respect to this resource.
The functional goals at work in the problem solving domain
constrain a subject's choice of representational space and, even
for expert subjects, surface structure variation in the problem
domain involves the subject in extra processing operations to make
problems congruent with preferred representations. Thus, contrary
to some approaches to problem solving, expertise cannot be defined
as that which renders formally equivalent problems psychologically
equivalent. On the contrary, for expert subjects, surface
structure plays an important part in determining the information
processing strategies necessary for solution.
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CHAPTER ONE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF PROBLEM SOLVING
AND THE CONCEPT OF EXPERTISE
Introduction
This thesis is about problem solving. In particular it is
concerned with an analysis of expertise in problem solving. The
term problem solving could be be seen to cover a very large area
of psychological research, particularly if it is understood broadly
as that area of psychology involved in an investigation of
goal-directed behaviour. Under this interpretation the term can be
used to describe areas as diverse as animal learning, and human
inference. But even within this broad area there has been very-
little research that can be said to concern itself with an
understanding of expertise.
Learning theorists for example, have tended to use criteria of
'success' to indicate when learning has taken place. Animals are
said to have learned when they are able to gain reward by making
seme arbitary response, the precise nature of which is of little
concern to the experimenter. All that is required is that the
animal be able to succeed in gaining reward by whatever means
possible. But expertise can be distinguished frcm simple success in
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as much as it presupposes success but is tempered by other-
considerations. An expert solution will be tempered by
considerations of economy for example, providing a solution which
involves the subject in the minimum of effort. An expert solution
will also be distinguishable by the extent to which it can be used
to solve problems other than the one in which the solution was
forged.
But while the transferability of a solution is indeed, a hallmark of
expertise, not all transfer experiments tap an expertise factor.
In the area of animal discrimination learning for example, it 'was
common to use a simple two-problem 'train and test' paradigm in
which subjects were trained on just one problem and then tested on
a second problem (Reese 1968, Riley 1968). This paradigm has also
been used extensively in the human problem solving literature
(Wertheimer 1945, Luger 1976, Johnson-Laird 1972). But this kind
of paradigm does not guarantee that any level of expertise has been
achieved on the first problem, hence it is really only testing the
extent to which any solution that the subject cares to generate in
response to that first problem is transferable to the second (cf.
McGonigle and Jones 1978).
In contrast to the above approach, the learning set paradigm of
Harlow used a multiple problem environment, in which subjects
solved each problem many times as well as solving many different
problems. Thus there were both intra- and inter- problem learning
components to ensure that seme level of expertise is generated.
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within the testing situation. Using this transfer paradigm,. Harlow
found that test-sophisticated animals could solve novel problems in
a single trial whereas naive subjects take many trials to solve
their first problem.
But while the learning set studies can be used to make a
distinction between success and expertise in terms of economy and
transferability, the actual nature of the expertise generated
within the learning set paradigm is still not known. It is
possible in principle to distinguish between two characterisations
of expertise. In the first instance expertise may be viewed as the
acquisition of knowledge about a limited dcmain of problems which
while allowing all problems within that domain to be solved
efficiently, nevertheless produces solutions which are confined to
that domain. This is the popular conception of expertise, and the
one which gives warrant to beliefs that for example a high level
proficiency in the game of squash tends to interfere with one's
ability to play badminton. But a second view of expertise might
be that it is possible to develop seme quite general problem
solving skills which enable problems of diverse sorts to be tackled
with seme level of proficiency. So for example we might expect
that there are certain skills required by the game of Bridge such
as remonbering which cards have been played, which will also be of
use when playing other card games.
It would seem that in order to distinguish between these two
possible forms of expertise it would be necessary not only to
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consider the transferability of problem solutions but also the
particular dcmain over which solutions are transferable. Expertise
of the domain-specific sort would of course only be expected to
range over problems of a single class. If a dcmain of problems
oould be formally defined in terms of its logical or mathematical
structure, we would expect expertise of this sort to render such
formally equivalent problems psychologically equivalent. Thus a
subject would be able to identify problems as manbers of the class
and to use a solution method that stood as a solution to that whole
class of problems (See for example the work of Dienes and Jeeves
1970).
In contrast, general expertise would not be so constrained, since,
by definition it is not founded in the subject's knowledge of a
particular class of problems but involves knowledge of certain
problem solving methods which could be applied to a broad range of
goal-directed activities (see for example the work of Newell and
Simon 1972). Harlow claimed to be studying just such a general
problem solving skill, namely learning-to-learn, yet he only
examined transfer of learning within the confines of a single class
of problons.
These considerations establish a range of descriptive criteria
which are necessary for an adequate study of expertise. Such a
study would need to look at transfer effects in multiple problem
domains in which problems can be classified into problem-types in
an a priori way on the basis of seme structural analysis, and this
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analysis must be of psychological relevance. It would be
necessary to use this taxonomy of problems in order to
differentiate between the two kinds of expertise outlined above and
to assess which of the two kinds is observed within the confines of
the laboratory situation. Finally it would be necessary to examine
the psychological mechanisms that underwrite such expertise. In the
sections that follow, research on problem solving is reviewed
against these criteria in order to assess what further
experimentation is required.
Success Versus Expertise
The early approaches to problem solving from the field of learning
research were not concerned with identifying expertise factors in
problem solving. Rather they were more straightforwardly
concerned with the mechanisms by which the subject could acquire
any solution to a problem however unsophisticated.
In Thorndike's experiments for example, cats were placed in puzzle
boxes, escape from which was contingent upon them pressing a lever
to open the door. Here the animal was seen to respond haphazardly
in a trial and error fashion with apparently no directed problem
solving behaviour. The animal would continue to respond in this
way until seme chance movement of a limb or part of the body
happened to make contact with the lever thus opening the door.
Repeated trials of the animal in this situation revealed that
- 5 -
learning is a very gradual process taking many trials during which
the animal begins to make fewer and fewer ineffective responses and
the frequency of lever pressing gradually increases„ The emphasis
here is on the gradual and continuous nature of the learning which
could be explained in terms of a strengthening of the appropriate
response by reinforcement. Thorndike formulated the law of Effect
to account for such learning, namely/ the responses that, lead to
favourable outcomes tend to be repeated.
Here then the criterion of learning was simply that the animal be
successful in escaping from the box by whatever means and was
capable of repeating such a blind trial-and -error solution when
confronted with that same problem again. But other approaches were
anxious to distinguish this trial-and-error learning fran more
sophisticated solution processes. For example psychologists in
the Gestalt tradition, notably Kohler (1925) and Wertheimer (1945),
used the term insight to describe a form of problem solving which
yielded a problem solution that was not just a trial and error
response, but rather was based on the subjects understanding of the
structural characteristics of the problem.
An example of insightful problem solving often quoted is that of
Kohler's chimp 'Sultan' solving the 'stick and fruit' task. In
this problem the chimp is placed inside a cage outside of which is
some itsn of fruit, say a banana. Naturally the chimp attempts to
reach through the bars of the cage in order to retrieve the desired
fruit but it has been placed too far away to be reached in this
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manner. However, inside the cage are two sticks. The sticks are
of different diameter and hollow. The chimp readily uses one of
the sticks as a tool with which to attempt to reach the banana but
this is to no avail because each of the sticks alone is too short
to reach the fruit. After many reaching attempts the chimp gives
up the task. In Sultan's case Kohler reports that later the same
day Sultan was still in the cage idly playing with the two sticks
when he chanced to put them end to end. Immediately Sultan "pushes
the thinner one into the opening of the thicker, jumps up and is
already on the way to the railings to which he has, up to now half
turned his back and begins to draw the banana towards him" „
In explaining these observations/ Kohler argued that the critical
factor was the animals grasp of the means-end relations that
pertain among the elements of the task. The obtaining of the fruit
was the goal of the problem, the attainment of which was blocked by
the cage bars. This could be overccme by a combination of the two
sticks not in a blind haphazard way but in a way decreed by the
nature of the goal in relation to the obstacle.
While the naturalistic setting of these experiments and the rather
anecdotal nature of the reporting is somewhat lacking in rigour,
nevertheless these are interesting observations of what does appear
to be quite spontaneous problem solving activity. Kohler uses
these observations to point out the non-monotonic nature of this
learning in contrast to the studies of Thorndike. Sultan^unlike
Thorndike's cats, seemed to arrive at a solution without any
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observable reference to presolution activity. Such learning cannot
easily be captured by an associationist approach. Indeed as Yerkes
points out:
"If this particular type of solution should be
exhibited under rigidly controlled
experimental conditions by several specimens
of chimpanzee few psychobiological observers
would be likely to deny insight or to hesitate
in describing the behavior as highly
intelligent".
In the area of human problem solving Wertheimer distinguished
between 'genuine' and 'poor' solutions on the basis of whether they
involved an understanding of the problem's inner structure. He
viewed problems as consisting of an underlying organisation that
decreed certain directions which a genuine solution must take. Hie
perceptual analogy which he drew was the way in which a circle with
a segment of its circumference missing tends perceptually to imply
a 'closing off' or a gap filling in the direction of completing the
circle. The reason for this is that the circle was one of the
preferred perceptual forms or 'good gestalts' which have a
privileged status in the perceptual system. To give a concrete
example in the case of problem solving we might consider
Wertheimer's parallelogram problem. In fig 1.1 is a parallelogram
of which we wish to find the area. For Wertheimer the
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parallelogram could be most 'productively' regarded as a deformed
rectangle (of. the dotted lines of figure 1.1), and furthermore,
the deformation is such that the amount of area gained on the left
hand-side is equivalent to the amount of area lost, on the
right-hand side. Consequently the area of the parallelogram must
be equivalent to the area of the parent rectangle. The rectangle
serves as a good gestalt for the parallelogram and the problem of
finding its area is reduced to the simpler one of finding the area
of a rectangle. Such an approach to the problem was regarded by
Wertheimer as one which would lead to a genuine solution since it
involved an insight into the inner structure of the problem.
The Gestalt emphasis on 'genuine solutions' and the corresponding
emphasis on the perception of structural relations, lead naturally
to considering whether an 'expertise' factor might be involved in
the distinction between trial and error and insight learning, and
if so, what kind of expertise might this be?
But our two criteria of expertise namely that the solution be
economical and transferable, are of little use here. Since Kohler
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made no empirical comparisons between learning by insight and
trial-and-error learning in terms of say, solution time, it is
difficult to compare the two forms in terms of their relative
economy. Neither did he make any systematic study of the
transferability of insightful solutions. It is not known for
example whether Sultan went on to solve other stick and fruit
problems more successfully or indeed whether he became more expert
at 'insight problems' in general. As for Wertheimer, while he
maintained that transferability was the hallmark of 'genuine'
solutions he did not himself carry out any systematic studies of
transfer. It is not known whether children taught the solution
to the parallelogram problem went on to solve other1 geometry
problems more successfully But while Kohler and Wertheimer did not
themselves carry out such studies, there are transfer of learning
studies which do bear directly on this issue.
Transfer Studies: Which kind of Expertise?
While there are many studies of transfer in the learning
literature, only a small number of them have used a multiple
problem transfer paradigm. But the work of Harlow et al (cf
Harlow, 1959) is a particularly appropriate place to start since
they attempted to explain 'learning-by-insight' in terms of a
gradual growth in expertise across problems.
Harlcw (1949) used an object-discrimination task in which monkeys
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ware presented with a pair of objects differing in multiple
characteristics. The objects were presented on a tray and each of
the objects covered a foodwell. The pair of objects were presented
to the animal six times (in the original study) and it was required
to choose one of the two objects. The position of the objects on
the tray (i.e. over the left or the right food well) was varied in
an unpredictable manner. Irrespective of its position,only one of
the two objects was ever rewarded and it was the same object on
each trial. When the animal had received the six trials with the
first pair of objects then the second pair of objects, again
differing in multiple characteristics and also different from the
previous pair, were presented. The animal is again required, to
choose just the rewarded object.
Since the objects are unrelated to one another the only possible
way for the animal to make the correct choice is to sample at
randan on the first trial and then, remembering which object it
chose, move on to the next trial. If the animal was successful on
the first trial then he must choose the same object on the second
trial and if not he must choose the other object. Harlow presented
his monkeys with up to 14 six-trial problems per day for several
months and examined the relationship between intra-problem learning
(ie. percentage correct on each of the six-trial pairs) and
inter-problem learning (ie. percentage correct as a function of the
number of previous pairs presented). Figures 1.2 and I.3 summarise
these results.
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Ficure I Z Discrimination
reversal learning curves on suc¬
cessive blocks of problems.
PROBLEMS
Figure 1.3Discrimination reversal learn¬
ing set curve based on Trial 2 responses.
The relationship between intra- and inter- problem learning is of
interest here. As can be seen early on in the problems there is
little inter-problem transfer manifest, learning is confined to
improvement within problems. But with practice the animals'
learning profile changes until eventually there is a high degree of
transfer between problems, and effectively, one-trial learning
within each of the problems. This can be seen clearly when
performance on trial 2 of each problem is plotted against the
number of problems solved, as in figure .3 above. Here after 80
problems or so, the animals solve a completely novel problem with,
almost 100% accuracy on only their second attempt at that problem,
this is compared with little over 50% accuracy (chance responding)
on their earliest problems.
Clearly these animals have developed a high degree of expertise in
the solving of these problems, and this expertise has both intra-
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and inter-problem components. As can be seen unlike the
intra-problem component, the inter-problem component is essentially
monotonic throughout. This was taken by Harlow to suggest that
'learning-by-insight' could be explained in terms of transfer from
previous problem experience.
This growth in expertise across problems was explained by Harlow in
his Error-factor Theory (cf. Harlow 1952 for summary), according to
which,the animal comes to a new task ready equipped with certain
response tendencies. By systematic observation of the type of
errors made by these monkeys Harlow et al were able to identify
four such response tendencies. The first was Stimulus
Perseveration wherein the animal was seen to exhibit a tendency to
choose the same stimulus on successive trials irrespective of its
reward value. The second was Differential Cue. Here the animal
tended to respond to the the position of the rewarded foodwell
rather than the changing position of the rewarded stimulus. The
third type of error was termed Response Shift wherein the animal
showed a tendency to respond to the non-rewarded stimulus after a
series of successive choices of the rewarded stimulus. And. finally
there was the Position Habit tendency. Here the animal
persistently chose the right or left object irrespective of the
reward values. In this theory learning was viewed as the
suppression of these error producing factors and thus the gradual
emergence of the appropriate response profile which has been
described as a Win-stay, lose-shift strategy.
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As Mackintosh's (1974) short consideration of these findings points
out, there are seme difficulties with this theoretical explanation.
It is not clear for example whether or not error factor elimination
is the cause or the consequence of learning. As Mackintosh points
out, on a six trial problem there are 2~* i.e. 32 possible response
sequences after the initial choice and error-factor elimination
wauld account for only the elimination of a subset of these. What
Mackintosh has failed to realize here though, is that Harlow's view
of learning is essentially a hypothesis-testing view. Harlow is
arguing that the animal is actively trying out various response
sequences in a systematic and directed way and eliminating those
which were ineffective. Consequently the animal would never
consider the 32 possible permutations of response sequences. This
wauld only occur if the animal was following a blind trial and
error (with replacement) strategy.
What is really unclear about Harlow's error-factor theory however,
is the status of the Win-stay, lose-shift' strategy that is the
result of learning experience. Is this strategy simply part of the
animals pre-existing repertoire of strategies that ccme into play
when the simpler strategies such as response shift are proved,
ineffective? If so then clearly it is not the strategy that has
been learnt in this situation. Rather, the animal learns that this
task is of the type that calls for a certain class of response.
Alternatively it may be that this new strategy is learnt in
response to the failure of the animal's pre-existing repertoire,
and presumably is then added to the repertoire. While this seems
to be more congruent with Harlow's account of the learning set data
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it is quite clear that the error factor theory offers no account
of the process by which such new strategies are forged from their
predecessors.
Harlcw's work is a fine example of the use of a multiple-problem
transfer paradigm as a means of generating seme form of expertise
in a problem solving task. Not only does the learning set
experience allow Harlow's monkeys to develop economical solutions
to each problem, as is evidenced by the one-trial learning in later
problans, but also it promotes the development of a solution which
is transferable to novel problems. But how novel? What is not
clear from this work is what kind of expertise is being developed.
Is it dcmain-specific expertise, in which case transfer is
limited to novel problems of the same class, or is it a more
generalisable skill that has been developed?
Harlow certainly claimed to be studying a general problem solving
skill, namely 1earning-to-1earn (Harlow 1949), and he argued that
the formation of learning sets;
"Reduces the problem from an intellectual
tribulation to an intellectual triviality and
frees the organism to tackle problems of a new
hierarchy of difficulty."
In this view it might be expected that the learning set animal was
developing an expertise that not only allows it to solve two-choice
discriminations effectively, but also allows it to deal with novel
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classes of problems more effectively. This being so, it might
have been expected that Harlow would have gone on to study his
animals on a new class of problems altogether, for example he might
have transferred his animals onto an oddity discrimination task.
Such a task might have served as Harlow's 'new hierarchy' of
problems. But without such data it is difficult to know what kind
of ejqpertise is generated in these tasks. Some evidence frcm
Shusterman (1962) however, indicates that the expertise may be much
more domain specific than Harlow anticipated. In his study
Shusterman found that monkeys trained on a Win-shift, Lose-stay
strategy transferred badly to the more conventional learning set
paradigm with its requirement for a Win-Stay, Lose-Shift strategy.
If indeed the learning set studies are demonstrations of domain
specific expertise, it might be the case that more general transfer
is simply beyond the bounds of the lower primates, and perhaps one
of the unique characteristics of the human problem solver is a
capacity for general expertise such as learning to learn,
(MoGonigle 1984). With this in mind we turn to a consideration of
some of the transfer studies with human subjects.
Hull's work on concept formation offers a close analogy to the
learning set studies of Harlow. This involved presenting subjects
with a number of pseudo-Chinese characters (Hull 1945). These
consisted of ccmplex patterns of lines and curves. Of the set of
characters a subset could be distinguished by the presence of one
particular feature that was common to all characters in that
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subset. The characters presented to the subject were paired with
nonsense syllables, all characters in the common subset being
presented with the same nonsense word. Whether or not the subject
had grasped the concept was assessed by whether or not he could
name the members of the subset appropriately. The general results
are well known, namely that subjects can indeed learn to associate
a nonsense word with a particular stable element in a changing
stimulus pattern and once established this can be extended to novel
instances with that same element. Furthermore subjects can
manifest this behaviour without necessarily being able to define
what the common element is.
Hull's original account of the learning process at work here, like
error-factor theory, was essentially one in which irrelevant
aspects of the stimulus became suppressed or inhibited. Here too
as with extensions of the original learning set results, studies
were made of the relative effectiveness of the number of trials
per problem versus the number of problems solved. So for example,
the studies of Mams (1954), on a task involving the learning of
certain rules for the spatial arrangement of two objects, found
that intensive training on a single problem produced more transfer-
to a novel problem than did multiple training. In contradiction to
this, Hull himself found that moderate familiarity with half as
many instances was more efficient than twice as thorough
familiarity with half as many. This latter result seams more in
keeping with the learning set studies (Harlow and Warren 1952,
Callantine and Warren 1955) who found multiple training to be more
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effective.
This contradiction was taken up by Morrisett and Hovland in a
single experimental study (1959). They argued that the crucial
difference between the experiments of Adams and those of Callantine
and Warren was the degree of mastery that subjects achieved within
each problem. All of Adam's single-problem subjects mastered the
training problem before going on to solve the test problems,, the
multiple-problem group did not, they were merely required to solve
each problem once. From this they hypothesised that subjects who
were given a multiple training paradigm but also allowed to master
each problem before moving on to the next would shew the most
transfer.
This hypothesis was well supported by an experiment in which they
compared three groups of subjects. One group were given 48 trials
on a single problem before a test problem. The second group had 2
trials on each of 24 problems and group 3 had 16 trials on each of
3 training problems. Group 3 with a moderate degree of mastery on
each of 3 problems showed the greatest transfer to the test problem
despite the fact that it was hardly distinguishable from group 1
during the training phase. Group 2 showed an overall poor
performance. While this study might have been even more convincing
had a criterion of mastery been used, nevertheless the findings
suggest, in accordance with Harlow's claims for the learning set,
that expertise on a single problem is'traded off'against expertise
across multiple problems.
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Morrisett and Hovland interpreted these findings in terms of an
associationist theory of learning, but as Kendler (1961) points
out, other studies, particularly those of Bruner, Goodnow and
Austin (1956) attempted to identify sane of the problem solving
strategies subjects use in solving these types of problem,,
The experiments of Bruner et al involved a concept formation task
in which subjects were presented with cards picturing geometric
patterns. The task for the subject was to find the principle that
vvas guiding the experimenter's classification of seme of these
cards as members of a related set. As Bruner et al point out,
there is a subtle distinction here between their approach and that
of Hull, since for Bruner et al's subjects, the task was to identify
the guiding concept rather than to use it to associate nonsense
words with figures.
The subjects, after each presentation of a card, were asked to
hypothesise a rule that they considered was plausibly in operation
given the evidence so far. They were then informed if they were
right or wrong and if wrong the experiment continued in the same
way. The value of this approach is that rather like the learning
set studies the nature of the subjects ' errors is observed directly
and consequently the decision-making process of the subject is to
sane extent externalised. Bruner et al found that there were
regularities in this decision-making process, and these
regularities they referred to as strategies.
To quote directly frcm Bruner et al;
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"The phrase 'strategies of decision making' is
not meant in a metaphorical sense. A strategy
refers to a pattern of decisions in the
acquisition, retention and utilisation of
information that serves to meet certain
objectives, that is to ensure certain forms of
outcome and to ensure against certain kinds of
others. Among the objectives of a strategy are
the following:
a) To ensure that the concept will be
attained after the minimum number of
encounters with relevant instances.
b) To be sure that the concept will be
attained with certainty, regardless of the
number of instances one must test en route to
attainment.
c) To minimise the amount of strain on
inference and memory capacity while at the
same time ensuring that the concept will be
attained.
d) To minimise the number of wrong
categorisations prior to attaining a concept."
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For Bruner et al, the strategy adopted by a subject is not fixed
but depends upon the relative weighting given to the four
objectives given above. And these in turn are determined by
certain conditions. For example if the consequences of failure are
severe then (d) becomes salient. If the nature of the instances
encountered is such that retention is difficult then (c) becomes a
priority objective. If there are time constraints imposed then (a)
will be a priority objective and this will be to the detriment of
(b).
Bruner et al identified two strategies at work. The first, termed
the focussing strategy proceeds by first assuming that all the
attributes of a positive instance define the concept and the
subject responds accordingly. In the face of cards that are not
instances of the concept, yet have some of the properties of the
cards that are (ie. negative confirming cases) the subject does not
change his hypothesis. Only when the subject is presented with a
card that is an instance but does not share these properties does
he change his hypothesis. In these cases the subject selects the
subset of properties that are common to both instances and then
proceeds. This strategy is mnemonically and inferentially
economical, but requires large numbers of instances.
The second strategy that was adopted by subjects in Bruner et al's
experiment is the scanning strategy. In this case the subject
chooses only some properties of the initial exemplar. When this
fails (ie positive and negative infirming cases) the subject seeks
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to change his hypothesis by reference to all the instances
previously encountered. Consequently this strategy places a high
demand on memory but can produce the correct concept in as little
as one trial.
The study of Bruner et al is of interest because, like the learning
set studies, it demonstrates how a multiple problem domain can be
used to generate some form of expertise in the laboratory.
Furthermore, Bruner et al offer some explanation as to the
psychological mechanisms that underwrite such expertise, and the
way in which the skilled problem solver might be able to assess the
computational cost and benefits accruing to certain problem solving
methods. Once again however, Bruner et al do not identify what
kind of expertise is being developed here. Are the strategies
identified by Bruner et al anything more than just local methods
for solving a particular problem? The ability of subjects to
assess the computational cost and benefit associated with
particular problem solving methods would certainly seen to be a
good candidate for a general problem solving skill. But like
Harlcw, Bruner et al did not study the performance of their
subjects on other related tasks in which such skills might also be
of use.
To conclude this review of the psychological literature then, it is
possible to summarise as follows. While early studies were little
concerned with expertise factors in problem solving, the research
with both human and animal subjects using multiple problem
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training, leaves no doubt that expertise cannot only be observed in
the laboratory but also that it is a significant variable in
determining performance profiles. However, these studies have
failed to identify what kind of expertise is being generated, in
these experiments, whether it is a domain limited form of
expertise or a more general problem solving skill. The
psychological research is simply silent on this issue. However
there is research from the field of artificial intelligence which
has made a quite clear distinction between these two forms of
expertise. While there is little by way of experimental work, in
this field, and certainly there are no good studies of transfer, it
does provide a framework within which an experimental programme can





Newell and Simon: The case for a General Problem Solver
Artificial intelligence views problem solving from a mathematical
and formal perspective, consequently a problem solution is
considered as scmething like a mathematical or logical proof and
problem solving behaviour is seen as a search for such proofs in a
given problem domain. As a consequence of this orientation the
types of problems used in artificial intelligence are those that
can be represented as a structured set of alternatives or options.
The aim of the problem solver is to find an ordered sequence of
such options that transform the initial state of the problem into
the desired goal state, just as a mathematician might locate and
put together the mathematical steps that constitute a proof of a
theoran.
The now classic example of a general problem solving program is the
'general problem solver' (GPS) of Ernst and Newell (1969). This
program attempted to attain seme level of generality by using a
heuristic search technique which could be applied in a number of
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different problem domains in order to identify ordered sequences of
options that would be appropriate for the generation of a solution
in that problem domain. The rationale behind this attempt, was that
if many different problems can be represented as structured sets of
options then it should be possible to develop quite general
procedures for searching amongst options. The general search
heuristic used by Ernst and Newell was called 'Means-End Analysis".
Bundy (1978) cites the following informal example of the way in
which a problem might be formulated in a way amenable to means-end
search for a solution;
"My goal or end is to transform 'me at heme' into 'me at
Trafalgar Square'. The first task is to compare these
two states to find the difference. I find the difference
to be one of location. The means I have of reducing
differences of location are operators like 'walk' or
'travel by train'. Seme operators like 'walk' can be
rejected as infeasible, but 'travel by train' is
feasible, so my next task is to apply this operator to
the initial state 'me at heme'. Unfortunately the
operator will not apply because the conditions are not
right; I am not at the station. So I set up a new
sub-goal to transform 'me at heme' to 'me at station'.
Again the difference is one of location and again I find
the 'travel' operators. I can reject 'walk' as
infeasible (I am lazy) and 'go by train' as a potential
loop and select 'go by taxi'. This cannot be applied
because the taxi driver does not know I need him. The
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difference is one of information, so I look for an
operator that can reduce differences of information and
find the communication operators like 'use the
telephone! ' "
As can be seen from this example the essence of the problem solving
process is the recursive use of operators to reduce differences
between the current state and the goal state and this difference
reduction can be carried out to any required depth. The result is
a plan consisting of a sequence of operators each of which sets up
the conditions necessary for the execution of the next operator in
the hierarchy. Ernst and Newell were able to formulate a wide
range of problems in such a way as to be amenable to means-end
analysis. These ranged from mathematical puzzles such as the
'Tower of Hanoi' and 'The bridges of Konigsberg' through more
complex mathematical problems involving integration to theorem
proving predicate calculus and sentence parsing. Thus it would
seem that GPS has indeed achieved seme level of general problem
solving capacity, but the work has not been considered as an
unqualified success even from within the field of artificial
intelligence research.
The cause for concern is that GPS requires an immense amount of
task-specific information to be given to it before it is able to
use the general search techniques effectively. As can perhaps be
seen from the above example, for each new problem the initial
state, the goal state and the relevant operators that can be used
to transform these states have to be defined by the programmer. It.
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is argued then that the actual contribution of GPS to the problem
solution is quite small.
The problem highlighted here was recognised by Ernst and Newell at
the outset. Their approach made a quite clear distinction between
two aspects of problem solving, the formulation or representation
of the problem and the heuristics or procedures that operate using
that representation in a search for a solution. They argue that
representational and procedural aspects interact in order to
determine the generality of the system. To quote;
"If we are to take seriously that generality is defined
by the domain of problems that are solvable, then many
perfectly general problem solvers exist: Turing Machines,
algol compilers, etc. but in describing the evaluation
of a polynomial to a Turing Machine most of the problem
solving techniques are contained in the specification of
the problem .Thus the generality of a problem solver
must be defined relative to the amount of information it
takes to specify the problem.
It is clear then that in building a system of seme generality the
difficulties do not rest in designing procedures for solving a
broad class of problems but rather in designing a representational
system sufficiently powerful to allow a large class of problems to
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be defined with the minimum of task-specific information while at
the same time being constrained enough to allow a finite set of
procedures to operate on that representation.
Clearly, what is being suggested here is that there is a trade-off
between the power of the system and the generality of the system,
powerful problem solving procedures require a very sophisticated
representational language, capable of representing a broad range of
different problems in a similar format. Reducing the pcwer of the
problem solving -procedures would put less strain on the
representational device. But Ernst and Newell chose to hold the
set of problem-solving procedures used by GPS constant, and in so
doing it would seem that they must place most of the
responsibility for generality into the representational domain., but
it is here where the theory behind GPS has least to say;
"..Nevertheless, the representation used in GPS was
chosen ad hoc, within the framework of the problem
solving techniques used, and not as a primary concern in
implementing GPS."
It would seem however that unless there is an adequate theory of
representation, this approach to generality is bound to fail.
Without such a theory GPS is no better than a Turing machine with a
Homunculus in the form of a programmer. It is because of this
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fundamental problem that most AI research on problem solving has
now moved away from the GPS-type approach towards the expert
systems paradigm in which programs are designed to produce
efficient problem solving within circumscribed task-domains.
While the AI research has changed its emphasis frcm general skills
to danain-specific expertise, there were seme concerted attempts to
use the GPS framework to study human problem solving, and here we
might ask whether such a theory of human problem solving can
explain how, if at all, the human system has overcome the
engineering problem identified by Ernst and Newell.
The work of Newell and Simon (1972) was one such attempt, and the
aim of the theory was to account for the problem solving behaviour
in a number of problem domains by describing in computational terms
the nature of the subjects' representation of the problem
environment and the procedures used in attempts to find solutions.
They argued that a three-way distinction must be maintained in any
analysis of problem solving, between the structure of the task
environment, the subjects representation in that in environment,
which may differ frcm individual to individual, and the problem
solving procedures that are used to solve the problem.
As a consequence of these distinctions it was necessary for Newell
and Simon to have seme means of accessing the nature of the problem
representations or 'problem space' that a given subject adopts in
his attempt to solve a problem. To this end they used the
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technique of verbal protocol reporting, which involved the subject
in providing a 'running commentary' of his thoughts as he proceeded
to solve the problem. Such 'think aloud' protocols were not
considered as introspection but as behaviour that could
legitimately be seen as tracing the subject's path through his
representation of the task environment or 'problem space'. To
quote;
"This is not a space that can yet be pointed to and
described as an objective fact for the human subject. An
attempt at describing it amounts, again, to constructing
a representation of the task environment - the subjects
representation in this case. The subject is presented in
the experiment with a set of instructions and a sequence
of stimuli. He must encode these components - defining
goals, rules and other aspects of the situation - in some
kind of space that represents the initial situation
presented to him, the desired goal situation, various
intermediate states imagined or experienced, as well as
any concepts he uses to describe these situations to
II
himself.
It may be noticed that the latter part of this quote which
describes the contents of this problem space sounds much like the
type of description used above as an example of means end analysis
in GPS with its emphasis on goals, initial states and intermediate
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states. And indeed it is the case that Newell and Simon used
information obtained from protocol data to compare subjects'
search through their problem spaces with the trace of GPS solving
the same problems. This was achieved by an intermediate level of
description called 'the problem behaviour graph'. This interpreted
the subjects' utterances in terms of states and operators and
described the choices between operators that subjects' were making.
This was then compared with the choices that GPS made in the same
situations.
There is no doubt that this method provides evidence for subjects'
use of states and operators and their use of means-end analysis
which is entirely consistent with the GPS model. As Bundy points
out there are seme differences of detail, for example human
subjects tend to use more elaborate back-up in response to error
and scmetiires use more sophisticated means of eliitu.nat.ing
infeasible operators, but by and large the fit between model and
human protocol data is good. As such GPS clearly has seme claim to
being a 'psychologically plausible' model of problem solving. But
this fit between the GPS and the human data in the light of the
criticisms levelled at GPS, only serves to raise questions
concerning the generality of the human problem solver. Is there
any evidence in Newell and Simon's account of human problem solving
of a level of generality beyond that attained by GPS, and if so
how does the human problem solver overcome the computational
problans identified by the GPS research?
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In order to address this issue, what would be required is an
understanding of the relationship between the task environment and
the problem space. That is to say an account of the factors that
influence subjects" representation of the problem solving task.
While Newell and Simon make it perfectly clear that the
relationship is not a simple one, and that for any given task
environment there are a large if not infinite number of possible
problem spaces, they do not offer any theoretical account of hew a
problem space is chosen and constructed. The use of verbal
protocols as the sole behavioural data means that their analysis of
problem solving only begins once the problem space is constructed.
They do not experimentally manipulate variables that might have
conceivably affected such a construction process. Thus as with the
GPS model upon which it was based, Newell and Simon's theory of
human problem solving is at its weakest at the point of most
stress. By Newell and Simon's own admission;
"The theory of problem solving to be presented in this
book has much more to say about methods and executive
organisation than about creating new representations or
shifting frem one representation to another. "
Thus it would seem that support from the field of artificial
intelligence for a belief in problem solving skills of seme
generality is not forthcoming. The questions of generality raised
at the beginning of this chapter in the light of the learning set
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research receive no support from this new approach. In his chapter
'Problem Solving and Education', Simon offers the following
conclusion concerning general problem solving skills;
"There is seme evidence that problem solving skills can
be taught, although there is regrettably little evidence
that such instruction is cost effective as compared with
equal effort devoted to subject matter skills."
(Simon 1980)
This would seem to suggest that Simon himself has little faith in
the notion of task-independent problem solving skills, and that
further attempts to examine such skills, if they exist, might be
fruitless. Thus we shall set aside such considerations for tha
moment and turn instead to the alternative characterisation of
expertise, namely, as a dcmain-specific skill, and examine how this
has been viewed from the area of AI and related work.
Domain Specific Expertise and State Space Analysis
A study of demain specific expertise must begin with an analysis of
the task demain. Such an analysis of problem classes must be
independent of psychological variables such as transfer, because if
not there is a risk of providing only a tautologous definition of
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the task domain in terms of the set of problems over which transfer
is manifest, while at the same time claiming the transfer to be
domain specific. But at the same time if this formal analysis is
to be of any use it must be assumed to have psychological reality
at seme level. It is in providing such an analytical framework
that AI research is so useful.
One formalism that has been used to this effect in AI research is
termed state space analysis (Nilsson 1972, Luger 1978, Goldin and
MeClintock 1980). For a large class of problems, (certainly for
all those used by Ernst and Newell for eg#) it is possible to
define the structure of those problems in terms of states and
relations between states. Board games such as chess and draughts
for example can be described as a finite set of legal
configurations of the pieces on the board, and in a state-space
analysis this would correspond to the set of states in a state
space graph. Furthermore the legal moves in the game which
transform one configuration into the next are represented, as arcs
in the state space graph. Given the exhaustive set of legal moves
and the resulting states of play it is possible to characterise the
play of the game as a path through the state space.
This type of analysis can be used to define the relationship
between two different problems and to define classes of identical
problems. Two problems are said to be identical or isomorphic when
they are described by the same state space graph. To give a
concrete example we turn to a consideration of the problem that has
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been used extensively in AI research on problem solving; the Tower
of Hanoi (ToH) problem.
This problem comprises of a board upon which stand three pegs* At
the start of the problem there are four disks of regularly
decreasing sizes stacked up on the lefthand peg with the largest at
the bottom. This is illustrated in figure 2.1 below.
ABC
Fig XI-
The Tower of Hanoi problem in its start position.
The task for the problem solver is to transfer the disks, moving
only one at a time from the lefthand peg to the righthand peg* But
in doing so he must never allow a larger disk to stand on top of a
smaller disk. This constraint defines the legal configurations of
the disks on the pegs and thus the legal moves that the subject can
make, and thus it is possible to describe the state space graph for
this problem. This graph represents the problem as a branching
tree of nodes and arcs in which the nodes are the legal
configurations of the disks on the pegs and the arcs are the
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permissible transformations of the configurations. Figure 2.2
figure 2.2 The state space graph for the ToH problea shotting 1-, 2- and 3- ring sub problea
spaces.
The configurations are seen as labelled nodes with the initial
state or start state of the problem as the topmost node. The label
of this node is AAAA. These 4 letters indicate that the four disks
are all on peg A - the left hand peg- at the start of the problem.
The leftmost letter A denotes the position of the smallest diskf
the rightmost A the positionof the largest disk, and so on.
Frcm the initial state of the problem only two legal moves are
possible, the subject can move the smallest disk to peg B, or to





below the topmost node of the graph. The label on the righthand
side; BAAA, indicates that the smallest disk can be moved to peg
B, the lefthand node. CAAA, indicates the only other option of
moving the smallest disk to peg C. In this way all the move
options frcm each successive state of play can be described. The
bottanmost righthand node is labelled CCCC, indicating that all the
disks are on the righthand peg. This, it will be recalled, is the
goal state, the attainment of which means the problem has been
solved. Consequently, it is possible to see frcm the state space
graph that the shortest solution path is to carry out that sequence
of 15 moves represented by the righthand side of the graph. This
constitutes the minimum solution path (MSP) for the ToH problems.
There are a number of other structural characteristics of the ToH
problems that become apparent from the state space graph. Most
notable is the highly recursive substructure and symmetry of the
problem. The ToH problem is a recursive problem in that in order
to solve the 4-ring problem, the subject must first solve a 3-ring
problem, and in order to solve a 3-ring problem the subject must
first solve a 2-ring problem and so on. That is to say, in order
to solve the 4- ring problem the subject must first get the biggest
disk to the goal peg. In order to do this it is necessary to have
all the other three disks stacked appropriately on the intermediate
peg - peg B. The subject must thus solve the 3-ring problem for
peg B before solving the 4-ring problem for peg C. In order to get
the smallest three disks to peg B the subject must first get the
largest of the three to peg B. In order to do that he must first
solve the 2-ring problem for peg C, and so on.
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This recursive substructure is readily seen in the state space
graph as a nested set of pyramids of nodes and arcs. The pyramidal
shape of the graph as a whole represents the 4-ring problem,, but
that pyramid is itself made up of 3 smaller pyramids each of which
is a self-contained 3-ring version of the ToH problem. These in
turn are each made up of the pyramids representing 2-ring problems.
A 3-ring and a 2-ring subproblem are circled in figure 2.2. This
substructure produces a symmetry in the ToH problem which again is
obvious from the graph. The moves represented by the lefthand side
of the pyramid are a reflection of the minimum solution path of the
righthand side but where the goal peg, instead of being peg C is
peg B and so on. It is this highly recursive structure that makes
this problem so amenable' to the kinds of recursive means-end
techniques embodied in AI models like GPS since the same move
patterns are present at each level of the recursion.
Of course, the state-space analysis is only one of possibly many
formalisms for the analysis of these problems, Nilsson (op cit) for
example provides at least one other approach. But why this
formalism is of particular interest is that there is reason to
believe that this level of analysis has sane psychological reality.
Luger (1980) argues that it is the detection of these structural
invariances and symmetries that constitutes the major problem for a
human problem solver. It is by the systematic exploration of these
move structures he argues, that a subject cores to solve the ToH
problem and that this exploration can be quantified by plotting a
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subjects path through the state space graph. If this is done seme
systematic characteristics can be recognised. For example, the
MSP from peg A to peg C will often be preceded by a symmetrical MSP
but from peg A to peg B. Likewise once a subject has solved a
3-ring subproblem in a MSP other 3-ring subproblems can. be so'J.ved
in a MSP also. Now consider the following problem;
The problem is described as follows;
"On the board in front of you are four delivery trucks from four
rival companies. They have been travelling to town along road A.
They must go to the factory in road C, which, to simplify loading
and unloading, has been divided into parking spaces. Each company
has its cwn ccmpany-owned parking lot and the colours of the lots
correspond to the company colours on the lorries themselves. There
are similar company-owned parking lots in roads A and C. As can be
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seen, the reads are narrow and no overtaking is possible, and no
lorry may park in the central cross-hatched area as this causes
congestion. A final problem is that each ccmpany zealously guards
its own company lots and will not allow lorries from rival
companies to park on them even momentarily. Given these
difficulties can you show hew to manoeuvre all of the lorries into
their appropriate lots in road C so that they might be able to
deliver their goods to the factory."
It is possible to plot a state space graph for this problem also.
Frcm the initial state one must either move the first lorry to its
parking lot in road C or road B. From there it would be possible
to move the second lorry to the other road and so on. If the
state-space graph of the parking lot problem is constructed in this
way then despite the apparent differences between it and the ToH
problem discussed above, the two graphs turn out to be identical.
This identity between the two problems can be seen if the 4 lorries
are replaced by the 4 disks of the IbH problem and the 3 roads by
the 3 pegs, and the parking constraints by the stacking constraints
on the disks of the ToH. Because of this structural identity
between the two problems they are said to be isomorphic modulo
their state space decomposition.
Thus we can see how the state space analysis of problems allows us
to define classes of structurally equivalent problems. Formally
speaking, while such problems vary immensely in their surface
structure characteristics, a solution to any one of these problems
- 40 -
that is based on subproblem invariances can stand as a solution to
any problem from that structurally defined class.
With this formal taxonomy of problems then, it is possible to make
two claims about domain specific expertise. Firstly, it would be
expected that an expert solution will be one that exploits the
structural invariances inherent in these problems. Second, such
expertise should guarantee that a problem solver will be able to
transfer his solution to other structurally isomorphic problems.
There are in fact three experimental studies of transfer using
state space tasks that have attempted to assess these claims.
These are reviewed below with respect to what evidence they offer
for the existence of domain specific expertise.
Seme Transfer Studies with State Space Tasks
The first study to be reviewed is by Luger and Bauer (1976). Thin
study used two state-space problems, the TbH described above and an.
isomorphic variant of it called the tea ceremony (TC). This task
although differing somewhat in its description employs a board
essentially the same as the parking lot problem described, above.
Appendix A includes a full description of this task along with all
the other state space problems referred to in the thesis.
In this study two groups of students solved both of these tasks in
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a 'train and test' procedure. One group solved the ToH problem
first, followed by the TC problem while the other group solved the
problems in the reverse order; ie. TC followed by ToH„ The
hypothesis under test was that if solution to these problems was
underwritten by an exploitation of the subproblem invariances
described by the state space graph, then since both problems have
the same invariances subjects should transfer positively across the
two problems.
Luger and Bauer measured total time and total number of moves to
solution for the two problems. An analysis of variance of these
data revealed the following results. There was no significant
difference between the groups suggesting that the order in which,
the problems were solved does not affect overall solution time or
moves -to- solution. There was no overall effect of practice
suggesting that the difficulty of the problem solved second by each
group was not reduced by prior experience of the other isomorphic
problem.
While this result appears to refute the hypothesis of Luger and
Bauer there was a significant effect of problem type, which
suggests that one of the problems, the TC problem, requires
significantly longer time and greater total moves for its solution.
Fortunately for the hypothesis this effect of problem type
interacts with problem order for both moves and time, suggesting
that this difference between the two problems is reduced as a
function of practice. This implies that same transfer between the
two problems has indeed occurred. While Luger and Bauer did not
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carry out any post-test for the location of this interaction, by
inspection of their summary tables it would seem that solving the
TC problem significantly reduces the difficulty of solving the ToH
subsequently.
Thus it would seen from this study that there is seme evidence? for
transfer across isomorphic problems. However, this experiment, as
it stands, tells us very little about the nature of the expertise
that underwrites such transfer. This is so for two reasons.
Firstly as was made clear in the review of psychological studies a
train and test paradigm of the type used here is not particularly
useful for an examination of expertise. It is not known whether
subjects in solving their first problem did in fact use the
structural invariances of that problem' to produce an. expert
solution as distinct from solving the problem by sane form of trial
and error learning.
But even if seme level of ejqpertise had been generated in problem
1, the second objection would still hold, namely with the
experiment as it stands, there is no way of knowing whether this
expertise was genuine domain specific expertise of the type
envisaged by Luger, or whether it was simply sane form of general
problem solving skill such as means-end analysis of the type used
by GPS to solve just this type of problem. Because Luger did not
include a control condition testing for transfer across
non-isomorphic problems he has not differentiated between the two
forms of expertise.
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The second study (Reed et al 1974) was essentially identical, in
design to that of Luger but using a different kind of state-space
problem. The first of these problems was the 'Missionaries and
Cannibals' task, in which the subject is required to transport
three missionaries and three cannibals across a river using a boat
which holds two of them at most. The problem arises because if at
any time the cannibals on either riverbank outnumber the
missionaries on that bank, then the cannibals will indulge in their
habit of eating missionaries.
The state space of this problem (see appendix A) is much simpler
than that of the ToH, it consists of only 14 states and the
solution path is 11 moves long, consequently the choice points for
possible legal moves is very limited in ccmparison to the ToH
problem. While there is some symmetry about the centre state
indicating that the first half of the solution path ( getting all
3 missionaries onto the far bank ) is the mirror image of the
second half ( getting all 6 people onto the far bank ), there is
very little of the rich subproblem structure found in the ToH
problem.
The second task used in this study is called 'the Jealous
Husbands' problem. In this task 3 husbands and their wives replace
the missionaries and cannibals. The problem arises because the 3
husbands will not allow their wives to be alone with any of the
other men. When the conventional state space graphs of these two
problems are compared they can be seen to have identical
structures. If however the state spaces are extended to include
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not only legal but also illegal moves then the state spaces are
distinct, the jealous husbands (JH) problem having more illegal
configurations than the missionaries and cannibals problem (MC).
This difference arises because in the JH task there is an
additional pairing constraint on the wives and husbands, for
example a wife would not be allowed in a boat with a man who is not
her husband, whereas in the MC task any cannibal my share the boat
with any missionary. Because of this distinction the two problems
are said to be homomorphic rather than isomorphic.
Reed et al used a 'train and test' procedure like that of Luger and
Bauer; one group solved the MC problems followed by the JH problem
and the other group solved the reverse order. They measured moves
-to- solution and solution time as well as the number of illegal
moves the subject made. Unlike the Luger and Bauer study however
they found no evidence of transfer effects for moves or time to
solution, there was however seme very minor reduction in the number
of illegal moves made, but they do not accept this as strong
evidence of transfer.
In a follow-up study Reed et al looked at transfer within the same
problem (either JH or MC) solved twice. They found that for the JH
problem there was a significant reduction in time and illegal moves
to solution between the first and the second attempts at the
problem but no effect for the number of moves to solution. For the
MC problem there was a significant reduction between the first and
second attempts only for solution time. Reed et al take this as
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evidence that the failure to find transfer between problems in
their first experiment was attributable to the failure of subjects
to recognise problem relatedness.
So in their final study the 'train and test' paradigm of experiment
1 was again used but this time subjects were given explicit
information about the relatedness of the two problems before they
moved on to solve the second problem. The results revealed a
significant transfer between the two problems but this was confined
to the group solving the JH problem first followed by the MC
problem. This effect was significant for time and illegal moves
only.
The failure to obtain any clear evidence for transfer here
seriously weakens Luger's claims about the psychological reality of
state space invariance. Once again however it is not clear whether
failure to find strong transfer is due to the use of the train and
test paradigm. It is not known for example, whether the subjects
had mastered the first problem before going on to solve the second.
What might have been particularly useful here, is the use of seme
form of criterion of mastery paradigm in which subjects are
required to solve each of a large set of probems to some level of
mastery before going on to attempt further problems. In this way
it would have been possible to ensure expertise within a single
problem before testing the generality of such expertise.
Ironically, in the third experiment to be reviewed here, Thomas
(1974), uses an isomorph of the MC task to examine intra-problem
transfer, but he does not go on to examine inter-problem effects.
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In the problem used by Thomas, hobbits replace misionari.es and ores
replace cannibals. He used two groups of subjects, one group - the
control group, solved the problem from the beginning to the end
once only. The experimental group however began by solving the
last half of the problem from the middle-state to the end state,
and only then went on to solve the whole problem from beginning to
end. Thomas argued that if moves through the state-space was the
appropriate level of analysis, then subjects in the experimental
group solving the second half of the problem twice should show an
improved performance on their second attempt.
However, the mean total moves required to solve the halves of the
problem were compared to reveal that the experimental group not
only solved the first half of the problem in fewer moves then the
control group but they also solved the second half in fewer moves
than the controls, even on their first attempt. Furthermore the
experimental group showed no improvement on their second attempt at
the second half of the problem.
Thus it would seen that while there is seme evidence of transfer
for the experimental group between halves 1 and 2, there is no
effect on a second attempt at the second half. Furthermore there
appears to be negative transfer from the first half to the second
half for the experimental group. As was mentioned above, there is
some symmetry between the first and second half of the problem
which might explain the transfer between these two halves for the
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experimental group, the negative transfer of the control group and
the failure to obtain transfer where it was expected, across the
first and second attempts at the second half remains a mystery*
Thcmas concludes that there is no evidence for the psychological
reality of state space analysis, but as with the other two
experiments reviewed here, weaknesses in the methodology temper
such conclusions. The failure to ensure that subjects were not
merely successful on their first attempt at the problem but had
actually mastered the problem more critically means that there are
only the slimmest grounds for claiming this experiment as evidence
against the role of state-space structure in determining transfer
effects. It is clear that these experiments do not allow for any
firm conclusions to be drawn about expertise factors in the solving
of these problems.
In conclusion then, work frcm the field of AI has provided us with
analyses of both general problem solving skill and expertise of a
more domain specific sort. On formal grounds alone, there sears to
be a strong case for believing that general problem solving
expertise may be very much more difficult to analyse in
psychological terms than expertise of a more domain-specific sort*
On the other hand the attempts that have been made in this area to
investigate domain specific expertise experimentally, have failed
to meet even minimal methodological standards set by the best
psychological research on transfer.
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This dees not mean to say however that the AI approach must be
abandoned. On the contrary, this research has provided us with a
very usable framework for analysing problem structure formally, and
thus defining problem classes, without which a study of domain
specific expertise cannot get off the ground. Rather than give up
this framework, it would seem more prudent to import sane of the
wisdan of the psychological studies of transfer into this task
donain, and to use a synthesis of psychological and formal
approaches as a lever to tease apart the two notions of expertise
which have been so persistently confounded in the experimental
literature. The experiments reported in the chapter that follows
are just such an attempt.
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CHAPTER THREE
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF STATE SPACE TRANSFER
This chapter reports two experiments with state space problems
designed to assess whether, under proper experimental conditions,
it is possible to generate seme form of expertise in this problem
domain, and secondly to investigate what kind of expertise this
might be.
Experiment 1: Isomorphic and Non-Isomorphic Transfer Compared.,
In the first experiment subjects are presented with 8 state space
problems to solve. On the basis of a state space analysis, these 8
problems form two sets. 4 of the problems are isomorphs of the ToH
and hence all have the same state space structure. Thus each of
the 4 problems in this set are of the same type modulo their
state-space analysis. The other 4 problems are not of the same
type. Each of the problans in this set has a different state-space
structure. In examing transfer effects in this multiple problem
domain it is hoped that two things will emerge.
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Firstly, by using this somewhat larger number of problems than has
previously been used, clear evidence of some form of transfer
effects will emerge. These will be indexed by a reduction in
solution time and moves to solution. Secondly, in examining the
domain of problems over which such transfer is observed, it is
hoped that it will be possible to infer whether such transfer is
underwritten by dcmain specific expertise as Luger envisages, or
whether seme more general form of expertise is involved. If it
is the former, we would expect transfer effects to be limited to
the isomorphic set of problems. If the latter is involved, we
would expect transfer effects to extend over both sets of problems.
Method
The Problems
It was felt that 4 problems per set would allow a sufficiently
detailed transfer profile to emerge, consequently 4 isomorphic
versions of the Tower of Hanoi (ToH) were designed. These will
hereafter be referred to as the Iso-set. A contrastive set of
Non-iscmorphic problems were also designed. This set, hereafter
referred to as the Non-iso set comprised of the Missionaries and
Cannibals problem (MC), a version of the two pails problem called
the Sugar Refineries (SR), a version of the 3-Nickels and Dimes
problem called the Shuntyard (SY) and a version of the farmyard
problem (FY). The original versions of all of these problems are
described in Goldin and McClintock (1980) and details of the
particular tasks used here are included as Appendix A. All of the
non-iso problems are distinct modulo their state-space
decomposition and all are distinct from the dbH isomorphs. All of
the problems are one-person problems and were presented on wooden
boards along with the necessary story context.
Subjects
The subjects for this experiment were lst-year undergraduates
attending Psychology I lectures at the University of Edinburgh and
who volunteered to act as subjects. They were not paid for their
services. Subjects of both sexes took part in the experiment.
There were 16 subjects, 8 in each of the experimental groups.
Design and Procedure
The two 4-problem sets were presented to both groups of subjects
but the order of presentation of the two sets was counterbalanced
across the two groups as in table 3.1.1a. The order of
presentation of the 4 problems within each of the problem sets was
also counterbalanced for each of the groups. Thus for each cell of
table 3.1.1a the order of presentation of the problems was
counterbalanced as in table 3.1.1b. Consequently of the 4
problems in each set each problem was solved in each of the 8
possible positions of presentation by seme subjects.
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Table 3.1.1a. Design of Experisent 1
first problem set second problem set
Group 1 ISOMORPHIC WON-ISOMORPHIC
Group 2 NON-ISOMORPHIC ISOMORPHIC
Table 3.1.1b. Counterbalancing of probleis within cells.
subgroups order of presentation
n=2 PI P2 P3 P4
NIIC P2 P3 P4 PI
n=2 P3 P4 Pi P2
n = 2 F'4 PI P2 F'3
Subjects were required to solve each of the 8 problems once only
and were encouraged to solve the problems as quickly as was
consistent with not making unnecessary errors. Subjects were
presented with the problems one at a time and were not told how
many problems they would be asked to solve. Before commencing each
problem the subject had the story context associated with that
problem read to him and then read the story for himself. The
subjects were not informed about the formal characteristics of the
problems. During each subject's problem solving the experimenter
recorded the number of moves made by the subject as well as the
time taken to solve each of the problems.
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Results
The mean solution times for both groups solving each set. of
problems (ie. the means corresponding to the cells of table 3.1ola)
are presented in table 3.1.2.
■first problem set second problem set
Group 1 ! I,NI ) 162 " 132
Group 2(NI,I) 326 150
Table 3.1.2. Cciparison between groups of lean solution tise (seconds) for
each prcblei set.
An analysis of variance on these data ( BMDP P2V ) revealed a
significant effect of group (F^ ^ = 6.64; p = 0.0219) and problem
set (F^ 6.19; p = 0.0261), and a significant group by set
interaction (F^ = 9.61; p = 0.0078 ), and a further analysis of
group effects for each set revealed a significant effect of group
for the first set only (F^ ^ = 10.80; p = 0.0054), there was no
difference between the groups on the second set of problems (F^ ^
= 1.26; p = 0.2803). These results suggest firstly, that the
non-iso set considered as a whole when solved by naive subjects is
significantly more difficult than the iso set. However it appears
that experience of solving the iso set significantly reduced the
difficulty of the non-iso set when solved subsequently. This is
supported by further analyses of variance which showed a
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significant difference between problem sets when solved by group 2
( non-iso -> iso ), ( 7 =13.93; p = 0.0100), but not when
solved by group 1 ( iso -> non-iso ) (F1 ? = 0.27; p = 0.6101).
Thus there is an asymmetry between the two groups. Experience on
the iso set transfers positively to the solution of the non--iso
problems but the converse is not true, experience on the non-iso
problems does not appear to transfer to the iso set.
Turning now to examination of transfer effects within each of the
cells of table 3.1.2a, figure 3.1.1 presents the mean solution
times to problems within each of the the cells of table 3.1.1.
Figure 3.1.1 Solution Tiie (sees) as a function of nuiber of
probleis solved. Problea 5 aarks the start of a net. proble. set
for both groups (non-iso'si gp.l, iso'si gp 2)
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While it appears from an examination of this figure that, there are
quite large inter-set effects, in fact an analysis of variance on
these data reveal no significant effect of practice within each set
(F^ 21 - 1-77; p = 0.1839). This suggests there is a large amount
of variance attributable to the individual problems that go to make
up the means for each set. Figure 3.1.2 a&b, presents an analysis
of mean solution times as a function of position of presentation













US {S3 ~ _
Oia Spgg6
5=g E=3 PE=3 iff ||5 !=S
0-m L-2i.i
12 3 4 12 3 4



















\7to HBS 3 1
i • ■ — u
e i±i y
o_
BS E5| m 11 gj 1
lr
1 2 3 4 i 2 3 4





Figure 3.1.2 Solution Uses (sees) For the individual probleas
•aking up the ISOMORPHIC set (3.1.2a) and the NON-ISOMORPHIC set
(3.1.2b), as a Function oF position oF presentation.
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As can be seen there are striking differences between the problems
and an analysis of variance revealed a significant, effect of
problem (Fg -^g = 13.8; p < 0.0001 ), a significant effect of set
position ( F^ g = 79.3; p < 0.0001) and a problem by set. position
interaction ( Fg = 10.3; p = 0.0004) suggesting that the large
differences between the individual problems is reduced as a
function of practice. A Scheffe test for post-hoc comparisons
(Hayes 1976), indicates that the effect of problem is attributable
to one problem alone - the MC problem (problem 3 in fig. 3.1.2).
This problem is more difficult than all other problems at set
position 1 (p < 0.05), but this difference is lost at set position
2. In fact, at set position 2 no single problem is significantly
more difficult than any other.
These results suggest that the inter-set effects of group 1 can. be
re-interpreted as a progressive decline in the difficulty of one
problem alone (the MC problem) as a function of practice. This
interpretation is supported by a consideration of the solution
times for each of the 8 problems as a function of position of
presentation as in figures 3.1.3 a&b (overleaf)
As can be seen in contrast to the initial suggestions of no
inter-set effects it can be seen that there are quite dramatic
transfer effects for certain problems. In particular the MC
problem shews a quite marked monotonic reduction in solution time
as a function of position of presentation. T-test on these data, for
the MC problem alone show a significant difference in solution time
between positions ( 1+2 ) versus ( 3+4 ), ( p < 0.05 ) but not for
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Figure 3.1,3a. Solution tine (seconds) tor the individual probleis that sake















Figure 3.1.3b. Solution tiae (seconds) for the individual probleas that nake
up isomorphic problea set as a function of position of presentation of each
problea.
positions (5+6) versus (7+8), (p > 0.05). A- simple linear
regression shews this decrease in solution time for the MC problem
to be linear across positions (r = 0.73; p < 0.05). There are no
similar effects for the only problem approaching MC in difficulty
namely the SR problem, (although fig. 3.1.3a does show seme
indication of inter-set effects for this problem ). This suggests
that the transfer obtained in this experiment is limited to a
single difficult problem and that the best predictor of transfer is
simply the number of previous problems solved irrespective of the
structural characteristics of those problems. As can be seen from
figure 3.1.3b there are no similar effects for the iso problems.
While experience on the iso set seems to improve performance on
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the non-iso MC problem there appears to be no improvement across
the iso- set as would have been predicted by Luger. The one
possible exception is the relatively difficult 'rockets' problem
which showed sane (non-significant) reduction over the iso set-
It would appear that the Formal taxonomy of Iso versus non-iso is
not useful for predicting either task difficulty or transfer
effects as indexed by solution time. A consideration of moves- to
-solution provides a similar profile.
Since the minimum number of moves to solution varies amongst the
eight problems used in this experiment, a corrected moves total, was
used in the analysis. This was derived as the difference between
the actual moves-to-solution observed and the length of the minimum
solution path for a given problem. Thus a subject who solved the
ToH problem in 25 moves would obtain a corrected score of 25-15,
ie. 10.
Figure 3.1.4 (overleaf) presents the corrected moves total as a
function of problem set and number of probiens solved within each
set. As can be seen there is little evidence for group differences
or transfer and an analysis of variance revealed no significant
effect of group ( F^ ^ =0.04; p = 0.8438 ) or problem set ( F^ ^
= 1.81; p = 0.2004 ) or practice within each set (F^ gg = 0.88; p =
0.5221).
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Figure 3.1.4. Corrected loves total as a function of nunber of
probleis solved. Problei 5 narks the start of a new problei set
for both groups.
Figure 3.1.5 a&b, (overleaf) presents corrected moves data for each
of the 8 problems as a function of practice. Once again there is
little evidence of transfer and the differences between individual
problems is large. An analysis of variance on these data revealed a
significant effect of problem ( F^ ^ ~ 9.43; p < 0.0001 ), but no
significant effect of practice ( F^ ^ = 3.43; p - 0.1134 ), and a
problem by practice interaction which just fails to reach
significance ( F7 42 ~ 2.17; p = 0.0563 ). For an analysis of the
ismarphic problems in isolation there is a significant effect of
problem (Fg ^g = 4.23; p = 0.0198 ) but no effect of practice
(F^ g = 2.98; p = 0.1351 ), or a position by problem interaction
- 60 -
(F 3 is =2.9; p = 0.0581 ). Similarly for the non-iscmorphic
problem considered in isolation there was a significant effect of
problem ( F3 = 8.94; p = 0.0008 ), but no effect of practice
(F^ g =2.63; p = 0.1559 ), or a practice by problem interaction
(F3 18 = 0,87; p = °-4739 )•
Figure 3.1.5a. Corrected loves total For individual problems of isomorphic
prables set as a function of position of presentation of each problei.
era-.
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Figure 3.1.5b. Corrected total aoves for individual probleas of non isomorphic
problei set as a function of position of presentation of each problea.
These results suggest that any effects of transfer obtained in the
solution time data are not accompanied by significant reductions in
the moves to solution. Nevertheless by inspection of figure
3.1.5b, it is clear that once again the MC problem appears to be
more difficult than the other problems and does show seme slight
indication of improvement with practice. What is perhaps most
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noteworthy is that once again there is no suggestion of transfer
within the isomorphic problems and indeed there was a. significant
effect of problem for this set considered in isolation even though
the problans share the same move structure, thus task-structure
does not predict problem difficulty. There is certainly no
indication for any of the problems that the number of moves to
solution approaches a MSP.
Discussion
On the basis of Luger's approach to problem solving, these state
space problems might have been expected to be good candidate
problems for a study of domain-specific expertise. The state space
analysis provides for a means of defining task domains in a way
which Luger considers to have seme psychological significance, a
position supported by Luger's own empirical work. However the
results of this experiment offer no support for Luger's hypothesis.
The large and approximately monotonic improvement in solution time
across problem sets, together with the failure to obtain any
corresponding improvement across isomorphic problems testifies to
the failure of this hypothesis. These findings suggest that the
transfer effects are underwritten not by domain specific expertise
as envisaged by Luger, but rather by expertise of a more general
sort.
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The mechanism responsible for the general transfer obtained here is
not easy to discern. It is clear that it is not simply an
improvement in seme GPS heuristic such as means-end analysis since
if this were the case, transfer across all problems including the
iscmorphic set would havee been expected. But the fact that only
the most difficult problems show any transfer and that difficulty
is not correlated with structural complexity seerts to offer sane
clue.
The fact that seme problems are more difficult than others even
when the problems have the same structure (cf the differences in
the difficulty observed across the ToH tasks in this study and the
significant problem effects of Luger and Bauer), seems good
evidence that a major part of the problems solving task lies in the
contextual embedding of a problem as distinct from its structural
characteristics. In Newell and Simon's terms constructing an
appropriate problem space seems to be more difficult for sane
contextual embeddings than others. This is strongly supported by
the work of Hayes and Simon (1976) who, using the ToH task, found
that systematic manipulation of the story context of the problems
affected not only task difficulty but also the likelihood of
transfer between two problems of the same structural type.
One of the most striking features of the two most difficult
problems, namely MC and SR, is that subjects attempting to solve
these problems are frequently led by the story context into making
certain assumptions about the nature of the task that are
incompatible with the actual solution path they are required to
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produce. For example subjects tend not to 'trust' the cannibals to
row the boat across the river unattended by missionaries (cf
Thcmas 1974). Unfortunately there are states in the solution path
frcm which no progress can be made without allowing two cannibals
to row the boat across the river. Likewise the subjects tend to
represent this problem as a 'ferrying problem' and consequently
expect that one person will be in the boat at all times ferrying
the others across and that the pattern of moves will be 'two
across, one back... and so on'. Both of these assumptions are
violated by the actual solution path subjects are required to make.
Similarly for the SR problem it is clear that sane subjects view
this problem as an 'addition' problem rather than a 'subtraction'
problem. That is, most subjects quickly find a means of obtaining
2 tons of sugar simply by snptying the full 5 ton container into
the empty 3 ton container. Faced with having 2 tons and needing 4,
subjects try and find sane means of keeping the 2 tons they already
have 'safe' while repeating the process to get another 2 and hence
4. With only the two containers at their disposal this is not
possible. The correct solution path requires the subjects to use
the 2 tons they have to produce a 1 ton space by partially filling
the 3 ton container, filling this space frcm the full 5 ton
container to produce 4 tons directly ( 5-1 = 4 ).
While not all subjects ccme to these problems with such erroneous
assumptions it is clear from informal reports taken at the end of
testing that some subjects do, (usually those that have the most
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difficulty), and this might account for the high variance on these
problems. This effect of context might be termed contextual
error-producing factors, and has much in common with the suggestion
of Schulz (1963) that much of problem solving can be usefully
regarded as the negative transfer of previously valid hypotheses.
It may be that subjects solving problems with these error factors
become aware of the need to avoid making such 'common-sense'
assumptions, and it may be that avoiding such reliance on context,
forms the basis of the general transfer effects obtained here.
One possible means of testing these conjectures would be to examine
individual move latencies on these problems, predicting that the
moves which required a violation of these expectations would take
the most time to be carried out, and that move latencies on these
critical states would reduce as a function of the number of such
states solved. But as Greeno (1974) has shown, subjects do not
solve these problems in a move- by- move fashion, rather they use
a good deal of look-ahead, contemplating possible moves before they
are reached. Thus it would not be possible to interpret move
latencies as reflecting the difficulties associated with the actual
move being carried out.
In the absence of such a possibility one prediction that could at
least be made is that difficult problems containing these
error-producing contexts will produce the most positive transfer to
other difficult problems with similar error producing contexts and
scire experiments associated with this hypothesis are reported in
appendix B along with replications of the basic findings reported
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here and in the following experiment.
Another possible means of addressing this issue and one that
finesses the problems mentioned above is to take the simple
expedient of asking subjects to make verbal protocol reports
explaining why they make the moves they do and why they reject
others. There has been much research using protocol reports to
allow the experimenter to identify moves which a subject is
considering, but there has been little effort dedicated to asking
subjects why they carry out the moves they do. This will be
investigated as part of the next experiment.
While these suggestions perhaps offers seme account of the general
transfer obtained in this experiment, it will not in any simple way
account for the failure to replicate the isomorphic transfer
obtained by Luger and Bauer. If anything, it might have been
thought that the benefits of overcoming the counter-productive
effects of context would have been greatest in the case of problems
with identical structures. Clearly we must look further for an
explanation of this failure.
Luger argues that one good index of structurally mediated problem
solving is the occurrence of minimum path solutions, ie. solutions
in which the goal state is reached frcm the start state in the
minimum number of moves possible. It is clear frcm the moves
analyses presented here that subjects solving the isomorphic
problem set in this experiment were not converging on minimum
solution paths. On the other hand subjects solving the MC and SR
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problem did show solution paths very close to the minimums. This
is not surprising since a consideration of the state spaces for
these two problems (cf appendix A) reveals that if a subject is to
provide a solution at all, then such a solution must be in the
minimum number of moves possible. There are no non-minimal
solution paths available to subjects in these problems, there are
only forward and backward moves along this minimum path. In
contrast, there are many non-minimum paths for the ToH problem.
On this basis it might be argued that subjects solving the MC and
SR problems are forced to search out minimum paths, but they are
not required to do so for the ToH problems. Thus subjects solving
the iscmorphs may have simply failed to utilise structural
invariances in order to improve their solutions. Instead they may
have been content to produce any path provided it was a solution
and required a minimum of cognitive effort. If this were so then
the reason for the failure to obtain isomorphic transfer is
precisely because subjects are not required to actually use
structural invariances in order to build up seme domain specific
expertise.
On a reconsideration of Luger and Bauer's results it was discovered
that there was a procedural difference between their study and the
one reported here, and one that is pertinent to the above
explanation. It was found that Luger and Bauer had not simply
asked their subjects to solve each of the two problans once. They
had in fact used a criterion of mastery procedure. Subjects in
their experiment were given one problem which they were required to
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solve repeatedly until they had produced a minimum solution path in
less than 90 seconds. Only when they had achieved this criterion
were they allowed to continue on to the next problem which they
again solved to criterion.
Clearly the use of such a criterion forces the subject to search
for solutions based on the structural characteristics of the
problem, in a way in which the subjects in this experiment were not
required to do. It may be then that the use of such criteria,
requiring as it does that the subject produces an expert solution
on each problem before going on to subsequent problems, is a
necessary pre-requisite for the occurrence of isomorphic transfer
as obtained by Luger and Bauer.
In experiment 2, performance of subjects under this criterion is
compared with that of subjects solving problems under a shallow
exposure condition of the sort used in this experiment.
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Experiment 2: Minimum Solution Paths and Isomorphic Transfer
In this experiment, two groups of subjects solve six ToH problems.
One group solves each of the problems to a minimum solution path
criterion, the other group is merely required to solve each problem
twice. Both groups then go on to solve two non-isomorphic
problems, the MC and the SR problem. If indeed it is the case that,
the failure to obtain isomorphic transfer in experiment 1 was
because subjects in that experiment were not required to use
structurally mediated problem solving methods then, in this
experiment, we would expect to find significant isomorphic transfer
for the criterion group only.
It has been suggested that the development of this form of domain
specific expertise leads to a concomitant loss in expertise of the
more general sort obtained in experiment 1. This view has been put
forward by Anzai and Simon (1979) for example, and it can be seen
as stemming directly from the trade-off between generality and
power highlighted by GPS (see chapter 2). This of course may not
be an inevitable consequence of growing expertise for humaan
subjects. It could be for example, that if subjects 'en route' to
developing domain specific strategies, also gain seme expertise in
more general procedures such as 'means-end analysis 'then seme
residual of this expertise might ranain for use on other unrelated
problems.
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The two non-isomorphic problems are included in this experiment as
an attempt to assess the extent to which domain specific expertise
pre-onpts transfer of a more general sort. But the inclusion of
such non-isomorphic tasks is only a rather crude measure. If
subjects show both isomorphic and non-isomorphic transfer it will
be necessary to have a means of factoring out domain specific and
more general components of the expertise. In an attempt to obtain a
richer source of information about the expertise factors involved
here, the method of protocol reporting is used in this experiment
in addition to the more conventional measures of solution time and
moves to solution.
Protocol reporting has been used with these kind of problems in
order to obtain information about the kinds of moves that, subjects
consider making in their attempts to solve these problems. It
was this kind of protocol data that Newell and Simon used to
compare human problem solvers with GPS (see chapter 2). In this
experiment however, the use of protocol reporting is slightly more
I
ambitious. Instead of merely asking subjects to 'think aloud'
about the moves they make, rather subjects in this experiment are
asked to introspect about the problem solving strategies they are
using, how they are thinking about the problems, whether they
recognise subproblem invariances, whether they recognise any
similarities between the problems and so on.
By using protocol techniques in this way it is hoped that a more
detailed profile of expertise will emerge and one that not only
distinguishes between dcmain specific expertise and expertise of a
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more general sort but also provides seme information as to the
psychological mechanisms involved in such expertise.
Method
Problems
The 4 ToH problems used in experiment 1 are again used here and in
addition 2 new versions of the problem, the 'harbour' problem and
the 'art galleries' problem (see appendix A) to make 6 versions of
the 4-ring ToH problem in all. Along with these problems all
subjects solved the two difficult non-iscmorphic problems from
experiment 1, namely the MC problem and the SR problem.
Subjects
The subjects in this experiment were 23 undergraduates of Edinburgh
University of both sexes attending 1st and 2nd year psychology
lectures. Subjects were not paid for their services.
Design
The 6 ToH problems were presented to all subjects in a
counterbalanced order as in experiment 1. Thus all S problems were
solved by seme subjects in each of the 6 possible positions of
presentation. This counterbalancing meant that for each group of
subjects there were 6 subgroups solving the problems in different
orders of presentation. It was hoped that 2 subjects from each
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group would make up each subgroup, but owing to illness 1 subject
is missing from the shallow group solving the problems in the order
'galleries, cakes, rockets, lots, computers, harbours. ' Subjects
then went on to solve the 2 non-isomorpic problems in the fixed
order of MC followed by SR. These were not counterbalanced since
the between-group comparison on these problems was considered to
be of primary importance.
Subjects were divided into two groups, one group (MSP, N= 12)
solved all problems to a MSP criterion which required them to
produce a minimum solution path to each problem they solved before
moving on to their next problem, unlike the Luger study there was
no time limit imposed upon the production of such a solution. The
second group were simply required to solve each problem twice
before moving on to the next problem,* they were not required to
produce a MSP or to improve their performance on their second
attempt, merely to repeat the problem. These two groups were
divided into two' subgroups, one subgroup were required to give
protocol reports about their solution method the other subgroup
were not.
Procedure
As in experiment 1 subjects were told that they would be required
to solve a few simple problems "each in the form of a board game".
They were told that their solution times and their
moves-to-solution would be recorded but that they were to solve
the problem only as quickly as was concomitant with not making
needless errors. Neither group were told that they would be
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required to solve the problems more than once, nor were they told
how many problems they would be required to solve. Protocol
subjects were however told that from time to time they would be
required to think about how they were solving the problem and write
their thoughts down on a piece of paper. Reports were required
after subjects had solved their 1st, 3rd 6th, and 7th problems. On
these occasions the subjects were asked to think about their
problem solving method and in particular they were asked to
consider what parts of the problem they found difficult and why,
and what they had learned about the problem that allowed them to
overcome these difficulties, and whether they could formulate any
useful hints that would help other people solve the problems more
easily. They were not asked to recall specific moves nor were they
informed of the structural relationships between problems.
After their first attempt at each of the 8 problems subjects in the
shallow group were asked to solve the problem again, subjects in
the MSP group, provided they had not produced a minimum solution
path, were asked to solve the problem again, this time trying to
reduce the number of moves they made. They were asked to do this
each time they failed to produce a solution in the minimum number
of moves possible (15 for the TbH problem, 11 for the MC problem
and 6 for the SR problem). As in experiment 1 the experimenter
recorded the time taken on each attempt at each of the 8 problems
as well as the number of moves to solution. Each experimental




Table 3.2.1 presents the mean time, moves and number of attempts at
solution over all 6 ToH problems solved by the two groups. This
table makes it clear that the two groups of subjects differed very
little in terms of the overall level of experience that they
received with the ToH problems.
time moves attempts
Shallow Group 107S 270 12
MSP Group 1225 261 12
Table 3.2.1 Coiparisan between groups of total tiie (secsl,
toves, and attempts to solve all £ ToH problems
T-tests on these data revealed no significant group differences on
any measure (time: P>0.05, moves: P>0.05, attempts: P>0.05,). But
despite the overall similarity in the level of experience that
these two groups recieved on the ToH problems; the transfer
profiles show striking differences. Figure 3.2.1 (overleaf)
presents the mean total solution time for subjects solving the 6
ToH problems. As can be seen there appears to be a large reduction
in solution time as a function of practice for both groups.
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Figure 3,2.1 6roup coiparisons of total solution ti«e (sees 1 as a
function of nuiber of probleis salved far the 6 ToH probleis: ALL
ATTEMPTS at each probles.
An analysis of variance (BMDP P2V) reveals a significant effect
of practice (Fj. = 8.44; p < 0.0001 ), but no significant effect
of group (F^ ^ = 0.30; p = 0.05899). There is however a
significant group by practice interaction ^F5X05 = 2.54; p =
0.0329). Separate analyses of variance for the two groups however
revealed a significant effect of practice for the MSP group ( F,- „
J ^ 33
=6.3; p = 0.0001 ) and the shallow group ( F5 59 = 3.5; p =
0.0080). In this experiment then in contrast to the results of
experiment 1, both groups show a significant reduction in solution
time over isomorphic problems and indeed the shallow group appear
to show a larger improvement than the msp group. However when only
the first attempt at each of the problems is considered the profile
appears somewhat different as is shown in figure 3.2.2.
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Figure 3.2.2 Group coiparisons oF solution tiie as a Function oF
nuiber oF problets solved For the 6 ToH probleis". FIRST ATTEMPT
ONLY at each problei.
Here the MSP group show a greater improvement in solution time than
the shallow group. This suggests that the improvement in solution
time for the shallow group is largely attributable to intra-
problem transfer while the improvement on the MSP group is largely
attributable to inter- problem transfer. An analysis of variance
on these data while showing a significant effect of practice
^F5,105 = P = 0-0011 ), did not unfortunately show any effect
of group (F^ 21 = 0.48; p = 0.4979) or any group by practice
effects (F,- =0.53; p = 0.75). Despite these non-significant
group effects on solution time the profile for the moves -to-
solution data support this interpretation.
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Figure 3.2.3 presents total moves -to- solution data as a function
of practice on the 6 ToH problems.
Figure 3.2.3 6roup coiparisons of total loves as a Function oF
nunber oF probleis solved For the 6 ToH problens". ALL ATTEMPTS at
each problei.
Here the profile is quite different for the two groups. For the
shallow group there appears to be no systematic improvement with
practice, while for the MSP group there is a gradual reduction in
the number of moves to solution. An analysis of variance on these
data reveal a significant effect of practice (F,_ = 4.41; p =
0.0011 ), no significant effect of group ( F^ ^ = 0.05; p = 0.8 ),
but a significant group by practice interaction ( F^^Q^=4.2;p
=0.002 ). Separate analyses of variance on the two groups
revealed a significant effect of practice for the MSP group (FĴ ^ JJ
= 5.8; p = 0.0002 ), but not for the shallow group ( = 0.66;
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p = 0.65 ). These results suggest that while the shallow group
show an improvement in solution time, in contrast to the MSP group,
this is not underwritten by any reduction in the number of moves to
solution.
An analysis of the moves data in terms of the percentage of
subjects reaching the MSP criteria as a function of practice
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Figure 3.2.4. 6roup coiparisons of the Percentage oF subjects
producing MSP solutions as a Function oF the nuiber oF atteipts at
each oF the 6 ToH probleis.
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AlS can be seen by inspection, once again there are striking
differences between the two groups both in terms of intra- and.
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inter- problem effects. The data for the MSP group indicate that
on their early problems subjects took many attempts to reach
criterion, with most subjects taking 4 attempts or more to reach
criterion on their very first problem. But by the 6th problem over
90% of subjects solved this novel problem to criterion on their
first attempt (In fact only 1 subject failed to do so)„ Thus for
this group there is an obvious shift from intra- problem transfer
to inter- problem transfer as a function of practice, to such an.
extent that the inter- problem component completely abolishes any
intra- problen effects after five problems have been solved.
In contrast the shallow group show little evidence of the
development of minimum path solutions. There is seme indication of
an intra- problem effect with a higher incidence of MSP solution on
the second attempt at problems but even this effect is small with
the frequency of MSP solution exceeding 50% on only one problem,.
There is certainly no indication whatsoever of an inter- problem
effect. It would appear then that this group in contrast to the
MSP group do not exploit the structural invariances in these
problans in any significant way.
It is argued from these results then that despite the fact that
subjects in the two groups received the same amount of exposure to
the 6 TbH problems the problem solving profiles are quite different
and that by being forced to produce a MSP solution subjects in
this condition are able to generate a high level of expertise in
the solving of these problems. So much so that after five
problems nearly all subjects could solve a completely novel problem
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perfectly on their first attempt. Subjects who do not experience
the MSP criteria do not develop such efficient problem solving
methods on these problems. If anything subjects in this group
appear to find some solution path and then repeat that path more
quickly on their second attempt at the problem. They do not appear
to show any improvement across problems. The next question is to
assess whether the expertise generated in the MSP condition
produces a marked decrement in transfer to problems with a
different structure in comparison to the shallow group.
Non-isomorphic Transfer
Table 3.2.2 presents the mean number of attempts to solve the two
non-isomorphic problems presented after the 6 ToH. Naturally the
shallow group made two attempts at each problem but it is striking
that despite the difficulty of these problems (see experiment 1)
the MSP group produced minimum solution paths to both problems in
little over a single attempt. 100% of subjects solved the SR
problem in a single attempt and 67% of subjects solved the MC
problem in a single attempt. In contrast only 50% of the
shallow-group subjects produced a minimum solution path on the SR
problem on either attempt and only 20% did so for the MC problem.
When solution time and moves to solution are considered for the two
groups on only their first attempt at the problems there appears
to be little difference in the performance of the two groups as is
indicated by table 3.2.3.
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MC SR
Shallow Group 2.0 2.0
MSP Group 1.3 1.0
Table 3.2.2 6roup coaparisons of the nuaber of atteapts taken to
solve the 2 non-isoaorphic probleas.
MC SR
moves t i me moves time
Shallow Group 18.2 350 7.6 ici'
MSP Group 18.9 o8 7 7.5
Table 3.2.3. 6roup coaparisons of the aoves and tiae (sees) to
solution for the 2 Non-isoaorphic probleas: FIRST ATTEMPT ONLY.
I
An analysis of variance on these data revealed no significant
effect of group for either moves (F-j^ 2Q = 0„03;p =0.87 ), or time
(Ff 2q = 0.02; p = 0.68).
The results of the isomorphic transfer phase suggest that the high
degree of expertise generated by the MSP group on the ToH problems
does not produce a loss in performance on subsequent non~iscmorphic
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problems at least in comparison to subjects who receive shallow
exposure to the same problems. Indeed if anything subjects in the
MSP group show a more efficient solution to these non-iscmorphic
problems if the incidence of minimum solution paths is taken as an
index of efficiency. Furthermore this higher incidence of minimum
solution paths in the MSP groups does not appear to incur penalties
in the form of longer solution times as might have been expected.
Protocol Reports
Given the moves and time analysis of the previous section it is of
interest to analyse the protocol reports for a number of key
features. Given the higher incidence of MSP solutions and the
inter- problem transfer of the MSP group then it should be that
this group will show a higher incidence of protocol reports that
confirm that subjects have recognised the similarity between the
isomorphic problems and also that they are attempting to solve the
problems in the minimum number of moves. This structural awareness
might also be evidenced in the type of strategies that subjects in
this group report. For example MSP solutions rely on- an
exploitation of the recursive sub-structure of the ToH problems and
consequently nay be evidenced by reports of the type referred to by
Simon (1975) such as recognising the need to " get the big disc
from the start peg to the goal peg, which means getting the other
three pegs discs to the middle peg" and so forth. These kind of
reports might contrast with subjects who report using trial and
error for example. It is also of interest to ascertain whether
subjects are sensitive to particular difficult states in these
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problems. This kind of analysis can be done both for the reports
as a whole and in terms of the protocol reports taken after varying
amounts of practice. Table 3.2.4 presents the percentage of
• 1 »
protocol reports falling into these various categon.es«.
recognise strategy report
structural
re 1 at ions
sim. diss. struc. trial
of of mediated &





SHALL. 80% 20% 50% 80% 0 0 40%
/ISP 100% 66% 85% 35% 66% 0 33%
Tabla 3.2.4. Percentage ot protocol reports tailing into the five categories.
By and large the differences are not great, particularly when, it is
noted that the total number of subjects providing reports was only
11. Both groups appear to recognise similarities between problems
but a much smaller percentage of subjects in the shallow group
actually report using such strategies. Of note also is that there
was a much higher incidence of trial and error reports from the
shallow group, and a much higher incidence of recognising difficult
points of certain problems in the MSP condition. Such reports took
the form of statsnents that suggested that the layout of certain of
the ToH boards made solutions more difficult, and that for the MC
problem, the requirement to bring passengers back made the problem
more difficult. The category termed 'other strategies' refers to
such reports as "the thing to remember is plan ahead"„
See appendix D for details of the categorisation.
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While such an analysis of the protocol reports is gross, the
differences between the groups is in the expected direction, with
the MSP group showing a greater awareness of stuctural factors and
less frequent use of non-directed strategies such as trial and
error. However it is striking that a high percentage of shallow
group subjects show sane awareness of the similarities between
problems. It is disappointing however, in the light of the moves
analysis that there vas not some indication in the protocols of
subjects' sensitivity to the procedural constraints under which
they were working.
Table 3.2.5 presents the same categories as a function of practice.
But given the somewhat disappointing global analysis above it is
perhaps unsurprising that table 3.2.5 is unrevealing.
recognise
structural































— 20% 80% 0 0 o
-- 40% 20% 0 0 40%
20% 20% 0 0 0
0 0 40% 0 0 0
-- 607. 20% 0 0 20%
-- 60% 0 40% 0 0
80% 0 20% 0 0
60% 20% 20% 0 0 0
Table 3.2.5. Percentage of protocol reports falling into the five categoriesas a function of practice.
Several points however are worth noting. Firstly there is a high
incidence of trial and error reports particularly in the early
protocols. It is also worth pointing out here that subjects tend
to report trial and error in response to their first rather than
subsequent attempts on a given problem. For the MSP group it is
clear that reports of structure mediated strategies appear only
after sore experience with the problems despite the fact that
subjects appear to recognise similarities between the problems
early on.
This recognition of similarity did not occur quite so early for' the
shallow group subjects. Finally for both groups although there is
a move away from trial and error solutions over the ToH problems
occurrence of the non-iscmorphic MC problem immediately preceding
report number 4 seems to have produced a tendency to revert to
trial and error especially for the shallow group.
These reports are broadly consistent with the view that subjects in
both groups recognise the structural affinities that exist between
th?ToH problems but that this happens more readily in the MSP group
and this group has a higher tendency to utilise such knowledge in
developing structurally mediated strategies.
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Discussion
The results of experiment 2 confirm the hypothesis that. MSP criteria
are necessary in order to obtain the structurally mediated transfer
effects postulated by Luger and Bauer. While shallow exposure to
these tasks can, under certain circumstances, produce an improvement
in solution time across isomorphic problems, such improvement is not
accompanied by a shift towards optimal solutions based on the
exploitation of invariance. This suggests that a high degree of
expertise within a single problem is necessary for such isomorphic
transfer to occur. The fact that both shallow and MSP subjects in
this experiment received the same amount of overall exposure to the
6 problems suggests that such expertise is not just attributable to
a greater exposure to the problems. Rather such expertise is a
response to experimental procedures requiring a search for optimal
solution paths.
It must be noted hcwever that even with such stringent procedures as
the MSP criterion in operation, changes in the surface structure
form of the isomorphic problems still presents seme difficulty for
subjects in the early stages of learning. It is clear from the
comparison of intra- and inter- problem effects in this condition,
that subjects must not only learn appropriate structurally mediated
solutions, but that they must also learn to recognise the problem
domain for which such methods are effective. This implies that, high
intra-problem learning in the early stages followed by inter-problem
experience in the later stages would be the most efficient procedure
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for generating the isomorphic transfer obtained here. This
conclusion is consistent with the learning set work of Harlow and
others reported in chapter one.
Cne factor of importance to emerge from the protocol analysis in
this experiment is that subjects in both groups seem to recognise
similarities between isomorphic problems but only the MSP group go
on to exploit such similarities in their search for optimal
solutions. This difference may be attributable to the fact that
although the shallow group are given enough inter- problem
experience to be able to recognise such similarities, they are not.
given enough intra- problem experience to be able to develop
effective procedures for producing minimum solution paths. An
alternative explanation and the one preferred here, is that subjects
in the shallow group have the option of developing such solutions
but the constraints that the shallow procedure imposes on these
subjects does not make it a sensible option for them. It is
aertainly the case that the differences between the two groups seem
to reflect the differences in the procedural constraints they
experienced.
The MSP group were required to solve each problem repeatedly until
they produced a minimum solution path, thus it was to their
advantage to find, as quickly as possible, a solution method that
would allow them to exploit similarities between problems and thus
reduce the number of attempts they made at each problem. In
contrast the shallow group were required to solve each problem twice
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irrespective of whether or not they produced a minimum solution path
on their first attempt. Thus it was not to their advantage to invest
resources in searching for optimal solutions, they would do well
simply to find any solution as quickly as possible on their first
attempt and then to repeat it as quickly as possible on their second
attempt.
If this view is correct, then it indicates that subjects are not
only sensitive to problem structure but also to the functional
requirements that the experimental procedure imposes upon them.
Subjects not only learn about structural invariances present in a
problem domain but also functional invariances, namely, what it is
that the experimenter requires them to do with the problems. Thus
contrary to Luger's approach it is inadequate to define a problem
solving task solely in terms of its structural characteristics. Any
theory of problem solving based on such an assumption is an.
oversimplification. In contrast to the expertise indexed by
isomorphic transfer, this sensitivity to functional goals is
presumably an aspect of expertise of a more general sort. It may be
this more general component of expertise that is responsible for the
performance fo the MSP group on the non-isomorphic problems. Here
their sensitivity to the need to produce a MSP solution led them to
keep restarting the problem from the beginning as soon as they
recognised they had strayed from the minimum solution path, and
before they had actually solved the problem from beginning to end.
An interesting question that arises from this view is what kind, of
problem solving behaviour would have been observed if subjects had
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been fully informed as to the procedural criteria in operation in
this experiment? It nay be for example, that a major 'problem' for
subjects is in fact deciding what procedural criteria are in
operation and thus what problem solving methods would be
appropriate. If subjects had been informed in this way then quite
different profiles might have emerged. For example, a subject, told
he was to solve 6 structurally identical problems each to a MSP
criterion, might invest a great deal of effort in finding an. MSP
solution on his first problem, he would probably consider each move
very carefully avoiding moves he thought would take him off the
minirrum path. He might even avoid making any moves at all until he
had worked out the minimum solution path in his head.
At present, the subjects in this experiment could be considered as
being in a situation similar to subjects in animal learning
experiments wherein extensive pre-training is used to enable the
experimenter to signal what it is he wants the animal to do. As
Gagne (1964) points out, given the apparent importance of functional
criteria, it is surprising that there have not been more studies
that have manipulated procedural variables such as the kind of
instructions given to subjects and so on.
Taken together, these experiments have demonstrated the usefulness
of multiple-problem transfer paradigms as a means of identifying
expertise factors in problem solving. But what the results imply
about the psychological mechanisms involved in such expertise is
less clear. This will be taken up in the general discussion.
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General Discussion of the State Space Experiments
These two experiments demonstrate that it is possible to obtain
quite reliable transfer effects within a laboratory setting provided
that proper experimental procedures are used. All of the main
effects reported here have been replicated and are reported in
appendix B. The experiments have used transfer effects to
distinguish empirically between the two forms of expertise discussed
in the review chapters. They provide evidence both for the more
general form of expertise and the dcmain specific sort, and slow how
the kind of transfer generated depends on the kinds of experimental
procedure used. The general expertise factor tapped by the
procedures used in experiment 1, produced only a weak form of
transfer when compared with the dcmain specific expertise generated
by the procedures of experiment 2. Indeed this expertise produced
100% transfer after 5 problems had been solved. This dramatic
transfer effect, highlighting as it does both the intra- and inter-
problem components of expertise, provides the basis for a working
definition of dcmain specific expertise, namely; that which renders
formally equivalent problems psychologically equivalent.
The fact that the kind of transfer observed depends largely on the
kind of experimental procedures used is an important one. This fact
explains why previous research (Luger and Bauer, Reed et al, Thcmas
op cit) produced such inconsistent results. More importantly, it is
possible to see that because of this fact, the theories developed
on the basis of this research are limited in their explanatory power
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to phenomena generated by that research. In particular, the fact
that these other studies concentrated solely on the train-and-test
transfer paradigm, means that their explanations emphasise the
intra-problem aspects of expertise at the expense of the
inter-problem components.
For example, Luger's theoretical emphasis is to explain the
performance on a single TbH problem in terms of the acquisition of
knowledge about sub-problem invariances as formalised in the state
space graph. Indeed, by looking in detail at subjects' move patterns
on rqpeated attempts at a single ToH problem, he has shown that
their move-patterns carte to mirror the sub-problem invariances as
their experience with the problem grows (Luger and Steen 1981).
Luger uses transfer only as a diagnostic tool, to show that the
subjects' problem representation is at a sufficiently abstract level
to encompass knowldege about structural invariance. He does not use
transfer to examine the difficulties presented to his subjects by
changes in the surface structure forms of the problems, and he is
not concerned to explain why one version of the problem he used is
more difficult than the other.
In contrast, the multiple-problem studies reported here, are chiefly
concerned with transfer as a psychological problem; that is to say,
they seek to explain why changes in surface structure form are an
obstacle to the transfer of well-learnt problem solutions. As such,
these studies have shown that the intra-problem learning of the sort
explained by Luger, is only one part of a full account of expertise.
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They have shown that the attainment of mastery on a single problem
does not guarantee mastery of a second problem, even when that
second problem is formally equivalent, solvable by the same
strategy, and when the subject has recognised that the problems are
the same. Only when a subject has had a large amount of exposure to
different surface forms of the same problem, in addition to
demonstrating mastery within a single problem, is he able to show
100% transfer. In short, there is a significant inter-problem
component which has to be explained by a theory of expertise. Such a
theory would not be in opposition to, or in replace of, Luger's
account of intra-problem learning but in addition to, and building
onto, this account.
By considering the inter-problem component of expertise as a
process of 'translation', its relation to the infra-problem
component can easily be appreciated; Taking Luger's account of
intra-problem learning, then reaching a MSP criteria within a single
problem implies that the subject has seme problem space which allows
him to exploit the sub-problem invariances of the ToH structure. On
being presented with a second problem, he must find sarie means of
encoding the new text instructions into the same problem space. Qn.ce
he has achieved this, then he will be in a position to take
advantage of the search strategies he has already developed for that
space (Anzai and Simon 1979). If a subject shows transfer between
the two problems, it is by virtue of him having the ability to make
this translation. If a subject fails, either he does not have
translation procedures required or he does not recognise the
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problems as inter-translatable. Since in our experiment, subjects
report recognising the similarities between problems even when they
fail to show transfer, we must assume the failure is one of
translation and not recognition. Thus, the subject's growth in
expertise, is explained by gains in his ability to translate
different problems into a single underlying problem space.
Fran this outline, it is clear that the burden of explanation for an
understanding of the inter-problem component lies in an explanation
of the factors which govern how a subject ccmes to interpret new
versions of the same problem in terms of a single existing problem
space, and how this improves with experience.
But while the ToH studies reported here have been valuable in
demonstrating the need for a theory of the inter-problem canponent
of transfer, they have yielded little by way of insight into the
nature of this translation process or hew this might change as the
subject's experience grows.
The inability to generate an explanation of the inter-problem
component stems, to a large extent, from measurement difficulties
associated with the state space problems. In these tasks the major
dependant variables are the time and the number of moves taken to
move the pieces from their initial state to the goal state. In
board games of this sort, time measurements are rather gross,
involving as they do, not only thinking time, but also the time
taken to carry out the action itself. Measures of the number of
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moves are also rather gross since for example, sore subjects may
'experiment' with moves, trying possibilities they are not ccmmitted
to, while others may attempt to work everything out in their heads
before making any moves. But there is a more fundamental problem
with these variables; these variables are variables relating to the
subject's search through the problem space, they are not variables
that relate to the subject's construction of a problem space or his
translation of a new problem into that space. In short, these
variables are indices of the intra-problem component of transfer,
they tell us little about the inter-problem component.
A third measure that has been used with these tasks is verbal
protocol reporting. With the work of Newell and Simon, this has
been limited to a recording of the think aloud verbalisations of
subjects as they solve a single ToH problem In effect, this means
that the experimenters obtain data about, not only the moves the
subjects make, but also the moves they consider making but do not
make (and of course, the moves they never even consider making).
Newell and Simon's work amply demonstrates that such concurrent
verbalisations are a rich source data about a subjects search of
his problem space, once again however, they do not yield any
information about the problems of translation or construction of
that space.
In experiment 2, an attempt was made to modify Newell and Simon's
method of protocol reporting in a way that would provide such data.
Instead of asking subjects to verbalise the moves they were
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considering, they were simply asked to provide information about
whether they recognised similarities between the problems, and what
aspects of the problems they found difficult. In this way it was
hoped to find out more about how an everday understanding of the
text instructions interfered with the translation process; hew for
example, certain instructions made it difficult to recognise that
previously successful combinations of operators could be re-applied
in this new situation. But the results were disappointings by and
large, the reports did not indicate why seme problems are more
difficult than others, or in any other way elucidate the
inter-problem component. The reports did provide evidence that
subjects did recognise similarities between problems,but this was
seldom expressed in terms of sub-problem invariance. (cf appendix
D for example protocols). It seems that these problems are not
amenable to this kind of protocol reporting.
These measurement limitations reduce the usefulness of the state
space problems as candidates for the further study of inter-problem
transfer. But their suitability is reduced even further by a second
limitation: The problems do not lend themselves to a systemtatic
manipulation of surface structure, and consequently it is difficult
to generate large numbers of problems within a single type. As a
consideration of appendix A reveals, the generation of new versions
of the ToH problems is a rather haphazard affair, and many of the
instructions appear quite similar. Certainly the content of the
instructions does not vary along any clearly discernable dimension;
For example, it is not clear what there is in ccmmon between moving
lorries around streets, moving wedding cakes frcm table to table,
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and changing numbers in a computer memory. Neither is there any
principled way of manipulating the sequential structure of the task
instructions; for example, it is not clear that presenting
information about what objects on the board can be moved, before
presenting information about where they can be moved to, rather than
vice versa, is a meaningful aspect of the task instructions. In
addition to the rather unconstrained way in which the instructions
vary, there is also the fact that each of these probiens is solved
on a different board, and it seens that changes in the perceptual
characteristics of the board contribute in unexpected ways to the
difficulty of the different versions of the problem (see appendix D
for protocol evidence of this).
In all that has gone before, we have made a fundamental distinction
between the process of encoding a problem into a problem space and
the process of searching that space for a solution. It may be that
underlying the limitations of the ToH problem is the fact that,
although the process of encoding is significant for subjects, it is
not their primary problem. The state space problems are primarily
problems of SEARCH; with these problems, the subject's resources
are not taken up with understanding the task instructions they are
taken up with search of the problem space which results frcm the
encoding of task instructions. Consider a typical subject solving
the ToH problem: He may spend 4 minutes or so, moving the pieces
around the board, searching for a legal combination that gets him
frcm the start to the goal. But he will probably only spend 1 minute
reading the instructions. The majority of his problem solving
effort is taken up with searching the extant problem space, and
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physically making moves around the board. In comparison to the
problem of search, the problem of encoding is trivial.
For a proper study of the inter-problem canponents of expertise,
what is required is a problem domain in which this asymffteb^ between
encoding and search is reversed; a dcmain in which 'the problem' is
that of mapping the different surface versions onto a single problem
space, a space from which the solution follows trivially. There
are in fact several such problem domains in the psychological
literature on reasoning, and if we compare the ToH problem with one
of these, namely the transitive reasoning task, it will be
apparent that these kinds of problem offer numerous advantages over
the ToH problems for further study of inter-problem learning.
The transitive reasoning task is simply this; a subject is given two
or more statements which describe several items along seme
dimension for example : 'Alan is taller than Bob, Bob is taller
than Carl, Carl is taller than Dave'. The subject is then asked a
question relating to the premises, such as, 'Who is tallest?' or 'Is
Alan taller than Carl?'. The subject then answers the question by
providing a name such as 'Alan' or by answering yes or no.
The work of DeSoto et al (1961), Huttenlocher (1968), and Trabasso
et al (1975), to name just a few, has demonstrated that these
problons support a wide range of psychological measures. They have
used not only reaction time measures and error rates but also
protocol analysis to show that subjects solve these problems by
using the premise information to construct seme form 'spatial image'
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which reflects the relative ordering of the items. Cnce this
ordering is established then subjects can simply 'read off' the
answer to the question without the need to make chains of
inferences. So for example, the protocol reports might reveal that
a subject 'makes a mental picture of the items in a line with the
tallest one at the left, shortest at the right' and so on. When
asked 'Who is tallest?' the subject simply 'reads the left hand
name'. Once the premise information is encoded in this way any
number of questions can be answered by recourse to this simple
'look-up' procedure. Such a spatial image device constitutes, what
for Newell and Simon would be, the subject's problem space The
mapping of premise information into the image constitutes the
encoding process, and the process of 'look-up' constitutes the
search of the problem space. Using reaction time measures it is
possible to distinguish between the process of encoding and the
process of search; by measuring premise reading time we obtain an
index of encoding, by measuring question answering time we obtain an
index of search. An analysis of these different time measures shews
that, in comparison to the ToH problem, the relation of encoding to
search is reversed; question answering can take as little as 3
seconds compared with promise encoding times of 25 seconds for
five-term series problems.
In addition to the sensitivity of the psychological measures,
associated with these problems, it is a straightforward matter to
generate any number of logically equivalent problems which differ
systematically in their surface structure form. For example, it is
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possible to change not only the number of promises contained in a
problem, but also the order of presentation of the premises and the
kind of relational term used in the premises. None of these surface
structure changes affects the logical equivalence of the problems,
yet the research has shown that they affect the time taken to solve
these problems; for example; C<B,A>B takes longer to solve than
A>B,B>C. This has been taken as evidence that surface structure
variation affects the encoding process in significant ways.
Thus, research with these problems, in contrast to our experiments
with state space problems, has shown that protocol analysis can be
used to examine in sane detail, the kind of problem space a subject
uses, and also that reading time mea5can be partitioned into
those that are directly related to the process of encoding and those
related to search. But to what extent can we be sure that these
problems can be used to generate task-specific expertise of the sort
we observed in the ToH problems?
There has been seme evidence, and much conjecture, about the role of
expertise factors in the solving of these inference problems, "the
work of Quinton and Fellows (1975) for example showed that there
were marked differences in solution time between novice subjects and
more experienced subjects solving the 3-term series problem. In a
review, Johnson-Laird (1975) conjectured that discrepancies between
the findings of several researchers could be explained in terms of
the different amounts of practice they gave to their subjects. For
example he argued that Huttenlocher's spatial image strategy was a
product of novice performance on the task and that more experienced
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subjects moved away from this strategy to one based on a linguistic
(propositional) representation of the premise information of the
sort hypothesised by Clark (1969), and finally to a 'perceptual'
(syntactic) strategy which exploited invarianoes in the way in which
pranise information was presented (Wood 1978 and Quinton and Fellows
1975). Each of these three methods relies on a qualitatively
different way of representing the premise information. This view of
expertise was also adopted by Ohlsson (1980), who used the data from
these different experiments to build a A.I. model of 'the
path-to-expertise' conjectured by Johnson-Laird. These findings are
reviewed in sane detail in the chapter that follows, but this brief
outline will suffice to highlight an important difference between
the view of expertise based on these findings and that developed, in
response to our experiments with the state-space problems.
In the case of the state space tasks we argue that the subject's
problem space remains stable over practice, and that inter -problem
transfer is obtained by virtue of improvement in the process of
encoding into that space. But in the case of the inference problems
the situation is different; it would seem that subjects actually
change the kind of problem space in which they work: If a subject
shifts frcm a spatial analogue representation to a propositiona1
linguistic representation, then clearly he has shifted to a
representational device which is qualitttivly different. The
inter-problem component of transfer is not simply a matter of
improvements in encoding processes, it is a matter of quite radical
changes in the way of representing the problem domain.
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Such changes in representation have important implications for the
generality of the expertise generated in these tasks. Quinton and
Fellcws for example, argue that their expert subjects develop a
strategy which is so closely tied to the syntactic invariances in
the problems that minor changes in the surface structure would make
the strategy ineffective. So, far from being a form expertise that
renders formally equivalent problems psychologically equivalent, the
reverse seams to be the case, subjects have moved from a strategy
which oould be extended across the whole range of transitive
problems (the image device) to one which solves only a subset of
those. This view of expertise as a shift to 'shallow heuristics' is
inconsistent with the view developed in this thesis.
Thus there is a tension between the account of expertise developed
in the transitivity research and that we have developed with the
state space problems. This tension raises a number of empirical
issues. Firstly is it possible to demonstrate a form expertise more
akin to that which we have observed in the state space studies, and
will the affluent psychological measures available in this new
domain help to account for the inter-problem component of that
expertise? Secondly, how are we to reconcile this view with the
view of expertise developed by Johnson-Laird and others? If we are
to posit two qualit .tively different forms of expertise then what
are the factors that govern which kind of expertise will develop?
In the chapter that follows, the work with transitivity is reviewed
in detail and these empirical issues are assessed in the
experimental studies of chapter 5.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DOMAIN SPECIFIC EXPERTISE AND THE SOLVING
OF TRANSITIVE INFERENCE PROBLEMS
Inference as Problem Solving
Inference problems are characteristic of a problem solving task in
as much as they involve goal-directed behaviour- So for example,
in the case of transitive inference tasks, the subject is given
information in the form of a set of premises (ie. 'John is taller
than Paul, Bob is taller than John'). He then has to process this
information in response to a specific goal which is provided in the
form of a question such as 'is Bob shorter than Paul?'.
As was briefly outlined in the preceding section, the transitivity
problems are a particularly useful class of problems for the study
of inter-problem transfer. This is so for several reasons; firstly,
we can define the class in terms of the logical equivalence of its
members, and it is possible to systematically manipulate the
surface form of the problems within this logically defined class-
Take for example the two problems belcw;
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Alan is taller than Bob. Bob is taller than Carl.
Is Alan taller than Carl?
Carl is shorter than Bob. Alan is taller than Bob.
Is Carl shorter than Alan?
These two problems are logically equivalent since they both involve
the coordination of three items along a single dimension in order
to infer which of the three is the furthest along that dimension.
Yet they differ markedly in their surface structure forms. This
has been achieved by changing the order of presentation of the two
premises and the order of presentation of the items within the
first premise. A change as also been made to the order of
presentation of the items in the question.
By clanging the order of presentation of premise information in
this way 8 possible surface forms of the 3-term problem can be
generated. If 4- or 5- term problems are used then even more
versions are produced. In addition, there are 4 versions of the
comparative question (A>C? A<C?, C>A?, C<A?) yielding 32 different,
versions of the problem in all. This family can be further
extended varying the question form; Instead of a subject being
asked the 'comparative' form of the question as above he could
instead be asked the question in 'superlative' form, ie. 'Who is
tallest/shortest?', yielding a further 16 basic forms. The nature
of the relational terms used in the premises affords a further
dimension for extension.
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It should be clear then that this problem domain benefits over that
of the state-space tasks used in previous experiments with respect
to at least one criterion, namely having a large dcmain of problems
which can be systematically manipulated. As the following review
of the literature reveals, these problems offer a further
advantage; they support a varied range of psychological measures
which provide insights into the nature of the representational
mechanisms that underwrite performance in this task domain„
Psychological Mechanisms in Transitive Inference
There are major lines of research on transitive inference in both
the developmental and adult literature and in both areas there has
been much attention paid to one particular psychological mechanism,
namely the spatial image device first discussed by DeSoto et al
(1965). While there have been many other psychological models (cf
Hunter 1957, Clark 1969) put forward to explain performance on
these problems, the spatial image device has proved to be by far
the most influential and consequently it is discussed below.
Huttenlocher's work on transitive inference (1968) developed the
spatial image account first postulated by DeSoto et al. She used
the method of verbal protocol reporting to examine how people
thought they were solving the problems. These revealed that
subjects claim to be constructing a mental picture of the iters
referred to in the premises. This picture consisted of an ordering
of the three iters along a horizontal or vertical axis. Some
subjects reported using the first-irentioned item in the first
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premise as the first item in the mental array and construct the
array accordingly, while others fix the dimension of the array
first ( ie. 'tallest goes on the left') and sort the premises
accordingly.
In studies both with children arranging actual blocks in accordance
with information presented in premises, and with adults solving the
more familiar form of the three-term problem, Huttenlocher found
systematic differences in performance according to the particular
version of the problem being solved. In particular she found that
problems in which the third item was introduced in the second
premise as the grammatical subject of that premise were much easier
to solve than problems in which it was introduced as the
grammatical object. Thus, given the first premise 'A is above B',
if the third item is introduced by the premise 'C is below B' it is
easier than if it is introduced by the premise 'B is above C'„
In explaining these somewhat counter-intuitive results
Huttenlocher argues that comprehension requires a correspondence
between the linguistic form of the statement and the situations
described by that statement. If the statement is incongruent it
must be reordered by subjects before it can be integrated into the
image. This means that for Huttenlocher the easiest form of the
three-term problem is 'A is taller than B, C is shorter than B',
while the most difficult form is 'B is shorter than A, B is taller
f
than C'. These predictions are consistent with the findings of
DeSoto et al and were confirmed in Huttenlocher's own studies.
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Developmental research has also made appeal to seme form of spatial
image device as the mechanism for solving transitivity problems.
Trabasso et al (1975) for example have used five- and six-term
variations of the three-term series corresponding to problems of
the form 'A is taller than B, B is taller than C, C is taller than
D, D is taller than E' for example.
In these studies children were repeatedly presented with the
pranise information until they had memorised each of the 4 pairwise
comparisons (ie. A is taller than B etc). They were then asked
questions about every possible combination of items (ie. 'Is C
taller than B?', 'is B taller than D?' etc). In this way it was
possible to test subjects on large numbers of questions which
varied according to the number of transitive steps there were
between the two items mentioned in the question. A question such
as 'is A taller than B?' required no inferential steps because the
information was actually presented in the premises directly, but a
question such as 'Is B taller than D?' requires the subject to make
one inferential step via the middle term C, and the question 'is A
taller than E?' requires three inferential steps via B, C, and D.
Using this procedure and measuring question answering time,
Trabasso et al obtained the scmewhat counter-intuitive result that
the more inferential steps a question required the subject to make
the faster the subject was able to answer the question. Trabasso
et al argued that these data could not be explained by any model
that required subjects to actually carry out a chain of transitive
inferences since this would predict that more links in the chain
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would require longer processing time. Instead Trabasso et al
argued that this reaction time profile, referred to in the
developmental literature as the inference distance effect, is good
evidence for the subjects' use of seme form of spatial linage
representation. If subjects were constructing a linear array in
their mind's eye and simply reading off the answer to the question
from this array then naturally, items that were further apart in
the array will be more easily discriminated and hence responded to
more quickly.
These findings demonstrate that the transitive inference problems
offer a broad range of measurement techniques which provide an
affluent source of information concerning the psychological
mechanisms involved in the solving of these problems. Furthermore
it would seen that the spatial image device is a strong candidate
for one such psychological mechanism. But what of transfer effects
and the role of expertise factors in the solving of these problems?
Where does the spatial image device sit with respect to expertise?
Is the use of the image device a relatively sophisticated strategy
emerging only after extensive practice or is it a rather naive
response to the task domain and one that is quickly abandoned in
favour of more sophisticated methods? Is it the case then that
psychological variables such as the inference distance effect and
the effects of problem form diminish as a subject becomes more
expert at the solving of these problems?
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Expertise Factors in the Solving of Transitivity Tasks
The notion of a path-to-expertise has been used in the adult
literature on transitive reasoning to describe the way in which a
subject's performance on three-term series problems might change
as a function of practice (Ohlsson 1980). In this view it is
suggested that naive subjects solving these problems might use
quite general but rather inefficient problem solving methods, but
as they become more experienced at solving the problems they
develop efficient methods specifically tuned to the task domain
under consideration.
Both Johnson-Laird (1975) and Ohlsson (op cit) adopt this view,
suggesting that novice subjects begin by the use of a
Huttenlocher-type spatial image device but as they improve they
move towards using seme form of linguistic representation (cf Clark
op cit) and finally use a very efficient strategy based on
selective search of premises. Evidence for this hypothesis comes
form the work of Quinton and Fellows (1975) and Wood (1978).
In the study of Quinton and Fellows subjects were presented with
large numbers of three-term problems to solve. Each problem was
presented textually and subjects were required to answer one of two
possible superlative questions (ie. Who is tallest?/Who is
shortest?). Quinton and Fellows not only measured the total time
taken for subjects to read the premise and answer the question but
also they asked subjects to provide verbal protocols about their
solution methods. These were taken at intervals throughout the
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experimental session. By using this method Quinton and Fellows
were able to identify two basic kinds of method which they termed,
'thinking strategies ' and 'perceptual strategies '.
The 'thinking strategies' can be further divided into two types
'series formation' and 'elimination'. Subjects using series
formation report taking the items mentioned in the premise and
forming a series or linear array in their mind's eye from which
they then read off the answer to the question. Elimination on the
other hand, does not involve the formation of an integrated spatial
image, rather subjects using this method first read the question
and then search the premises for the relevant item. Thus if the
question asked for the tallest item and the first premise read 'A
is taller than B', the subject would retain only item A in memory
as the tallest item currently encountered and go on to the next
premise. If the second premise was 'B is taller than C' then he
would have his choice of A confirmed. If on the other hand the
question had been 'Who is shortest?', then the subject would have
eliminated A has a possible candidate on his reading of the first
promise and eliminated B as a candidate on his reading of the
second premise, leaving C as the shortest item.
The perceptual strategies identified by Quinton and Fellows were a
more sophisticated version of elimination which allowed the subject
to avoid considering the meaning of the promises altogether. In
their most advanced form they involve the following operationss-
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1) The subject would compare the relational term used in the
question with that used in the first premise. If they matched,, the
iter on the lefthand side of the premise was carried over as the
candidate answer. If they didn't match, the other item was carried
over. Thus for the question 'Who is shortest?' and the premise 'A
is taller than B', the terms do not match and so B is carried over.
2) Next, the subject searches the second premise for an
occurrence of the candidate term, if the term does not appear then
it is the answer to the question, if it does occur anywhere in the
second premise (ie. it is in fact the middle term of the three)
then the other term in that premise is the answer.
Quinton and Fellows found that subjects solving large numbers of
these problems gradually improve their performance as assessed by
solution time. They also found that the type of strategy that
subjects used varied as a function of practice. Novice subjects
tended to use seme form of thinking strategy while more practiced
subjects tended to use seme form of perceptual strategy. Thus they
argued that the transfer effects they obtained were underwritten
by a qualititive shift from thinking strategies to the more
perceptual strategies.
They also argued that one of the characteristics of this
path-to-expertise was a trade-off between generality and power.
They suggest that although thinking strategies employing the image
device would be comparatively slow they would in principle enable
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the subject to deal with any form of question or premise he might
be presented with. Even negated premises and comparative questions
are solvable in this way. In contrast while the perceptual
strategies are highly efficient methods they are quite task
specific in as much as they could only be used to answer
superlative questions and were limited to regular forms of the
pranises.
This view of a path-to-expertise as a trade-off between generality
and power is supported by the work of Wood et al (op cit). They
used five-term problems presented textually and found that subjects
began by reporting the use of seme form of image device but with
practice they quickly moved on to elimination strategies. These
elimination strategies while providing an effective solution for
superlative questions, could not be used to solve comparative
questions and Wood et al found that practised subjects, unlike
their novice counterparts were quite unable to answer unexpected
comparative questions presented at the end of problems.
These results would appear then to offer strong evidence for sane
form of domain specific expertise factor in the solving of the
transitivity problems analagous to that identified in the
state-space experiments. Furthermore it would seem that the spatial
image device is a rather unsophisticated and ineffective method of
solving transitive inference problems and probably not the one
which we would want to consider as a particularly expert response
to the problem? How true is this?
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The Spatial Image and Expertise.
With careful consideration, it becomes clear in fact that the
expertise generated in these experiments is not really of the same
type as that obtained in the state space experiments. Certainly it
is the case that the expertise generated in the transitivity
experiments produces dramatic transfer and seems to be limited to
problems of the same class. But what has become confused in these
studies is precisely which class of problem is being solved by the
subjects. It was argued at the outset that the three-term problems
could be classified on the basis of the fact that they all required
a certain logical inference to be made if the solution was to he
attained. This logical inference involved the comparison of two
items via a middle term. Under this definition we could also
recognise four- and five-term transitivity problems of the type
used in the developmental literature to be of essentially the same
class. But now consider the expert strategies described by Quinton
and Fellcws and Wood. Here subjects are no longer required to make
such inferences. Because they have access to the question before
reading the premises, they only need ever compare two items within
any given premise. There is no need for them to combine the
premise information in the way entailed in the truly inferential
class of problems. Thus it would seem that the paths-to-expertise
described here are only made possible if the subject is given the
opportunity to implicitly redefine the class of problem which he is
solving.
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As is clear from the work of McGonigle and Chalmers (1984), there
is a lesson to be learnt here for researchers interested in
studying inference. Many studies of inference have used procedures
which allow simultaneous access to premises and question, and many
studies have allowed subjects to practice on "warm-up" problems
(Hunter 1957, Clark 1968, Jones 1970, for eg). But these are
precisely the conditions that promote the non-inferential
strategies identified by Quinton et al. These studies may thus be
providing data that has very little to do with transitive inference
per se. Lending support to this argument is a study by Potts and
Sholz (1975). This revealed that subjects required to solve
problans when premises and question were simultaneously available
produced a quite different profile to subjects who were required to
read the premises before reading the question.
In the developmental literature there have been similar confusions,
Bryant and Trabasso (1971) for example, claimed that children as
young as four years could make transitive inferences provided
certain experimental procedures were used. McGonigle and
Chalmers(1977) however, showed that with these procedures even
squirrel monkeys could be shown to make apparently transitive
choices, but these choices could equally be explained by a model
which did not require the coordination of relations. Thus such
procedures may only show seme form of 'pseudo-transitivity'.
It would seem then that a study of expertise in the solving of
inference problems must be careful to ensure that the experimental
procedures used to study such expertise do not in fact allow the
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subject to avoid making inferences altogether. This can be done by-
using procedures which do not present premises and questions
simultaneously or which use comparative rather than superlative
questions. There have been experiments using such procedures but
while these studies have demonstrated that subjects tended to use
seme form of spatial image device in these situations, they have
not looked at the effects of practice on the use of this device.
It is not clear from these studies whether the image device is a
relatively sophisticated and expert response to the problem
environment or whether subjects quickly abandon this strategy in
favour of seme other inferential device.
In conclusion then, it would appear that the research on inference
makes it clear that the transitivity tasks would be a useful demain
in which to study demain specific expertise. There are affluent
psychological measures available to the experimenter and already
seme psychological mechanisms have been postulated to account for
performance on these tasks. However there has been no proper study
of transfer effects in this task-domain and consequently there has
been no consideration of expertise factors in relation to such
mechanisms. The experiments reported in the experimental chapter





Experiment Three: Transfer with 3- and 5-Term Series Problems
In the light of the literature reviewed in the previous chapter it
is clear that the first aim of this experiment must be to establish
clear evidence for the existence of an expertise factor akin to
that identified in the state-space experiments. Thus we need to
examine the performance of subjects solving transitivity problems
in a multiple-problem paradigm which does not promote the use of
non-inferential strategies, of the type identifed by Wood (op cit)„
This can be achieved in one of two ways; Either subjects can be
given comparative questions (ie. 'is D>B?'), as in the studies of
Bryant et al (op cit), or alternatively subjects can be given
superlative questions (ie. 'Who is tallest?') provided that, these
are not presented simultaneously with the premises, but are
presented after the premises. In this way, subjects cannot use the
question to guide their processing of the premise information„ In
this study, superlative rather than comparative questions are used
for two reasons; Firstly, nearly all of the adult literature on
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transitive reasonig uses these questions, but none has examined the
importance of the relative ordering of question and premises for
the development of expertise. Secondly, as part of this study we
shall be using 2- dimensional problems which do not lend themselves
easily to being associated with comparative questions.
Using this type of procedure, we need to establish whether any
transfer effects occur and we need to use protocol analysis to
investigate the problem solving strategies used by subjects. In
this way we hope to examine whether subjects report using some form
of spatial image device as did Huttenlocher 's subjects and to
assess the status of such a device with respect to growing
expertise; Will the use of such a device be limited to novice
performance as in the case of the study of Quinton and Fellows (op
cit), or will this new procedure generate a form of expertise which
relies on the use of a spatial image device?
To this end the first experiment uses two types of problem. The
first type is the usual three-term series problem described in the
previous chapter and used by many researchers in the field. The
second type of problem is slightly different. This second type
consists of a set of five-term problems which use relational terms
in two dimensions (for eg A is left of B, B is left of Cp D is
above C, E is rightof C). This second set of problems was included
for the following reasons.
It has been argued strongly (Foos 19SO), that subjects solving this
type of spatial problem use a spatial image device essentially the
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same as that reported by Huttenlocher. This being so then,, the
second set of problems would be of use as a means of testing the
transferability of any expertise generated on the three-term tasks.
For example, if subjects solving the three-term problems quickly
abandon the spatial image device in favour of sane more
task-specific inferential strategy then they would not be expected
to show any improvement over novices on the solving of the
five-term problems. On the other hand, if the effects of practice
on the three-term subjects was to actually develop the spatial
image strategy, then we might expect to find some positive
transfer.
Both sets of problem were used in conjunction with superlative
questions presented after the premises had been read, and the
method of protocol reporting was used to probe for the presence of
the image strategy. In particular subjects ware required to make a
total of 12 protocol reports after varying numbers of problems had
been solved. Using this method it was hoped that changes in




32 inference problems were used in this experiment, 16 three-term
series problems of the type used by Huttenlocher, and 16 five term-
series problems with relational terms in two dimensions similar to
those used by Foos.
The three-term problems consisted of two sets of the 8 regular
comparative forms of the problems as in table 5.1 „ 1 „ The
relational terms used were 'taller than', and 'shorter than'.
Relational terms were randomly assigned to the first set of 8 forms
with the constraint that 4 of each relation occurred in the first
set, and the relational term used in the other set of 8 problems
was chosen so that any given problem in this set used the
relational term not used by its corresponding version in the first
set. The items consisted of Christian names. Of the two sets, 4
used female names and 4 used male names. The names were selected
at randcm from a pool of 16 of each sex, except for the constraint
that no two names could ever occur in a single problem together
more than once. To make the analysis easier each of the names
began with a different initial letter.
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latch probleis Non-iatch prableis
A is taller than B B is taller than C
B is taller than C A is taller than B
A is to the left at B A is to the left of B
B is to the left of C C is to the left of 3
C is to the left of B B is to the left of C
A is taller than B C is shorter than B
C is shorter than B A is taller than B
B is to the left of C C is to the left of B
C is to the left of B A is to the left of B
A is to the left of B B is to the left of C
B is shorter than A B is taller than C
B is taller than C B is shorter than A
B is to the left of C A is to the left of B
A is to the lett of B C is to the left of B
C is to the left of B B is to the left of C
B is shorter than A C is shorter than B
C is shorter than B B is shorter than A
C is to the left of B C is to the left of B
B is to the left of C A is to the left of B
A is to the left of B B is to the left of C
Table 5.1.1 The 8 regular fons of the three- ten and 5 ter» problens (najor axis only).
Letters correspond to Christian Naies (Alan Bob and Carl for eg.)
For each of the two sets of 8 regular forms the premises were
combined with one of the two superlative questions: "Who is
tallest?" or 'Who is shortest?'. Once again for one set of 8 the
questions were randomly assigned with the constraint that 4 each of
the two forms were presented. For the other 8 the problems were
assigned the question not assigned to its corresponding problems
in the first 8. Thus there were 16 problems two each of the 8
regular forms differing with respect to question type and, in same
cases, the sex of the names used as items. The 16 problems were
presented as two blocks of 8 regular forms although for the
subject there was no indication of the end of a block.
The composition of the five-term problems is more complex to
describe. Again the 16 problems consisted of 2 sets of 8 forms
differing according to the question type, and the sex of the names
used as items. The 8 forms comprising each set were the 8 basic
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forms described by Foos and reproduced in table 5.1/lc As can. be
seen this typology is somewhat different to that of the three-term
problems. For the three-term problems the major differences
between problem forms is the order of presentation of premise
information within each premise. For the five-term problems the
major distinction is the order of presentation of problems across
each premise. This is congruent with Foos' own experimental
emphasis and his distinction between 'match' problems in which
every successive premise has one term that is mentioned in the
immediately prior premise, and 'non-match' problems in which
successive premises may not necessarily have any items in common.,
This does however lead to severe counterbalancing problems when
only 16 problems are used.
Foos used 4 relational terms 'north of', 'south of', 'east of', and
'west of' and his terms were common words such as 'farm', 'lake'
etc. From Foos' report it is not clear hew he combined these
relational terms with the 8 problem forms. Even for Foos' own
experiment a full counterbalancing is not possible within the
number of problems he used. In our case with only 16 problems it
is out of the question. But the major problem-type effect recorded
by Foos was between 'match and non-match problems rather than to do
with the relational terms used or with the orientation of the major
axis in the problems. Thus it was decided to use problems whose
major axis was always horizontal and whose horizontal relation was
the relational term 'left of'. Furthermore the fifth-term in the
series was added as either the second or the third promise of the
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problem and was linked to an end-term and a middle-term of the
major axis equally often by the use of either the relational term
'above ' or 'below'.
This is congruent with Foos' own procedure as far as can be
determined. The decision to use the relations 'left of', 'above',
and below', was taken in order to avoid the difficulty that
subjects might have with remembering the cardinal points of the
compass, particularly east and west, (Foos' subjects were given
♦
score-sheets with these orientations clearly marked). Also, this
would avoid lengthy and cumbersome questions such as 'Who is the
southernmost?'. The use of conventional spatial relations is
consistent with the earlier work cited by Foos (1980), with the
study of Wood et al (1974) and that of Mani and Johnson-Laird
(1982) discussed in the next experiment.
As with the three-term problans described above the items used in
these problems were Christian names and they were counterbalanced
across the problems in the same way as the three-term problems;.
Design
Subjects were randomly assigned to 2 groups. Group 1 (n=16)
received the 16 three-term problems first followed by the 16
five-term problems. Group 2 (n=14) received the two types of
problem in the reverse order. The design is summarised in table
5.1.2.
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first problem set second problem set
Group 1 1-d imensiana1 3-term 2-dimensional 5-term
Group 2 2-dimensional 3-term 1-dimensional 3-term
fable 5.1.2 Design of experisent 3
Within each of the 16 problem sets the order of presentation of the
problems was fixed. In both cases however the first 8 were
instances of the 8 regular forms of table 5.1.1, the second 8
problems solved were a further 8 instances of the same forms
presented in the same order.
Subjects
The subjects were 30 3rd-year undergraduates from the department of
psychology, University of Edinburgh, and participated in the
experiment as part of their practical course and were not paid for
their services. Subjects of both sexes were randomly assigned to
groups.
Procedure
The problems were presented to subjects on a monitor screen
controlled by an APPLE II microcomputer. After preliminary
information about the experiment (which did not include warm-up
trials or examples of the type of problems to be solved) subjects
ware required to press the <space> bar of the computer keyboard and
the premises of the first problem were presented on the screen. All
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of the premises of the problem were presented simulataneously for a
fixed duration of 12 seconds for the three-term problems and 24
seconds for the five term problems (6 seconds per premise). This
latency was controlled by the computer. After this time the
prenise information was replaced by the appropriate question. The
subject was then required to press a key while at the same time
verbalising the answer to the question. The key-press stopped a
timing routine controlled by the computer which timed the duration
between the onset of the question and the key-press. The subjects'
verbal responses were recorded by the experimenter who was in the
same room as the subject throughout the session.
Each successive problem was presented by the computer in response
to the subject pressing the <space> bar and the subject was given
no indication of how many problems he would be required to solve or
any warning of the change in problem type after the first 16
problems. Subjects were informed that their question answering
time was being recorded and that they were to answer the problems
as quickly as they could without making unnecessary errors.
The problems were presented to subjects on a monitor screen
controlled by an APPLE II microcomputer. After preliminary
information about the experiment (which did not include warm-up
trials or examples of the type of problems to be solved) subjects
were required to press the <space> bar of the computer keyboard and.
the premises of the first problem were presented on the screen. All
the premises of the problem were presented simulataneously for a
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fixed duration of 12 seconds for the three-term problems and 24
seconds for the five term-problems ( 6 seconds per premise). This
latency was controlled by the computer. After this time the
premise information was replaced by the appropriate question. The
subject was then required to press a key while at the same time
verbalisisng the answer to the question. The key press stopped, a
timing routine controlled by the computer which timed the duration
between the onset of the question and the key-press. The subjects
verbal response was recorded by the experimenter who was in the
same room as the subject throughout the session.
At intervals throughout the session the experimenter interrupted
the subject to ask him to provide a written protocol report
describing how he was solving the problems. Every subject was
required to give 6 such protocol reports for each set of problems
giving a total of 12 reports for each subject. These were taken
after the 1st, 4th, 8th, 9th, 12th, and 16th problems of each set.
After each of these particular problems had been solved, a buzzer
sounded and the words "take a break" were presented on the screen.
At this point the experimenter asked the subject to write down a
few words about how he was solving the problems. When the subject
had done this, he pressed the <space> bar twice, to receive the
premises of the next problem. Although subjects were informed at
the beginning of the session that they would be asked to provide




Table 5.1.3 presents the mean question answering time for both
groups of subjects solving both types of problem.
•first problem set second prabiern set
Group I 85.76 121.52
Group 2 189.07 84.11
Table 5.1.3 Group coiparisons of aean question ansttering tiae for both
sets of probleas
An analysis of variance (BMDP P2V) on these data revealed a
significant difference between the two groups (F^ = 4.56; p =
0.0417), a significant effect of problem set (F . = 18.98; p =i /tO
0.0002) and a significant group by problem set interaction(Fj 2q=
99.2,; p < 0.0001). T-tests for group effects on problem sets
solved first and second revealed that there was a significant
effect of group for the problems solved as the first set (t =
_6
2.1x10 ; p <0.01), but no differences between the groups on the
-3
problems solved as the second set (t = 1.3x10 ; p > 0.05). An
inspection of table 5.1.3 reveals that the five-term series
problems solved as the first set of problems by group 1 produce a
much slower solution time than the three-term set solved first by
group 2.
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As can be seen however this difference is much reduced when the two
sets of problems are solved as the second set suggesting that the
experience that the group 1 subjects had with the three-term
problems solved as their first set allowed them to solve the
five-term problems more easily than group 2 solving them as naive
subjects. In support of this, t-tests reveal that there is a.
significant difference in solution time between the five-term
~3
problems solved in position 1 and position 2 (t = 1.1x10 ; p =
0.0012) but no significant difference between the three-term
problems solved first and second (t = 6.8 xlO p = 0.68 )«
These results suggest a positive transfer between three- and five-
term problems but only when the five-term problems are solved
second.
Turning now to an analysis of the effects of practice within each
set of problems, figure 5.1.1 (overleaf) presents the mean question
answering time as a function of the number of problems solved for
both sets of problems and both groups. The 16 problsns of each set
have been collapsed into blocks of 4 for convenience of
presentation but analyses of variance treated all 32 problans as
separate. In addition to the group and set effects reported above,
these analyses revealed a significant effect of practice (F-^ =
7.59; p < 0.0001) and a significant three-way interaction between
practice, set and group (F^ ^g = 2.07; p= 0.0105).
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1
Figure 5.1.1. 6ruup comparisons of question answering tiie I50ths of second),
as a function of nuiber of problems solved. Problems are presented as 8
blocks of 4. Block 5 larks the start of a ne» set of probleis for both groups.
Separate analyses on each problem set for each group revealed a
significant effect of practice for the five-term problems solved
as the first set (F^,- = 3.48; p = < 0.0001), for the three-term
problems solved as the first set (F-^ 225 = 2-58; p = 0.0014), for
the five-term problems solved as the second set (F ^ 225 ~ 2*28;
P = 0.0052), but not for the three-term problans solved as the
second set (F ,c ,QC =1.6; P = 0.077).15,iyb
These results, in consideration of figure 5.1.1, are interpreted as
suggesting there was significant improvement in solution time as a
function of practice within each set of problems. The exception-
the three-term problems solved as the second set- may be
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attributable to floor effects. Turning now to a consideration of
the proportion of problems answered correctly; It was found that
the proportion of errors is, by and large low. The average error
rate for the three-term problems is about 10% and for the five-
term problems, about 30%. There is some indication of the
frequency of errors dropping as a function of practice in a way
that is analogous to the reduction in solution time presented in
figure 5.1.1. But because of the low frequency of errors^ no
statistical analysis was carried out on these data. It now remains
to be seen whether the protocol reports reveal anything about the
psychological changes that underwrite these transfer effects.
After consideration of the literature in general and the particular
emphasis of this experiment, the protocols were examined for 5
major categories of report. Appendix D contains a detailed
description of these categories, along with an explanation of the
categorisation process supported by examination of selected
protocols.
First of all, the protocols were examined for_evidence that the
subject used sane form of mental image. These reports fall into
two categories; GLOBAL IMAGE and DIMENSIONALISED IMAGE. Global
image refers to fairly gross reports such as "I made a mental
picture in my minds eye". These reports do not provide enough
information to decide whether the subject is literally picturing
the premises as they are written, whether he has seme very concrete
image of a set of people (Egan and Grimes-Farrow 1982), or whether
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he is using the kind spatial irrage device described by Huttenlocher
(op cit) which is characterised by a spatial array of the names
along a single dimension corresponding to the relative heights of
the people. In contrast, dimensionalised image refers to reports
which are clearly instances of a Huttenlocher-type of image such
as, "I made a mental picture with the tallest at the right,
smallest at the left and so on."
Mynatt and Smith (1977) make a distinction between the use of iirage
strategies and the use of VERBAL REHEARSAL strategies, and the 3rd
category for which the protocols were examined was the use of
rehearsal strategies. Reports such as, "I made a verbal list of the
names and repeated them over to myself, tallest first" would
qualify for this category. Many subjects quite simply reported
using "verbal rehearsal of names".
The 4th category- SCANNING- refers to reports indicating that the
subject is not reading the premises in the order which they are
presented but instead is searching the premises for certain kinds
of information. In particular searching for premises which contain
information that can be added directly to the existing
representation. Thus if a subject is presented with promises such
as 'A>B, OD B>C', as he might be as part of a five-term problem,
he might report for example, "take first name, attach second to it,
scan for any other occurrence of first name etc. ie. taking one
name and attaching others to it rather than having say, two pairs
of names and later joining them up".
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The final category is ELIMINATION. This is to be distinguished
from the kind of elimination discussed by Wood (op cit, see
introduction). In these reports the subject does not search the
premises for the answer to the question- he could not because he
doesn't receive the question until he has read the premises.
Instead he reports using a spatial image but remembering only the
end-anchors of the array. He can do this because although he does
not know what question he will be asked, he knows that it will be
a superlative question such as 'Who is leftmost? ' or 'who is
tallest?' and thus he need only remember the extreme items, in the
wards of one subject; "..only remembering the outside names so less
names to remember. This is because I know the limited number of
questions being used....hope the questions don't change!"
Each of the 12 protocols from each subject was inspected for these
five categories of report. The categories were not mutually
exclusive and a single report can contribute a data point to
several categories, as in the case of; "I made a visual image of
tallest on the left, smallest on the right (category 2), then
rehearsed the names (category 3)". These 5 categories accounted
for over 80% of all reports. Other types of report were the use of
mnemonics such as remembering the initial letters of the names
mentioned in the premises, and a small number of reports of
remembering the premises verbatim (mainly in the three-term set),
and also of non-directive reports such as "I made a mistake because
I was feeling tired".
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Figure 5.1.2. (a-d) on the facing page, presents the frequency of
occurrence of each of the five categories of report. This is
broken down into problem set (3- and 5- term) for both of the
groups. Thus, figure 5.1.2-a gives the data for group 1 solving
their first set of problems- the three-term problems, and figure
5.1.2.b the same group solving the five-term problems which they
solved subsequently. Similarly for group 2 in figures 5.1.2-c and
5.1.2d. Note also, that for each group solving each set of
problems, the data is broken down as a function of practice. Thus
in figure 5.1.2a, the distribution of protocols over the categories
is presented in 6 blocks. The first block corresponds to the
protocol reports which were recorded immediately after the subjects
had solved their 1st problem, the second block corresponds to those
reports taken immediately after they had solved their 4th problem
of that set and so on, until we ccme to the last block of figure
5.1.2a which corresponds to those reports taken immediately after
the subject had solved all 16 of the three-term problems.
Similarly for figures 5.1.2. b,c, & d.
The first thing to note is that in all groups for both sets of
problems^ the frequency of reports of seme form of image strategy
was high and appeared very early in the experimental session. In
fact 75% of subjects reported using such a strategy even on the
protocol report taken immediately after their first problem.
Furthermore, the frequency of such reports remained fairly constant
over subsequent reports, on their last report 80% of subjects
reported seme form of image device. It seens then that the use of
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the image device occurs in response to the earliest reports and is
not given up in favour of sane other strategy. Instead,, other
categories of report occur in addition to the stable image reports
and as an elaboration of them. The subjects do not appear for
example, to begin by using sane form of image device and then
abandon this in favour of a purely verbal rehearsal strategy.
Instead the subject begins by reporting the use of an image and
subsequently he reports using an image plus rehearsal as in; " I
ordered the people in a line, tallest at the left", and
subsequently: "picture the names in a line and verbally repeat the
names".
The dimension of this elaboration differs as a function of problem
type and group. For the three-term problens solved first (group 1:
fig 5.1 .la), subjects appear to begin by reporting the use of a
global undifferentiated image strategy which is quickly refined
into a dimensionalised image. Thus several subjects in this group
reported in their early protocols; "I made a mental picture of the
names" and later reported; "I ordered the names frcm tallest to
shortest, tallest on the left, shortest on the right". In
addition, subjects augment this by the use of rehearsal as
described above. There is very little evidence for the use of
scanning and elimination for these problems. For the three-term
problems solved second (group2: fig 5.1.Id), the profile is similar
if scmewhat attenuated.
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For the five-term problems solved first (group 2: fig 5.1,2.c) there
was an addition of rehearsal to the basic image as with the
three-term problems. But for these problems there was a large
number of reports indicating that this was even further elaborated
by the addition of scanning and/or elimination. Thus one subject
reports the following on his first report; "Picture of
relationships" (global image), and the following on his penultimate
report; "...slot people into a position frcm left to right
(dimensionalised image), then drop the middle names (elimination)".
For the five-term problems solved second, again there is a high
incidence of seme form of image device elaborated by rehearsal and
scanning, but there is less evidence of the use of elimination. It
is noteworthy that protocols from these five-term problems
generally do not show evidence of the dimensionalised image that
features so strongly in the three-term problems, rather image
reports tended to be of a more global nature. This is presumably
due to the fact that the relational terms used in the premises of
these problems were explicitly spatial- it would be somewhat
pedantic for the subject to report, "placing the leftmost item at
the left" and so on.
Considering this strategic elaboration in purely quantitative
terms, it is possible to examine the extent of this elaboration and
whether there is more elaboration shown when subjects are required
to solve the more difficult five-term problems. This is achieved
by counting how many categories each report falls into and
comparing this with previous reports frcm the same subject. If a
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subject reports using a dimensionalised image in his first report
and then reports using a dimensionalised image plus rehearsal in
his second report, and he reports no change subsequently, then he
is scored as having made 1 strategic elaboration during his solving
of the problems and so on. Figure 5.1.3 presents the percentage of
each group of subjects who showed varying amounts of strategic
elaboration. This is presented as a function of problem set.
fig. 5-1.3.
first set «c°nd set
rusher of strategy changes for'each problea set
Figure 5.1.3, coiparisons of percentage changes in protocol reports as a
Function oF problei set. Group l! (3-ter«, 5-ter»). Group 2! (3-teri, 5-ter«J.
As can be seen, in terms of the modal frequencies, most subjects
solving the 3-term problems showed 1 or 2 strategic elaborations,
whereas most subjects solving the 5-term problems showed between 2
and 3 elaborations with seme subjects showing as many as 4 and even
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5 elaborations. It seems that the problems which are the most
difficult to solve- as determined by solution time (cf. fig.
5.1.1)- are also those for which subjects tend to show the most
strategic elaboration.
Finally, it is possible to examine regularities in the sequential
course of these strategic elaborations. This is achieved by
examining the frequency of occurrence of various patterns of
elaboration. Since there are five categories, there are 5!=60 ways
of combining all five categories. But in fact, there was a fairly
regular syntax to the elaborations. For the three-term problems,
most subjects showed the following pattern; global image ->
dimensionalised image -> rehearsal. A few subject showed; rehearsal.
-> global image -> dimensionalised image. For the five-term
problems the most common syntax was global image -> rehearsal ->
scanning -> elimination, although few subjects reached elimination.
Once again, a few subjects showed rehearsal before global image but
no subject showed scanning or elimination before global image or
rehearsal. Examples of protocol reports obtained in this study




The solution time data leave no doubt that there is an expertise
factor involved in the solution of these inference problems, and
the protocol reports have proved to be a useful source of
information concerning the psychological mechanisms .involved in
such expertise.
These reveal that nearly all subjects use some form of spatial
image device in order to solve these problems. The use of such a
device appears early in the protocol reports. Even after their
first problem most subjects report using some form of image.
Furthermore the dimension of strategic change associated with
reduction in solution times, unlike previous studies (Wood et al op
cit) is not a .shift away frcm the use of this device. Subjects
persisted in the use of the spatial image throughout the
experimental seesion. The dimension of strategic change appeared
rather to be an elaboration of the basic image device.
One elaborative dimension was the addition of strategies dedicated
to reducing the memorial strain of the task. Thus subjects report
using mnemonics such as rehearsal, and remembering only the
end-anchor iters of the premises. The fact that such reports were
more frequent for the five-term problems is indicative of the
greater strain that these problems place on menory.
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Such supportive mnemonics are not however to be regarded as a
domain specific aspect of expertise. Indeed the use of such
mnemonics can be seen as a much more general problem solving skill
involving subjects' 'metacognitive knowledge' of their cwn memory
processes. A much more likely candidate for a domain specific
component is the use of scanning. These reports suggest tliat
subjects do not inevitably process premise information in a
bottcm-up way in the order in which they are presented on the
screen, rather they actively search for items that can most easily
be integrated into the spatial image. They report for example
searching for items that can be linked directly onto an item that
is already established in the image.
In support of this Foos (op cit) has argued that a major
contribution to problem difficulty in his experiments was the need
to hold in memory, items that could not be linked immediately onto
the array under construction. So for example, the problem; "A>B,
B>C, OD, D>E" is easy to solve in comparison to the problem; "A>B,
D>E, C>D, B>C" in which the pair; D,E cannot be integrated into the
representation until all the premises have been read. It would
seem that scanning allows subjects to overcome this difficulty.
This particular version of scanning would not be appropriate for
the three-term problems, since because they have only two premises
there is always a corrmon term in the new premise. However, the fact
that subjects report building the image in a preferred direction,
namely starting with the tallest, would suggest that subjects may
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scan the premises for items that are congruent with this preferred
direction of working. This interpretation of scanning, in
accordance with McGonigle and Chalmers (1984), forces a distinction,
between the representational space used to solve these problems and
the information processing strategies dedicated to translating
problems into that space.
The fact that subjects report using an image representation to
solve both types of problem presented in this experiment suggests
that this device is a quite general background resource, capable of
being used in a number of different problem solving situations (see
for example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) for evidence of the use of
spatial metaphors in other situations). The information processing
strategies such as scanning on the other hand, dedicated as they
are to translating between individual problems and this general
representational space, must be domain specific. The very fact
that the three-term problems used non-spatial relational terms
while the five-term problems used explicitly spatial relations, yet
at the same time, subjects report using a similar representational
space for both problems, is evidence for the specificity of these
translation strategies.
Taking this as a working hypothesis about the nature of the
expertise involved in the solving of these problems what further
work needs to be done? Firstly it will be necessary to cores to a
clear understanding of the characteristics of the representational
resource involved here. If it is a quite general resource hew does
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a subject come to recognise when a particular problem domain is
solvable by use of this resource? What aspects of the problem
domain constrain the generality of this resource? We have already
observed that the relational information does not have to be
inherently spatial. It is also questionable whether or not this
information even has to be fully ordered. In his experimentf Foos
found that subjects given indeterminate premise information such as
"A is left of B, C is below B,D is right of C", would interpret
this information as if D was directly below A.
While this result would not be surprising given the suggestion of
McGonigle and Chalmers (op cit) that the image is imposed upon
premise information as an interpretive schema and as an 'effort
after meaning', it does conflict with the research of Mani and
Johnson-Laird (1984), who found that subjects could not construct a
spatial image representation from such indeterminate premises., This
is the first issue taken up in the final experiment of the thesis.
As a second consideration in the final experiment it will be
necessary to make a detailed examination of the information
processing strategies used by subjects to overcome the surface
structure variation inherent in this problem domain. In accordance
with most other work in this area experiment 3 concentrated mainly
on question answering time. It is clear however, given the above
hypotheses, that the effects of problem variation should be
reflected not in question answering time but rather in premise
reading times.
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In particular if one were to establish that the image device is
indeed asymmetrical with respect to preferred direction of working,,
it is possible to predict which surface forms of a transitive
inference problem will require conversion in order to make them
congruent with this preferred direction of working. This extra
processsing should be observed as greater premise integration times
for these non-preferred forms. These '£igural effects" as they
have been called (Johnson-Laird 1984), are common in the research
literature. Indeed as we have already seen, they provide the
mainstay of evidence for Huttenlocher's model of reasoning (see
also Clark and Hunter op cit).
What is not known however, is what happens to these figural effects
as the subjects become more expert. On the one hand there is
reason to believe that figural effects should subside with
practice. After all, the operational definition of domain specific
expertise put forward in this thesis can be stated as; that which
renders formally equivalent problems psychologically equivalent. On
the other hand if it is indeed the case that even expert subjects
used a dimensionalised spatial image strategy surely the adverse
effects of incongruence must persist? This is the second issue
taken up in the final experiment.
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Experiment Four: Representation, Strategy and Expertise
The 'top-down' view of problem solving developed thus far suggests
that background representational resources such as the spatial
image device are used as an interpretive schema for incoming
information. As McGonigle and Chalmers (1984b) point out this view
has good analogies in the field of perception in which redundant
information in 'good figures' such as the circle allows the
perceiver to infer the presence of a whole circle even when it is
partially occluded.
This view of the role of the image predicts that even when the
premise information is incomplete or 'indeterminate' the subject
should be able to use the image device to impose an ordering
structure on that information. But recent work by Mani and
Johnson-Laird (1982) has suggested that this might not be the case.
In their study they found that subject readily used seme form of
spatial imagery to interpret 'determinate' problem information such,
as;
The knife is to the left of the plate
The plate is to the left of the fork
the plate is below the spoon
But for indeterminate versions of the same problem in which there
is seme ambiguity as to the appropriate spatial layout of the
items, such as;
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The knife is to the left of the plate
The plate is to the right of the fork
The plate is below the spoon
they found that subjects did not seem to use a spatial image
representation. Rather they retained the premise information in a
propositional form close to the surface structure format of the
premises.
One of the problems with this study thoughts that there may have
been sane ambiguity on the part of the subject, as to what the
nature of the problem solving tasks actually was. On the one hand
subjects in this study were required to verify whether a diagram
was consistent with the premise information and on the other hand
they were given incidental recall tests. The results of the state
space experiments made it clear, that the way in which the subject
interprets the functional goal of the problem solving experiment-
has a major effect on what kind of strategy he adopts. The use of
both memory and drawing tasks in Mani and Johnson-lairds experiment
my mean that the subject does not have a clear idea of what is
required of him in this experiment.
In the experiment to be reported here, both determinate and
indeterminate problems are used and the functional goals of the
problem solving task are directly manipulated. This is achieved by
varying the type of question that accompanies the premises. In one
condition both determinate and indeterminate premises are presented
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in conjunction with a set of comparative questions of the type used
in developmental research by Trabasso et al (op cit). In this
condition subjects are required to make comparisons between all
possible pairings of iters in a five-term series (ie. Is A>E? , Is
B>C? etc.). It is argued that this question set requiring as it
does that the subject has a 'full perspective' on the premise
information available, will encourage subjects to use a spatial
image device as an interpretive schema for the premise information
in both determinate and indeterminate cases. This question set
also allows for the measurement of inference distance effects which
Trabasso claims are indicative of the use of spatial image devices
(cf chapter four), hence it will provide evidence for the use of
such devices additional to protocol reports.
In a second condition subjects are required to solve indeterminate
problems, but this time not with a full set of comparative
questions, but with the more usual set of two superlative questions
(Who is tallest/shortest?). Furthermore these are presented before
the premise information. This kind of procedure, it will be
recalled, is precisely that which encourages, not the use of a
spatial image, but rather seme form of elimination strategy of the
type identified by Wood. This question set, requiring as it does,
only a 'partial perspective' on the premise information should be
unaffected by the determinacy of the premises. This condition will
also allow for comparison between the amount of reduction in
solution time produced by the use of the two kinds of strategy,.
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It is hoped that this manipulation of the functional goals of the
problem solving task will encourage a clear distinction in the
protocols between those subjects using a spatial image device and
those using some form of elimination strategy. If there is a high
percentage of subjects using spatial images with indeterminate
problems this will be good evidence for the view of the image as a
quite general representational device. It is then necessary to
consider what kinds of domain specific information processing
strategies subjects need to deploy in order to make the various
surface forms of the premises congruent with such a general, schema.
With respect to this issue, it will be recalled that Huttenlocher's
model makes certain predictions about the relative difficulty of
various forms of the three-term problems in accordance with the
number of operations that are required to translate the
information into the spatial image. So for example the premises;
"A is taller than B, C is shorter than B" were said to be easier
than problems of the form "B is shorter than A, B is taller than.
C", since in the latter form the first premise is incongruent with
preferred direction of working and the new term of the second
premise is introduced as the granmatical object.
More recently Potts and Sholz (1975), and also Foos (op cit) have
provided evidence that Huttenlocher's predictions require seme
modification. In particular they suggest that it is not the
grammatical status of an item that is significant but rather the
congruence of the relational term describing a new item with, the
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position of that item in the array. Thus they suggest that a new
item "school" introduced in the premise, "The lake is north of the
school", will be more difficult to process if in fact the school is
the southernmost item in the array. This modification is of
particular interest since like the preferred direction of working
hypothesis, it emphasises that it is the status of the item with
respect to the subjects representational space that is important
rather than seme absolute linguistic characteristic of the premise
per se.
Along with the direction of working hypothesis the congruence
hypothesis allows us to rank different problem forms with respect
to their expected difficulty, so for example in the problem;
D is taller than E
C is taller than D
B is taller than C
A is taller than B
the premise information is presented in a way that is inconsistent
with most subjects preferred direction of working which is tail to
short. It should thus be a relatively difficult problem to solve.
The following problem;
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E is smaller than D
D is smaller than C
C is smaller than B
B is smaller than A
should be even more difficult since not only is it inconsistent
with subjects preferred direction of working but also the
relational terms used to introduce new items are incongruent with
that item's placement in the actual array.
Such difficult problems can be seen as requiring extra processing
operations in order to convert the premise information into a form
more easily assimilated into the representational space. Such
processing operations provide the bridge between the specific
characteristics of a particular problem that is to be solved and
the architecture of the representational space that the subject
employs to solve the whole class of related problems.
In this experiment, these figural effects are examined by the use
of a procedure which allows the subject to control his own. premise
reading time. In this way it is possible to examine the reading
time profiles for various premise figures. If indeed it is the
case that certain figures require additional processing to make
thorn congruent with the underlying image device, then this would be
expected to show up in such measures.
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These figural effects should be limited to subjects solving
problems by the use of a spatial image, and whether or not such
effects remain as expertise grows will be relevant to our
interpretation of the nature of domain specific expertise. On the
one hand since the image has been shown to remain stable with
respect to practice, it would be expected that figural effects
must also remain constant irrespective of a general decrease in
solution time. On the other hand, if domain specific expertise is
to be regarded as rendering formally equivalent problems
psychologically equivalent, it would be expected that the general
reduction in solution time concomitant with practice should in fact
be brought about by a collapsing of such figure effects.
Method
Task Materials
The problems solved by subjects were five-term series problems
using the relations 'taller than/shorter than'. Two basic sets were
used; a set of 32 determinate problems and a set of 32
indeterminate problems. The determinate set consisted of 8 each of
the 4 figures listed below;
i) A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E
ii) B<A, C<B, D<C, E<D
iii) D>E, OD, B>C, A>B
iv) E<D, D<C, C<B, A<B
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In each case the relational term was either 'taller than' or
'shorter than' and the letters were replaced by Christian names as
in the previous experiment. It will be noted that the first two
problems are consistent with a tall-to-short preferred direction of
working, but that problem two introduces iters in a way that is
incongruent with their final placement in the array. Similarly the
third and fourth problems are inconsistent with a short-to-tal1
preferred direction of working, and problem three introduces
problems in a way that is incongruent with their final placement.
The indeterminate set of problems were produced frcm the
determinate set in a way outlined by Mani and Johnson-Laird, In
each case the indeterminacy is introduced into the second premise
by replacing the middle term brought over frcm premise 1 by the
end anchor of premise 1, thus;
i) A>B, A>C, C>D, D>E
ii) B<A, C<A, D<C, E<D
iii) D>E, OE, B>C, A>B
iv) E<D, E<C, C<B, B<A
these two sets of problems were ccmbined with two types of question
set to produce the two functional perspectives. The partial
perspective set consisted of only two forms;
i) Who is tallest?
ii) Who is shortest?
- 147 -
and one of these questions was presented before the subject read
the relevant premises, thus allowing for the use of Wood-type
elimination strategies based on selective search for the premise
information pertinent to the question.
The full perspective set consisted of 7 basic types of question
each presented with both 'taller than' and 'shorter than'
relational terms, giving a total of 14 different forms:
i) Who is taller/shorter A or B?
ii) Who is taller/shorter D or E?
iii) Who is taller/shorter B or C?
iv) Who is taller/shorter B or D?
v) Who is taller/shorter A or D?
vi) Who is taller/shorter B or E?
vii) Who is taller/shorter A or E?
As will be noted these questions require the subject to make
comparisons of two iters separated by 0,1,2, or 3 inferential
steps. In this way it was intended that the full perspective set
vvould encourage the use of a spatial image device and furthermore
the use of such a device could be evidenced by the appearance of
inference distance effects as suggested by Trabasso. To make up
the set of 16 questions a second question 7 was added. The subject
was required to answer two of the above questions after reading
each of the 32 problems. For each problem one of the questions
involved a small inference distance ( 0 or 1 step ) while the other
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involved a large inference distance ( 2 or 3 steps ). The order of
presentation of all questions was counterbalanced across problems.
Subjects
40 Subjects of both sexes took part in this experiment. Subjects
were attending third-year practical classes in the department of
psychology at the University of Edinburgh. Subjects were randomly
assigned to 3 groups.
Apparatus
An Apple II microcomputer was used to present questions and record
response times as in experiment 3. In this experiment however
subjects were required to press the <space> bar to obtain each
premise one at a time.
Design
Subjects were divided into 3 groups. One group solved determinate
problems with the full perspective questions, a second group solved
indeterminate problems with the full perspective questions and the
third group solved indeterminate problems with the partial
perspective questions. This is summarised in table 5.2.1 overleaf.
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Problem Type Question set
Gp 1 ( n = 1 5 ) Determinate Full Perspective
Gd 2 (n=12) i ridetermi nate Full Perspective
Gp 3 (n=13) Incietermi nate Partial Perspective
Table 5.2.1 Design of Expedient 4.
Within each group subjects solved the 32 problems in the same fixed
order, namely, two figure 1 problems, two figure 2 problems, two
figure 3 problems, two figure 4 problems; and this block of 8 was
repeated four times. Groups 1 and 2, solving the full perspective
questions were further subdivided into 4 subgroups so that the
order of presentation of the questions could be counterbalanced.
Subgroups 1 and 3 received the questions in the order
1,5,2,6,3,7,4,8 repeated 8 times to give the 64 questions (2 per
problem). Subgroup 3 differed from, subgroup 1 in as much as 'the
order of presentation of questions within each of the 32 problems
was reversed. Subgroups 2 and 4 solved the problems in the order
8,4,7,3,6,2,5,1, but were otherwise identical to the other two
subgroups.
This counterbalancing meant that across any one group all 16
question types were presented within the first 4 problems, and thus
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it will be possible to examine inference distance effects over
practice. The relational terms used for the first 32 questions
was randomly chosen with the constraint that both questions on any
given problem must use the same term. The second 32 questions used
the relational term that had not been used on the corresponding
question of the first 32.
Procedure
As in experiment 3 subjects were tested individually with an
experimenter present to record the subjects verbalised answers to
questions. Each subject was informed of the general nature of the
experiment but was not given warm-up problems. Subjects were
informed that their performance was being timed and were encouraged
to solve the problems as fast as was consistent with minimal
errors. To this end subjects in this experiment were informed by
the experimenter when they had made a mistake in answering the
question (in the case of indeterminate problems this meant
providing an answer that was inconsistent with any possible
interpretation of the premises).
In order to encourage the development of elimination strategies in
the partial question group, subjects were informed that they were
allowed to answer the question as soon as they were able so to do,
even if they had not finished reading all of the premises„ (In
fact the choice of problem figures was such that subjects could
actually answer the partial questions after reading only the first
two premises of the problem). In this condition the experimenter
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also recorded the premise upon which the subject answered the
question.
As with experiment 3 it was intended to take protocol reports
during the session to provide further information about subjects
problem solving methods. It was intended to take 12 protocol
reports at varying intervals through the session. Unfortunately
owing to time constraints this did not prove possible in all cases.
While sane subjects provided all twelve protocols the majority only
provided 6, at intervals throughout the 32 problems, and seme only
provided one after the first problem and one after the last.
Nevertheless, subjects were encouraged to give a full description
of their problem solving methods and whenever a subject reported
using a spatial image device then the experimenter asked the
subject to specify in which direction the subject constructed the
array, i.e. whether fron tall to short on a vertical axis with tall
at the top or on a horizontal axis with tallest at the left and so
on.
As can be seen frcm the design section, order of presentation of
the four premise figures and question form was organised in such a
way that each problem occurred in conjunction with each question
form at regular (8-problem) intervals throughout the session.
Thus by grouping the 32 problems into 4 blocks of 8 it is possible
to examine the effects of practice on premise figure and question
form (particularly inference distance effects for groups 1 and 2 )
for each group of subjects.
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Results
Three categories of results are reported here. The protocol
reports are examined for evidence of both image formation and
elimination strategies, and then the question answering time is
examined for support for these reports. Finally premise
integration time is examined with respect to figure effects and the
effects of practice.
Protocol Reports
Table 5.2.2 presents the percentage of reports falling into the
two main categories of elimination and image formation.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Iiage Fonation 871 941 381
Eliiination 01 01 ill
Elaboration:
Rehearsal 801 751 01
Xneionics 531 331 231
Table 5.2.2 Percentage oT protocol reports Tailing into the three lain categories
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It can be seen from table 5.2.2 that, as predicted, the majority
of subjects, in groups 1 and 2 use an image formation strategy
which is elaborated by the use of mnemonics and rehearsal as in
experiment 3. Mnemonics refers to the use of memory saving devices
such as remembering only the initial letters of the items mentioned
in the premises. Subjects in group 2 solving indeterminate
problems, if anything, show a higher frequency of such reports than
those in group 1. In the partial perspective condition however,
where subject were again solving indeterminate problems the
frequency of image reports was much less and the majority of
subjects reported using an elimination strategy. As can be seen
the frequency of image reports was however still reasonably high.
Of those image reports, 80% occurred in the early reports and were
later replaced by elimination reports, the remainder occurred early
and persisted throughout the session. A detailed analysis of
these shifts is not possible due to the low density of protocol
reports provided by seme subjects. Of the subjects reporting the
use of a spatial image strategy, 98% report constructing an array
frcm tallest to shortest along a horizontal axis, with the tallest
at the left.
Question Answering Time
An analysis of question answering time is not meaningful for group
3 since this group received questions before premises, but for the
other two groups question answering time can be used to examine
inference distance effects. Figure 5.2.1 (overleaf) presents
question answering time averaged over the 4 inference distances.
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Figure 5.2.1 Inference distance effects (leans for groups 1 and 2 only)
A distance of 0 indicates that the two items compared in the
question were actually adjacent items and thus were presented in
the same premise. A distance of 1 indicates that the two items
compared are separated by one other item, a distance of 2, that
they are separated by two other items, and 3 that they are
separated by three items and are thus the two end-terms of the
five-term series.
It will be recalled, that Trabasso argued that the subjects' use
of a spatial image representation could be inferred frcm the
counter-intuitive result that subjects respond faster to items that
are separated by a large inference distance than to items that are
actually presented together in the premises. It might be expected
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then, on the basis of the protocol results above, that subjects in
groups 1 and 2 would show such a question answering time profile.
As can be seen from figure 5.2.1, this is indeed the case. The
faster response time to 0 distance questions than to 1 distance
questions can be accounted for by the fact that the 0 distance
questions contain a higher proportion of end-anchored questions
which tend to be answered faster independently of inference
distance effects. When the inference distance effect is examined
as a function of practice as in figure 5.2.2 below, it can be seen
that the effect emerges early in practice and remains relatively
stable throughout the session, a finding which concords with the
protocol reports for these subjects.
inference distance & problsa blocks
Fisure 5.2.2 Inference distance effects as a function of proble. blocks salved
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An analysis of variance on these data reveals, a significant
inference distance effect (F^ ^ = 12.29; p < 0.0001). No
significant effect of group (F^ 23 = 0.74; p = 0.3975), a
significant effect of practice (F^ ^ = 15.95; p < 0.0001), but
no practice by distance interaction (Fg 207 =1-65; p = 0.1019),
distance by group interaction (F3 59 = 0.19; p = 0.9055), or
practice by group interaction (F^ ^ = 2.01; p = 0.1207).
These results indicate that subjects' reports of using a spatial
image representation to solve these problems are reflected in the
question answering profiles. Even in situations of indeterminacy,
in which the structure does not allow for a veridical ordering of
the items mentioned, subjects will still impose seme ordering so
that such a representational device can be used to answer the
questions.
Premise Integration Time
Premise integration time refers to the time taken for subjects to
read the information in all four premises in order to be able to
answer the question associated with the premises, and figure 5.2.3
(overleaf) presents the total premise integration time averaged for
the four practice blocks for each group of subjects. Analysis of
variance on these data reveals an overall effect of group (F 2 35 =
3.62; p = 0.0373), an effect of practice blocks (F
39,105 ib°/b'°
p < 0.0001), but no block by group interaction (Fg 395= 1=88? p =
0.0904 ). This suggests an overall effect of practice on premise
integration time.
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figure 5.2.3 6roup co»parisuns of Preiise integration ti»e as a function of problei blocks
Further analyses reveals that the main effect of group is located
between group 3 and the other two groups. Thus there was no effect
of group when only groups 1 and 2 were considered (F^ 24 = 0.07; p
= 0.7979), the effect of practice blocks however remained (F
3,72 ~
7.59; p = 0.0002). This refinement of the group effects allows us
to conclude that it is the question set distinction (full vs.
partial), rather than the determinacy or indeterminacy of the
premises that determines premise integration times.
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Figure 5.2.4 a,b&c, (facing page) presents integration times for
each of the four premise figures as a function of practice blocks
and groups. An analysis of variance on these data reveals a
significant effect of figure (F ^ 3Q5 = 10.35; p < 0.0001),, a
significant effect of group (F£ 35 = 3.62; p = 0.0373), a figure
by group interaction (F g =4.04; p = 0.0011), a figure by
block interaction (Fg 3]_5= 2.19; p 0.0228), but no significant,
three-way interaction (F ^g =2.19; p = 0.3087).
Tn a consideration of groups 1 and 2 treated separately there was
an effect of figure (F ^ 73 = 12.93; p < 0.0001) bu'" no "ffect
of group (F^ 0.07; p = 0.7979), and no interaction between
group and figure (F ^ ^ = 2.16; p = 0.1007), or between practice
and figure (Fg 235 = 1.37; p = 0.2033). For group 3 considered
alone there was a significant effect of figure (F ^ ^ = 3.88; p =
0.0176 ), and practice (Fg = 10.08; p < 0.0001), but no
interaction between practice and figure ( Fg gg=1.79; p = 0.0804 ).
These results suggest that the time taken to integrate the premise
information varies as a function of premise figure for both partial
and full question conditions, and that these effects persist over
practice. As can be seen by inspection however the figure
profiles for the two question conditions is quite distinct. For the
full question condition the rank ordering of problem difficulty
seans to be fig.l < fig.3 < fig.2 < fig.4, whereas for the
partial condition the ordering is fig.4 < fig.l < fig.3 < fig.2,
suggesting that the different question sets place different
- 159 -
demands on the information processing carried out by the subject.
On the basis of the protocol reports it is possible to deduce
which figures should be expected to produce most difficulty for
subjects, particularly in the full question condition. Subjects in
these conditions reported the use of a spatial image device in
which the preferred direction of working for most subjects was
from tall to short. On this basis it would be predicted that
figure 1 and 2 would be easier to solve than figures 3 and 4 since
they are consistent with subjects' professed direction of working.
This seems to be supported by figure 5.2.4. There is a further
distinction to be made on the basis of the congruence of the items
with respect to their final placement in the array (cf Potts and
Sholz). Figure 2 although presenting information in a form
consistent with the subjects preferred direction of working,
presents new items in a way which is incongruent with the items
final placement.
As can be seen from figure 5.2.4, this problem is more difficult
to solve than its congruent counteroart- figure 1. Similar
profiles emerge for figures 3 and 4 with the congruent figure, ie.
figure 3, being solved more easily than fiqure 4. As can be seen
by inspection the size of the effects due to congruity are
approximately equal to those due to preferred direction of working.
It will be noted that no such profile emerges for the partial
question condition.
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In a cost-test questionnaire administered to subjects they were
asked to rank the four premise figures thay had solved in terms of
an assessment of their difficulty. And there was a hiah concordance
between these subjective rankings and rankings on the basis of the
above predictions from the image model. 80% of subjects usincr an
image strateoy record a rankina of fig 1 < fig 3 < fia 2 < fig 4
for example.
In an attempt to analyse these figure effects more fully,
individual premise reading times were analysed with respect to
figure effects and practice blocks. These results are presented in
figure 5.2.5 (facing page). An analysis of variance on these data
reveals an overall effect of group (F2 = 5.12; p = 0.0111), an
effect of practice (F^ -^qq = 6.97; p = 0.0002), but no main effect
of premise (F ^ -^qq = 1.74; p = 0.163). There was no premise by
practice interaction (F g 324 =1.46; p = 0.0002), but there was a
significant premise by figure interaction (F gg ^4 =2.98; p =
0.0002), and an interaction between group and premise (F g -j 08 ~
2.54; p = 0.0246). Finally there was a significant three-way
interaction between practice, figure and premise (F 2y 527 ™ 1*59;
p = 0.0028), but no interaction between group, block and premise (F
18 324 = 1-09' P = 0-3652 ).
These results suggest that the figure effects obtained when total
premise integration time is analysed can be further refined into
distinctive premise contours associated with each of the figures.
Furthermore, the significant three-way interaction suggests that
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for seme groups, these contour effects chanqe as a function of
practice.
An analysis of groups 1 and 2 alone reveals a significant effect of
figure 3 75 = 8.96; p = < 0.0001) and a premise by figure
interaction (F g 225 = 3.15; p = 0.0013), but no practice by
premise interaction (F g 225 = 3*39; P = 0.1925), and no three-way
interaction between block figure and premise (F g 225 = 1=21; p =
0.2278). This suggests that for the full question condition
premise contours associated with the various premise figures are
stable over practice.
In a consideration of group 3 however, there is not only a main
effect of premise (F 3 33 = 2.87; p = 0.0513), but a premise by
block interaction (F g gg = 4.46; p < 0.0001), and although there
is no interaction between figure and premise (F g gg = 1„ 79; p -
0.0800), there is a three-way interaction between premise, block
and figure (F ^ = 1.64; p = 0.022). Thus the partial question
condition produces a quite different effect on premise reading
time. Here it appears that the premise contours associated with the
various figures change as a function of practice.
Cne of the most striking characteristics of the contour effects is
the way in which the two groups solving indeterminate problems -
groups 2 and 3 - are almost indistinguishable early in practice but
the group with the partial question set quickly drop away from the
other group and the premise contour becomes very much flattened.
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Indeed there is no significant effect of premise contour for group
3 when only the last two blocks of problems are considered (F ^ gg
=0.58; p = 0.6351). This is may reflect the way in which these
subjects move away from the image formation strategies as the
partial question set beccmes exploited by the use of elimination=
Discussion
The hypotheses under test in this experiment are well supported by
the data. In consideration of the full perspective question set,
once again the protocol reports make it clear that nearly all
subjects use seme form of image device for solving these problems„
These reports are substantiated by observations of inference
distance effects in the question answering times. The fact that
there was no distinction between subjects solving determinate and
indeterminate problems in this full perspective condition suggests
that the image device is not constructed as a consequence of
praru.se comprehension but rather is a background resource which is
used in order that comprehension might be achieved. This is
supported by protocol reports suggesting that practised subjects
construct a spatial array in anticipation of reading particular
problems and as a hypothesis about those problems.
The protocol reports also make it clear that for the full
perspective condition once again, use of the image device persists
even as subjects beccme more expert. Furthermore the characteristic
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architecture of this device is also stable over practice . Thus
even practised subjects claim to have a preference for ordering
itans along a horizontal axis with the tallest item on the left and
preferred left-to-right direction of working.
Having used protocols to establish this stability over practice it
was then possible to investigate premise figure effects. In
particular it was found that those problems which were incongruent.
with the subject's preferred direction of working required longer
pranise integration times and were judged to be more difficult by
subjects. These premise profiles are taken as evidence for the
existence of information processing strategies which serve to make
incongruent information congruent with the characteristic
architecture of the underlying representational space. While the
underlying representational space is a general cognitive resource,
these processing strategies serve as the bridge between this
general resource and the specific characteristics of the domain at
hand.
These figure effects were present only in the full perspective
condition and were stable over practice. In the partial
perspective condition, where there was very little evidence of the
sustained use of images, these figure effects quickly dissipated as
the subject became more expert. This suggests that the processing
strategies hypothesised to underlie these effects are .indeed
dedicted to the image representation and that for an elimination
strategy the relationship between premises is of little importance.
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The fact that for image users, the premise figure effects are
stable over practice is crucial to the understanding of domain
specific expertise. This refutes the proposition that domain
specific expertise is that which renders formally equivalent
problems psychologically equivalent. It would seen that a set of
formally equivalent problems are never psychologically equivalent
for novice or for expert. Surface structure variation within a
class of problems will always make itself felt. The structure of
the psychological representation of a problem class is never
isomorphic with the formal structure of that class.
The view of domain specific expertise that emerges here then, is
that an expert subject is able to recognise a class of problems as
potentially solvable with respect to seme representational
resource. Not only this, but he must also be able to deploy
specific procedures for relating this novel class of problems to
that background resource.
Given this interpretation, it is clearly of interest to examine how
a subject might determine when a particular representational
resource is appropriate for a particular problem domain. The clear
dichotomy between full and partial problem perspectives obtained in
this experiment would suggest that one important criterion used by
subjects is a sensitivity towards the functional goals of a problem
solving situation. Subjects in the full perspective conditions
were required to make multiple comparisons between premise itans in
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order to solve the problem correctly, whereas the partial
perspective subjects were only required to identify one item that
had a particular property (ie the tallest or smallest item).
The different functional goals of these two conditions make the
subject's choice to use an image device more or less appropriate,,
In the full perspective condition it is an appropriate resource to
use. In the partial condition it is not since it involves the
subject in retention of premise information which is not pertinent
to the solution of the problem. It is not surprising then that
subjects in the partial perspective condition abandon the image
device in favour of the more appropriate elimination method.
Sensitivity to functional goals was also identified as a factor in
the solving of state space problems (cf chapter 3) and is clearly a
general problem solving skill probably used by subjects to avoid
the use of inappropriate problem solving methods in a wide variety
of situations. In a short follow up study (see appendix B)„ The
subjects of this experiment were tested again one week later. This
time all subjects were presented with the determinate problems but
in a partial perspective condition. Subjects practised in the use
of elimination were initially much better at solving these problems
despite the fact that group two had experienced these same
determinate premises the week earlier. Most subjects who had
experienced the full perspective condition the week previously
began by using the previously appropriate image device. But this
was quickly abandoned however in favour of elimination such that
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initial group differences were quickly lost. This would suggest
that subjects are sensitive to the efficiency of problem solving
methods with respect to the kinds of memory load they place on the
system for example, as well as the effectiveness of a method in
terms of whether it affords a solution to the problem The image
device is an effective method even for the partial perspective
condition but it is not efficient.
General Discussion of the Inference Experiments
The decision to use inference tasks rather than state space tasks
in this second set of experiments was motivated by two things.
Firstly, it was argued that these problems were amenable to
protocol analysis techniques and this would provide a relatively
direct method of gaining information about the psychological
mechanisms underwriting dcmain specific expertise. Secondly, it-
was argued that such expertise could be easily studied in this
domain of problems because it was possible to systematically
manipulate surface structure variation within a single class of
problem.
The experiments reported here have certainly born out this
decision. In both experiments, but particularly experiment three,
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protocol analysis has proved to be an affluent source of
information concerning the psychological mechanisms of expertise.
These protocols revealed that subjects use a form of spatial .Image
device to solve these problems, but contrary to indications in the
literature, this device is not abandoned as subjects become more
expert. On the contrary, the device is used by expert subjects in
anticipation of premise information and as a schema for the
interpretation of such information. Furthermore, as the subjects
become more expert the device becomes more dimensionalised with
subjects reporting a consistent preferred direction of working,
along a horizontal axis from left to right with the tallest at the
left. In addition, the protocol reports also revealed that with)
practice the image device became elaborated by the use of mnemonic
strategies such as rehearsal, a clear indication that the subject
was sensitive to the manorial demands placed on him by these tasks.
Because the protocol reports indicated the image device to be
stable over practice, it became clear why surface structure
variation plays such an important part in the psychology of
reasoning with these inference problems (see also Johnson-Laird
1983). Surface structure variation leads sane problems to be
presented in a way which is incongruent with the characteristic
architecture of the image device. Thus a subject must deploy
information processing strategies which render these problems
congruent. The need to deploy such strategies with certain forms
of problems is responsible for the characteristic premise
integration time profile observed with these problems.
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It is these processing strategies and the distinction between
representation and strategy that they imply, which provides us with
an understanding of the psychological factors involved in domain
specific expertise. Expertise within a class of structurally
equivalent problems does not serve to render such problems
psychologically equivalent. On the contrary, domain specific
expertise implies that subjects have a quite general
representational resource against which novel problems must be
evaluated. In so doing the subject must actively translate such
novel problems into a form which is compatible with the background
resource. Domain specific expertise is the ability to recognise
problems as solvable with respect to an existing representational
schema while at the same time recognising that each problem has a
distinctive surface structure form.
These experiments also confirmed another form of expertise which
did not involve the use of the image device. This was the
elimination strategy of Wood et al (Wood et al op cit, Quinton and
Fellows op cit). It was argued that this expertise was not of the
domain specific sort with which this thesis is primarily concerned.
This could not be so because it involved the subject in implicitly
redefining the problem that he was solving. The shift frcm the use
of the image device to the use of elimination is based upon the
subject using his knowledge of functional invariants in the
experimental procedure to avoid carrying out inferences altogether.
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Based as it is however, on the subject's awareness of functional
goals, this form of expertise can be seen as being rooted in a more
general problem solving skill, namely, the subject's sensitivity to
what it is that he 'needs to know' in order to solve the problem as
effortlessly as possible.
It is clear then that the use of protocol reporting has provided
information without which a number of the conclusions could not be
drawn. For example without an independent means of assessing a
subjects preferred direction of working, the effects of surface
structure variation would have been uninterpretable. It seems clear
that future work in this area must be prepared to consider the role
of such data much more carefully.
It is of interest then, to note that there have recently been
reports in the literature on the role of verbal reporting in
problem solving (Ericsson and Simon 1980, Berry and Broadbent 1984)
which have attempted to assess the precise relationship between
verbalisable knowledge and problem solving performance. In this
thesis we have concentrated very little on this aspect of the
protocol data. As was pointed out in the discussion of experiment
three, it is not clear from these experiments in what way the
observed changes in protocol reports were related to improvement
in reaction times. It is not known for example whether practice at
protocol reporting per se improved the subjects ability to
introspect about his solution method, or whether the changes in
problem solving behaviour suggested by the protocols were causal
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to reduction in solution times.
Berry and Broadbent's paper serves to demonstrate that the answer-
to this problem is very complex. They found that the ability of
subject to verbalise knowledge associated with performance on
complex cognitive tasks was often quite unrelated to the ability of
subjects to actually perform the task. Under certain conditions,
subjects showed an improvement in performance with practice that
was not accompanied by an improved ability to answer questions
requiring explication of the knowledge associated with such
performance. Under other circumstances, with the very same tasks,
subjects would show a marked improvement in their ability to
verbalise knowledge but showed no improvement in performance. Only
when subjects were given explicit verbal training on the problems
and were required to 'think aloud' while solving the task was there
an improvement in performance which was accompanied by an
improvement in verbalisation.
Clearly, this issue is an important one but one which is in need of
further research before an adequate account is forthcoming. From
the point of view of this thesis we must be content that the
correlation between such measures as premise integration time and
inference distance effect, and the qualitative measures of protocol
analysis is both consistent across subjects and between
experiments, and as such is strongly suggestive of a genuine
relationship.
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Finally, given that the inference problems were chosen precisely
because they supported the use of protocol measures, it might be
asked to what extent are such problems representative of problem
solving in general? Berry and Broadbent, for example argue that
since protocol data does not always provide access to the kinds of
knowledge involved in problem solving its importance for a study of
problem solving might be quite limited. This conclusion has to be
resisted. Apart from the fact that the experiments reported here
make claims about the nature of expertise which are in principle
generalisable to other domains, there would appear to be strong
reasons for suggesting, that only when problem solving involves
verbalisable knowledge is it problem solving of any interesting
sort. In most areas of 'real world' problem solving such as
mathonatics and computer science for example, one of the hallmarks
of an 'expert' is his ability to communicate his understanding of
the subject to others. If this were not the case then science
would simply not be possible. It is also of interest to note in
this respect, that one of the criteria used in AI research to
assess the 'expertness' of an expert system is the ability of the




An Evaluation of the Experimental Programme
This thesis has been concerned with an investigation into the
nature of expertise in problem solving. In the .introductory
chapter a number of criteria were put forward against which much of
the literature on problem solving could be assessed.
It was argued that a distinction had to be maintained between a
'successful' solution and an 'expert' solution. The latter is not
a solution which simply provides an answer to a problem but one
which is tempered by considerations of economy, and particularly
one which extends beyond the confines of the problem in which it
was generated. It follows frcm this latter point, that any
experimental study of expertise must use transfer of learning
paradigms in seme form or other. Much of the early research on
animal learning was judged to be inadequate with respect to this
criterion (Cf Thorndike 1898, Kohler 1925 for example). Few of
these studies used transfer paradigms, and those that did used the
train-and-test paradigm simply as a means of testing for the
presence of a particular solution method.
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It was argued that a study of expertise required a different kind
of transfer paradigm, one in which subjects were presented with
multiple problems to solve and which allowed for a leve) of
expertise to be generated within the testing situation. While
there had been such studies reported (Cf. Harlow 1959, Hull 1920),
these studies proved to be inadequate by a further criterion.
It was argued that there were two possible views about the nature
of expertise. The first of these regards expertise as the ability
to use highly effective problem solving methods but methods which
are quite task specific because they are based on knowledge which
is specific to the task domain in question. This domain specifc
notion of expertise was contrasted with a second which views
expertise more in terms of the possession of problem solving
heuristics. These heuristics are not tied to a particular task
domain but are quite general because they do not incorporate
task-specific knowledge. While studies using multiple-problem
transfer procedures had demonstrated quite dramatic transfer
effects they had failed to discover which kind of expertise was
underwriting such transfer effects.
Because these criteria proved so useful for evaluating the existing
problem solving literature, it seams appropriate at this time to
assess the experiments reported in this thesis by the same
criteria. The first goal of the experimental programme was to
establish transfer effects in the laboratory and to identify which
- 174 -
form of expertise might underwrite any transfer thus obtained„ The
state space problems of Luger et al (Goldin and McClintock 1980)
were useful in this respect since they allowed for a means of
analysing problems into classes or domains in terms of their
structural affinities. Furthermore it had been argued that human
problem solvers are sensitive to the structural properties of these
problems and that knowledge of structural equivalence was involved
in the solution of these problems. Thus if expertise in problem
solving were of the domain specific sort, it would be expected that
any transfer effects that were obtained with these problems would
be limited to problems of the same structural type. In contrast if
expertise were of a more general sort then no such constraints on
transfer would be expected.
The results of the two experiments with state-space problems
reported in this thesis show that in fact both kinds of transfer
effects can be obtained in the laboratory. Experiment 1 revealed
transfer effects across non-iscmorphic problems. This was taken
to indicate that seme form of non dcmain-specific expertise had
been tapped. In contrast, experiment 2 revealed transfer effects
which were limited to isomorphic problems and thus taken to
indicate that seme form of domain-specific expertise had been
tapped. This second form of expertise however, produced much more
dramatic transfer effects than the more general sort obtained in
experiment 1. Here subjects were showing 100% transfer after
solving only five problems.
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These experiments also made a clear distinction between a
'successful' solution to a problem and an 'expert' solution„ In
experiment 1 in which subjects were simply required to solve each
problem in any way they liked, the solutions tended to be
inefficient as judged by the number of redundant moves in the
solution path and there was no evidence for any transfer across
isomorphic problems. Only in experiment 2 in which subjects were
required to solve each problem to a criterion of mastery did they
use knowledge of structural equivalence to produce solutions in the
minimum number of moves possible, and only then did the dramatic
isomorphic transfer ensue. It was clear that expertise within a
single problem was necessary to guarantee transfer to subsequent
problems of the same type.
While the experiments with the state space problems provided us
with the ground rules for identifying expertise of a domain
specific sort and made it clear that such expertise produced by far'
the most dramatic transfer effects, in fact these experiments
afforded little that could be used to establish a psychological
account of such expertise. It was not clear from these experiments
what the nature of the psychological representation might be that
allowed subjects to extend solution procedures to problems
differing quite widely in their surface structure characteristics.
Nor was it clear what the role of practice was on these
representational mechanisms. Part of the problem here lay in the
fact that the psychological measures that could be used in this
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problem domain were quite restricted. Variables such as solution
time, moves to solution and trials-to-criterion while offering
good indices of improvement with practice do not themselves inform
about the mechanisms giving rise to such improvements.
In an attempt to rectify these measurement problems the method of
protocol reporting was used. Such methods have been shown to be of
use in other problem solving contexts and have provided useful
information about the nature of the psychological representations
that underwrite performance, Furthermore, research using state
space tasks has demonstrated the efficacy of this method for
providing information concerning the kinds of moves subjects make
or consider making.
The attempts in experiment 2 to use this method to obtain
information about the representational device underwriting such,
move-making were unrevealing. Subjects appeared to be unable to
report anything about their representation of the problem
environment. Since the method of protocol reporting has been shown
to be successful in other problem solving situations it could only
be concluded that there was something inherent in the nature of
these state space tasks that made the method inappropriate. It
might be for example that the level of representation is too low to
be amenable to conscious access. This explanation has been put
forward to account for the fact that people are very poor at
describing motoric skills which they demonstrably possess.
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A second limitation of the state space paradigm as an empirical
basis for psychological explanations is that the problem types are
limited in terms of the number of distinct problems that can be
constructed for each type, and the individual problems within each
type cannot be varied in any systematic way. Clearly, if we are to
study factors affecting expertise within a single task dcmain then
the internal structure of that dcmain must be well specified„
For these reasons it was decided to look for a new problem domain
which, while affording potential for investigating seme of the
psychological mechanisms of expertise, nevertheless conserved the
important findings of the previous work. In particular seme means
of classifying problems in terms of their structural
characteristics would be needed. This would allow further
experiments to focus on the kind of domain specific expertise that
had produced such dramatic transfer with the state space problems.
Furthermore it would be necessary for large classes of problems to
be generated so that multiple problem transfer procedures could be
used. But also it must be possible to specify the systematic ways
in which problems within a given class differ frcm one another.
Finally it must be possible to measure transfer in terms of
solution time or seme other index as well using protocol methods to
get at same of the psychological mechanisms that underwrite
performance.
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With these criteria in mind deductive inference tasks were used as
the problem domain for further experiments. The formal logical
analysis of these problems provides a taxonomy of problem classes
and there was already a wealth of litrature on the use of reaction
time data and protocol methods with these problems.
But the work that was already in existence on expertise factors in
the solving of these problems was both sparse and ill-conceived*
It had been argued that 'novice' subjects solved these problems by
integrating the premise information into seme form of spatial image
representation or mental model, while 'expert:' subjects avoid the
use of any such 'thinking' strategies. Rather they used short-cut
heuristics based on their knowledge of the questions asked and the
syntactic invariances in the premises of the problems,.
(Johnson-Laird 1975, Quinton and Fellows 1975, Wood 1974)* But it
was clear however that this version of expertise was not of the
same nature as that which had been identified in the state space
experiments.
This expertise was not generated over a single class of problems*
It could not be because the subject was implicitly redefining the
class of problems within which he was working. At the outset the
subject's task was to make transitive inferences based on the
co-ordination of premise information, but the subject becomes an
expert, not at doing this, but rather at searching the premises in
turn for a specific item of information. These expert strategies
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actually allow the subject to avoid making inferences altogether.
It was clear then that before we could begin to examine the
psychological mechanisms of expertise in these tasks we must
establish the existence of a form of expertise that was specific to
the inference problems as a distinct class of problems.
In experiment 4 of this thesis a direct comparison was made between
subjects solving problems by the use of shallow heuristics, and
subjects solving problans that required inferential skills. The
results clearly showed that there were significant transfer effects
as indexed by reduction in solution time with practice and that it
was shown by both groups of subjects. Only in one group however
did the protocol reports show the use of shallow heuristics. In
the other groups, subjects report using a spatial image strategy.
Thus there is demonstrably an expertise factor in performance on
these inference tasks which is a time form of expertise on a single
class of problems analogous to that obtained in the state space
experiments.
Having established that there is sane form of danain specific
expertise to be explained here, it was then possible to consider
the extent to which the protocol data offer sane insights into the
psychological nature of the expertise and how this is expressed
within the problem danain, thus justifying the decision to use
inference problems. Experiment 3 used a protocol probe technique
to analyse the characteristics of the subjects problem solving
strategy and how this changes over practice. Most other studies
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have simply asked subjects to provide protocol reports after they
had finished solving the problems, in this study subjects were
interrupted at various points in the experimental session and asked
to provide a protocol report. This method proved to be an affluent
source of information as to the psychological variables affecting
performance.
Firstly it was found that nearly all subjects used seme form of
spatial image device for representing the items mentioned in the
premises in terms of an ordered linear array. The use of such
devices has been reported elsewhere in the literature but the
status of such a device with respect to expertise was unknown. It
has been argued that such a strategy was only used by novice
subjects, on the other hand the developmental literature suggests
that the use of such a device is a quite sophisticated response to
the problem.
The results of the protocol reports make it quite clear in the case
of adult problem solvers solving problaxis which do not support the
use of shallow heuristics, that the image device occurs very early
in the path-to-expertise. Even after the very first problem, most
subjects report using such a device, furthermore the use of this
device persists despite improvenents in performance as their
experience with the problem domain grows. Most subjects still
reported using the device after the last problem of the session.
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It is clear then that the use of this device is not a consequence
of growing expertise. The results of experiment 4 add further
weight to this. Here it was found that subjects report using the
device quite consistently, even for solving indeterminate problems
which do not in themselves provide enough information for the
construction of such an image. This made it clear that subjects
were not constructing the image on the basis of an understanding of
the premise information but rather using the image as a schema for
the interpretation of that information. This was further supported
by the protocol reports of subjects using the spatial image device
as a hypothesis in anticipation of actually reading the premises of
a novel problem.
Thus rather than being a consequence of expertise the spatial image
device appears to be a general background resource capable of being
called up in response to a diverse range of problem solving
situations. It is hardly surprising then to find that the use of
such devices has been widely reported in many other contexts
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Foos 1980, Friedman 1984), and indeed
that subjects in the experiments reported here can not only use
such devices to solve three- and five-term transitivity problems
but also indeterminate problems and problems involving the
co-ordination of two-dimensional relational terms.
But if the spatial image device is to be interpreted as a general
problem solving resource, how is the expertise factor tapped in
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these experiments to be explained? Once again the protocol
reports frcm experiment three provide seme clues. These indicate
that although the use of a spatial image device persists throughout
all the problems the basic mechanism is elaborated somewhat as a
function of practice. One significant elaboration is the use of
mnemonics such as rehearsal. But while such mnemonics provide
interesting information concerning metacognitive factors in the
information processing abilities of these subjects, they may have
little to do with the expertise factor observed here. On the
contrary it could be argued that such mnemonics emerge as a
response to the extra time for which expert subjects were required
to retain premise information .
Of more interest were the reports suggesting that the image device
became more clearly dimensionalised as a function of practice with
the items being arranged on a horizontal vector frcm left to right
with the tallest on the right. Subjects began to actively search
for premise information which was congruent with this preferred
direction of working. It seemed that as suggested by McGonigle and
Chalmers (1984 a&b), there are two aspects to the solving of these
problems that must be differentiated. Firstly there is the
representational space that is prior to the interpretation of any
problem, and which has a characteristic architecture, and was used
as a schema for interpreting premise information. Secondly there
must be a set of information processing strategies that subjects
use to map the different surface forms of the problem domain onto
this space. Problems whose surface forms were most congruent with
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the underlying representational architecture require the least
extra processing to be so mapped, but problems whose surface forms
are incongruent with the representational space require extra
processing time to make them congruent. In terms of a task specific
component of expertise then, it searted that this could be
identified as the ability to develop strategies that allowed the
problems of a specific domain to be interpreted in terms of a more
general, domain-independent representational resource.
Experiment 4 examined this hypothesis further by presenting
subjects with 4 sets of problems which, although formally
equivalent five-term inference problems, differed markedly in 'the
degree to which there surface forms were congruent with the known
characteristics of the spatial image device. It was argued that,
incongruent versions would require extra processing time for their
pranises to be mapped onto the representational space. But as the
subject's knowledge of the problem dcmain grows, and he becomes
more expert at dealing with the specific surface structure
variations we might expect that these differences between congruent
and incongruent forms would dissipate. This would be quite
consistent with the operational definition of expertise that was
developed in response to the state space findings namely,
expertise is that which is required in order to guarantee that
formally equivalent tasks are also psychologically equivalent.
The premise integration time data of experiment 4 provided strong
support for the claim that there was a meaningful distinction to be
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irade between representation and strategy. There were strong
effects of problem congruence on premise integration time.
Problems that were less congruent took longer to integrate.
However the effect of problem congruence did not interact with
practice effects, incongruent problems did not become easy to
integrate as subjects became more expert. Indeed if anything the
effects of congruence became more stable with practice.
It appears then that these findings contradict the hypothesis that
while the representational space is a general problem solving
resource the processing strategies constitute a dcmain specific
factor of expertise. But more careful consideration al'lcws this
contradiction to be resolved. If we accept the good evidence to
show that the representational architecture is independent of the
particular information that is presented in a problem and remains
unchanged as a result of that information^ then obviously the
processing strategies that are used to map that information onto
the representational space must also be stable over practice.
Indeed it might even be expected that as the problem dcmain becomes
more well defined with practice then the reaction time profiles
attributable to the use of such strategies must themselves become
more well defined. Any changes in such profiles could only be a
consequence of a general noise reduction factor and would perhaps
be of little interest.
To further clarify this we might contrast the situation in
experiment 4 with that in experiment 3. In experiment 3 subjects
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report scanning problems in search of premises that were congruent
with their preferred direction of working. Such scanning was
obviously not possible in experiment 4 because premises were
presented individually. But if subjects in experiment 4 had been
able to control the order of promise presentation, it might have
been found that, as their experience of the surface valuations
present in the problem domain grew, they might well have begun, to
opt for a presentation order that meant premises were presented in
an order that was congruent with their preferred direction of
working. This would have alleviated the need for inter-premise
conversion strategies and so reduced premise integration time. But
this would not have meant that the effects of problem congruence
had been dissipated in any true sense, it would merely have meant
that the incongruences had been overcome in a different way.
Whichever way it is viewed then, domain specific expertise is the
ability to deploy information processing strategies that allow
novel problems in that domain to be interpreted in terms of a more
general representational framework. But this interpretation of
domain specific expertise contradicts the earlier suggestion that
the effect of such expertise was to render a formally equivalent
class of problems psychological equivalent. The effects of surface
structure variation on 'naive' problem solvers is well documented
in both the developmental and adult literature (Donaldson 1968,
Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972 for eg), and it might have been
expected that extended training on structurally equivalent problems
would serve to alleviate the adverse effects of such content
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variables on abstract thinking. But the conclusions of this thesis
make it clear that formally equivalent problems, varying in -'cheir
surface forms, are never psychologically equivalent for novice or
expert. Indeed they will be treated as different by an expert
precisely because they are formally equivalent. The only
difference between novice and expert is that the expert, if he
knows two problems to be formally equivalent, can attempt to
provide a solution for one on the basis of his solution for the
other, but this involves knowing the systematic differences between
the two versions of the problem. This distinction between formal
and psychological equivalence is reflected clearly in a recent
article on the solving of 'NP-ccmplete' polynomial equations in
matharatics. After much research effort these problems are still
refractory to solution. More recent research effort has been
dedicated instead to proving that these problems form a class and
are related to other classes of problems for which solutions might
be more readily attained. In which case mathematicians would still
not have a solution to the NP-ccmplete problems, but at least they
would know that a solution exists (Kolata 1980).
Directions for further research
To summarise then, the experimental programme reported in this
thesis has achieved several things. Firstly it has shown that
expertise can be studied in the laboratory, provided that suitable
experimental procedures are employed. Secondly, it has
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distinguished between two forms of expertise and provided sane
evidence for both. Finally in concentrating on one form of
expertise namely, domain specific expertise, the thesis has offered
seme account of the psychological mechanisms involved. In
considering the implications this work has for further research,
there would seem to be two useful directions further work might
take. The first of these is to examine seme of the psychological
mechanisms that are involved in the other form of expertise
observed, but not accounted for, in this thesis, namely non
domain-specific expertise. The second is to follow up the major
conclusion of the thesis with respect to domain specific expertise,
namely to examine further the relationship between general-
representational resources and task specific processsing
strategies.
In considering non donain-specific expertise, the results of the
thesis suggest that metacognitive factors play an important role in
problem solving and would seem to offer a strong candidate for
aspects of seme general problem solving skill. The factors can be
classified into two types, which might be labelled, 'subject' and
'object' knowledge, (cf. McGonigle 1984). Sensitivity of
subjects to their own memory limitations is an example of subject
knowledge. The protocol reports revealed that subjects were very
much aware of their working memory limitations as they solved the
inference tasks. They were able to predict when characteristics of
the task would be likely to lead to failures of memory and were
able to take pre-emptive action to avoid such failures by the use
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of mnemonics. This awareness presupposes that human subjects have
access to the workings of their own system and knowledge of their
cwn design limitations. Such knowledge would clearly be of use in
a wide range of problem solving situations and is thus a strong
candidate for a general problem solving skill.
It is interesting to note in this respect that the growth in
metacognitive awareness and self-monitoring of this sort has
recently been put forward as a major axis of cognitive development
(Kail 1978). Young children can be taught to use mnemonics such as
rehearsal, but it is not until age 9 and over that they are able to
recognise situations in which the use of such mnemonics is
appropriate. This distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing
when' has also been identified as an important dimension in
children's oral communication skills. (Dickson 1980).
Object knowedge refers to the knowledge that a subject gains about
the functional criteria at work in the problem solving environment.
In the case of the inference experiments for example, the shift of
subjects towards shallow processing heuristics was based on the
subjects' knowledge that they were only being interrogated about a
subset of the information that was available and could thereby
eliminate redundant information. Such sensitivity to what it is
the subject 'needs to know', allcws highly cost-effective
processing of information. Given the difficulty that subjects
experience in finding minimum solution paths to the state space
problems for example, it would be wasteful for a subject to process
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to this level if a minimum path was not a requirement of the task,
as functionally defined by the experimenter. The ability of a
subject to assess the functional goal of a novel problem situation
is thus a further general problem solving skill.
Research on metacognitive factors is concerned, in essence, with
the study of the problem solver as a 'knowing system'. It follows
then, that the paradigm for such research must involve informing
the subject, quite explicitly, about the nature of the functional
goals that are at work in the problem solving situation, and
assessing the extent to which such knowledge affects problem
solving behaviour. It is of interest to speculate then, whether
subjects solving state space tasks for example, would behave
differently if they were explicitly informed about the isomorphic
structure of problem classes and that mastery of one guaranteed
mastery of all. Would subjects, knowing that they had a large
number of isomorphic problems to solve, elect to practice
extensively on one problem before moving on to the next? Such
experiments would raise interesting questions concerning the
ability of subjects to assess the computational costs and benefits
accruing to various problem solving strategies, and to decide which
strategy would be most appropriate in a given situation.
The problem of strategic decision making has received very scant
attention in recent years. The emphasis has tended to be on
describing the different strategies that different subjects use and
explaining individual differences in these terms (Newell and Simon
- 190 -
1972, Egan and Grimes Farrow 1982, Underwood 1978 for eg)„ There
has been little corresponding work on why a given subject chooses
the strategy he does. Most of the AI work in this area has
accounted for such decision making by recourse to deterministic
procedures such as using the strategy that has most recently proved
successful and so on (Anderson 1976). But recent work on
hypothesis evaluation (Fischoff and Beth-Mayroum 1983) and
judgemental heuristics (Kahneman and Tversky 1983), make it clear
that human subjects have a much richer set of decision criteria
available to them and much work remains to be done in describing
exactly what criteria human subjects use to determine the efficacy
of a given problem solving strategy in new situations.
Turning now to a consideration of further work on domain specific
expertise, the central issue is one of further investigating the
relationship between representation and strategy. One of the most
important aspects here is the suggestion that the representational
space features as background resource used to interpret novel
problems rather than being a product of that interpretation. This
has important implications for the role of such devices in tasks
such as discourse understanding which is discussed by MuGonigle and
Chalmers (1984b).
From the perspective of the experiments reported in this thesis
however, a number of directions for further work are suggested.
The most important of these is the need to examine what
constraints there are on the use of representational spaces such as
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the spatial image device. That is to say, what is the domain of
problems for which such a device might serve as a background
resource?
The experiments reported here have already shown that subjects
appear to be able to use this device to interpret a diverse range
of problems, from those involving both spatial and non-spatial
relational terms in one and two dimensions through to
indeterminate problems of certain sorts. The indeterminate
problems are a particularly interesting case because there is
nothing inherent in the premise information that gives warrant to
the use of such a device. But one factor that does give such
warrant is the fact that a subject can usually be assured that,
although the information necessary for making certain comparisons
is not in fact present in the premises, nevertheless, the items
that are referred to by the premises, that is the referential
domain of the problem, do in principle contain that information. So
for example although the premises; "A is taller than C, C is
shorter than B; Is A taller than B?" do not contain information
about the A-B relation, the subject can be assured that if A, B, C
were picked out in the real world they would be orderable along the
dimension of tallness. This assurance validates the subject's
attempt to impose a determinate ordering on the information.
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Perhaps it is the case then, that the use of a spatial image device
is constrained by the referential dcmain of the problem. Consider
for example the problem "A is taller than B, B is a better
violinist than C; Is A a better violinist than C?". It is not
obvious that a subject would be able to solve such a problem by the
use of a spatial image device or any other device for that matter.
Recent work at Edinburgh has extended the inference studies to look
at the relationship between the referential dcmain of problems and
the use of spatial images. They find that when the problems
describe items in a way that is congruent with their appearence in
everyday contexts then they are comprehended more easily, and
secondly thay found that the continuity of the referential domain
was a more significant factor in comprehension than the
determinacy of the problems.
If it proved possible to delimit the dcmain of problems for which
the image device serves as a background resource, it would then be
possible to examine in more detail the range of information
processing strategies that a subject is capable of deploying in his
attempts to deal with novel problems in terms of this background
resource. The experiments reported in this thesis did not discuss
in any detail the strategies that subjects use to process
indeterminate information determinately and further study of
indeterminacy will be revealing here.
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In conclusion then, this thesis has laid out the ground rules for
an adequate theory of expertise in problem solving and attempted to
examine just a small part of the psychological mechanisms that are
involved in such expertise, but in so doing, it is hoped that
directions for further work have been well specified. Che thing
that is certain is that there are insights to be had into the
nature of problem solving expertise, and that these might only be
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OF THE STATE SPACE PROBLEMS
REFFERRED TO IN THE THESIS
APPENDIX A
The State Space For The Tower Of Hanoi Type Problems
u. — °
Tower Of Hanoi Version 1: The Wedding Cakes
The four tiers of the wedding cake were iced on the table upon
which they now stand, that is the red table. For the wedding
they must be moved to the blue table.
Because of its weight you must only move one tier at once.
Also of course it would be unwise to rest a larger tier on a
smaller tier (for example the base on the top tier), since
there might be a danger of collapse. It would also be very
risky to try and place two tiers side-by-side upon any table
as they might topple off the table.
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as they might topple off the table.
Despite these problems can you show how to transfer the cake
from the red table to the blue table?
ToH version 2; Parking Lots
There are four lorries parked on road A on the board in front
of you. As you can see the roads are narrow and no overtaking
is possible. The lorries are of different sizes and the
biggest is at the front and the smallest is at the back and so
on. They are all heading for the factory in road C. Outside
the factory are four parking lots. Because of the size
difference each lorry has its own 'company lot'. There are
similar company owned lots in roads A and B. Each lorry may
park only on the lot appropriate to its size. Can you
demonstrate the means by which each lorry my deliver its
goods without violating the rules. Please move one lorry at a
time.
ToH Version 3: Computer Problems
Imagine I have a very old and cronky computer. My computer
has three manory locations. These three memories are
represented by the three 'pigeon-holes' in front of you. Each
memory can hold only four numbers. As you can see the top
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memory has the four numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 in it.
The operating characteristics of this computer are such that
it can move numbers frcm one memory to the other, but can only
move one number at once.
Furthermore the computer is so old that no number can be
placed on top of a smaller number or else the smaller number
will be lost. As you can see though it is alright to put
smaller numbers on top of larger ones. If you were the
computer programmer what sequence of moves would you instruct
the computer to carry out in order to transfer the four
numbers in the top memory to the middle memory without losing
any of them.
ToH Version 4: Rocket Silos
There are three bays in the rocket factory, the construction
bay, the launch bay and the hold bay.
The construction bay contains a brand new space ship. The
space ship is made up of four stages or modules as follows;
the Booster (B)
the Orbiter (0)
the Mother Ship (M)
the landing craft (L)
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As can be seen frcm the board in front of you the landing
craft (L) is the smallest and is stored inside the mother ship
(M). The mother ship is in turn inside the orbiter (0)„ The
booster (B) is the largest and contains the other three.
The engineers must move the rocket frcm its present position
in the construction bay to the launch bay. They have only one
crane and it can lift only one module at once. Furthermore for
security reasons no module my stand anywhere except one of
the three bays and modules must be stored appropriately- where
necessary, that is inside one another.
If you were the engineers what sequence of moves would you
carry out in order to transfer the rocket frcm the
construction bay to the launch bay.
ToH Version 5: The Tea Ceremony
Three people, a host, an elder, and a youth participate in the
ceremony. There are four tasks they perform, listed in






The host performs all the tasks at the beginning of the
ceremony, and the tasks are transferred back and forth among
the participants until all the tasks are performed by the
youth, at which time the ceremony is completed.
There are two constraints on the movement of tasks, only one
task-the least important a person is performing-may be moved,
and no person may receive a new task unless it is less
important than any task they perform at the time.
The object of the Tea Ceremony game is to transfer the four
tasks from the host to the youth in the fewest number of
moves.
ToH Version 6: The Harbour Problem
There are three canals in the international harbour. Each
canal has moorings for four ships. Each of these moorings is





Because of their patriotic tendencies no country will allow
its moorings to be used by any other country.
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There are four ships from four countries moored appropriate1y
in the west canal. Unfortunately they all have to be moved, to
their appropriate moorings in the north canal in order that
essential repairs can be carried out.
The problem is made worse because there is only one pilot in
charge of all the harbour traffic so only one ship can be
moved at a time. Furthermore, apart from the moorings in the
north, west and east canal there are no other moorings because
of strong tides. Can you show how the pilot can move the
ships to the north canal?
ToH Version 7: The Art Gallery
In the art gallery were three pedestals. The curator had
placed a piece of modern sculpture on the lowest of the three
pedestals. The sculpture consisted of four sections of
different sizes all stacked together.
One day the sculptor arrived to view his masterpiece. On
seeing his work on the lowest pedestal he complained f saying
his work of art should be on the highest pedestal. He told
the curator to move the sculpture, but warned him not to put
any piece on the floor for fear of dirtying the fine colours,
and not to rest any section on a smaller section in case the
piece got damaged.
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The curator was alone and as the sculpture was so heavy he had
to move only one section at a time. And he could not rest two
sections side by side because the pedestals were too small.
When the sculptor returned he found that the job had been
properly done without dirtying or damaging the pieces. How
did the curator carry out this complicated task?
State Space For The Missionaries And Cannibals Type Problems
forbidden moves
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MC Version 1: Missionaries And Cannibals
Three missionaries and three cannibals are on one bank of a
river with a rowboat that will hold at most two people. How
can they cross to the other side of the river, in such a
manner that missionaries are never outnumbered by cannibals on
either riverbank.
MC Version 2: The Jealous Husbands
Three jealous husbands and their wives, having to cross a
river at a ferry, find that the beat is so small that it can
contain no more than two people. Find the simplest schedule
of crossing that will permit all six people to cross the river
so none of the women shall be left in company with any of the
men unless her husband is present. It is assumed that all
passengers unboard before the next trip and at least one
person has to be in the beat for each crossing.
The State Space For The Goat, Wolf And Cabbage Problem
(Diagram Overleaf)
A farmer wishes to take his wolf, his cabbage, and his goat
from the farmyard to market. He has use of a truck that is so
small that it can only carry himself and one other item So he
must make more than one journey.
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There is a problem however, if the goat is left alone with the
wolf, the wolf will eat the goat. If the goat is left alone
with the cabbage it will eat the cabbage. If the farmer is
with the animals they will behave themselves.




(CW ) (F;G )




(C ) (F;GW )
(F;GC ) (W )
(G ) (F;CW )
— (F:G ) (CW )
( ) (F;GCW)
State Space for the the Goat/Wolf/Cabbage Problem
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The State Space For The Three Nickels And Three Dimes
(c) Three nickels and three dimes:
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(NDD DNN) (DDN NND)
(DD NNND) (NDDD NN)
(DNDD NN) (D DNDNN)
(DD NDNN)
(DDDN NN) (DD DNNN)
(DDD_NNN)
goal state
Version 1: The Shuntyard
The seven yellow circles in front of you labelled A-G are
platforms in a shunting yard. The red lines are railway
tracks. The three white trains at platforms A, B, and C., are
required to move to platforms E, F, and G. The red lines are
railway tracks. The three white trains at platforms Af Bf and
C, are required to move to platforms E, F, and G. Likewise the
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three black trains at platforms E, F, and G, are required to
move to platforms A, B, and C.
Only one train is allowed at any platform at once„ Trains may
move in either direction along the track, but there is only
one driver so only one train can move at once. Also it is
against company regulations to leave trains anywhere except at
platforms. If you were the driver how would you swap the
trains over?





(3,5) (3,2) •—> to (3,0)
(0,2) ► to (0,0)
(2,0) » to (0,0)
to (3,0)
* denotes a goal state
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Versionl; The Sugar Refinaries
At the sugar refinary there is a large silo of sugar and two
tankers. The tankers are of different sizes, the large one
holds five tons of sugar when full, the smaller one three tons
of sugar. Consequently it is easy to measure out three or
five tons from the silo but other amounts require shrewd use
of the silo and tankers at your disposal.
An order has ccme in for four tons of sugar, to be delivered
to a factory in town in the large tanker. Your task is to
find a means of leading exactly four tons of sugar frcm the
silo into the large tanker. Can you show how this can be done






Experiments with State Space Tasks
The experiments reported here were designed as follow-up studies
to the first experiment described in the body of the Thesis
(Chapter 3). In particular, the first experiment to be described
is an attempt to replicate the failure to obtain any transfer
across the isomorphic tasks in experiment 1 of the thesis. Also it
includes a replication of the transfer that was finally obtained on
these tasks using the MSP criteria. The second two experiments
wsre designed to assess seme of the factors assumed to affect the
general (non-isomorphic) transfer obtained in experiment 1.
Experiment la
In this experiment two groups of subjects were required to solve
the four ToH problems from experiment 1. In order to assess the
possibility that the kind of instructions which the subjects were
given might affect the functional criteria that they assumed to be
at work in the experiment. The subjects were divided into two
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groups. One group were given instructions designed to focus their
attention on the structural characterisitics of the problem,
enphasising the requirement to solve the problem in as few a number
of moves as possible. The second group were given the same
instructions as subjects in experement 1 which merely advised them
to solve the problems as quickly as was compatible with the
avoidance of unnecessary errors.
Method
Task Materials
The four ToH problems used in experiment 1 of the thesis were also
used in this study.
Subjects
Were 30 3rd-year psychology undergraduates took part in this
experiment as part of their practical course. Subjects were of
both sexes.
Design and Procedure
Subjects were divided into two groups, group 1 received the four
ToH problems in a counterbalanced order as in experiment 1 of the
thesis, and were instructed that they would be required to solve a
few simple problems and that they should attempt to solve the
problems as quickly as was consistent with not making needless
errors. Thus the subjects of this group solved the four problems
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in similar conditions to those of experiment 1. Group 2 also solved
the four problems in a counterbalanced order, but in this group
received instructions designed to draw their attention to the
structural characteristics of the problem by asking them to solve
the problem in as few a number of moves as possible emphasising
that time was not important.
Results and Discussion
Figures l.la&b (opposite) present mean moves to solution and mean
solution time for the two groups solving the four problems, s can
be seen in terms of moves -to- solution group 2 show an overall
better peformance than group 1 but an analysis of variance on these
data show the effect of group just failing to reach significance
(p= 0.0578), there was however a significant effect of practice
(p=0.012 ), but by inspection it can be inferred that this may well
be due to the very high score of group 1 on problem 2. The
interaction between group and practice was not significant (p >
0.05).
Analyses of variance on the solution time data revealed that again
there was no effect of group (p = 0.7314), but a significant effect
of practice (p = 0.0094); and no interaction between group and
practice (p > 0.05). Once again however it would seem likely that
the high score for group 1 on problem 2 was responsible for the
effects.
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These results suggest in accordance with the experiments reported
in the thesis, that simple exposure to structural isomorphism does
not gaurantee that such invariances will be used by the subject to
produce optimal solutions, even when subjects have been explicitly
asked to attempt to solve the problems in as few a number of moves
as possible. Any transfer effects that does occur in this
procedure is singularly unimpressive. Certainly there is no
indication of a shift towards minimum path solutions, even for the
structure-oriented group. It appears that a more stringent
procedure than simply asking the subjects will be required if such
transfer is going to be obtained at all.
Experiment lb
In this experiment the subjects of experiment la returned 1 week
later. In this experiment however, both groups of subjects solved
the same problems under the same experimental conditions, namely
all subject solved three of the ToH problems they had solved the
previous week, but this time the solved the problems under the MSP




Because of time constraints and the possibility that criterion
procedures may take large amounts of time, it was decided that only
3 ToH problems would be used for this study. Thus 3 of the ToH
problems solved by subjects in the previous week were used in this
experment, The problem called 'computers' being dropped, (see
Appendix A).
Subjects
Of the 30 subjects participating in the previous week's experiment,
24 were able to attend the second week of testing.
Procedure
The 3 problems were presented to all subjects under the same
conditions but in a counterbalanced order. All subjects received
the 'solution time' instructions from the previous week. The
subjects were asked to solve each problem in turn, they were not
explicitly informed of the criterion of success in operation but if
subjects failed, to solve a problem in the minimum number of moves
possible (15) they were asked to solve the problem again, this time
attempting to solve the problem in fewer moves. As in previous
experiments moves -to- solution, and solution time, were recorded




Table 2.1 (opposite) presents the mean number of attempts required
to reach the MSP criterion, and figure 2.1 a&b (opposite) present
the total moves and time to reach criterion.
As can be seen from this table even with the MSP criteria in force
(and even after having previous experience with these problems),
subjects were still requiring over 2 attempts to reach the
criterion even on thie last problem. However there did appear to be
seme reduction not only in the number of attempts to reach solution
but also in the time and moves to solution. Using non-parametric
analyses of variance however, there was no significant effect on
any of the three measures.
But in contrast to the experiment of the previous week, all,
subjects did achieve a minimum solution path, and the number of
attempts required to do this was well within the number of attempts
that subjects had made on the problems in week 1. That is to say
that subjects in week 1 were essentially required to make 4
attempts at solving the ToH problem structure by solving each of 4
iscmorphs once only. In this experiment subjects, even on their
first problem required less than 3 attempts to reach criterion.
Frcm this comparison between the inter-problem transfer of week 1
and the intra-problem transfer of week 2, it is clear that the
structure of the ToH problem is more readily asssimilated with deep
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exposure to a single problem than with shallow exposure to the
class of isomorphic problems.
Thus it is clear that a high frequency of changes in the surface
structure form of isomorphic problems with frequency of exposure to
any one problem is less likely to produce a structurally mediated
level of problem solving than a low frequency of exposure to
surface structure variation within the context of a high frequency
of repetition on a single form. While these results concur with
the results in the area of 'concept formation' studies,
particularly those of Morrisett and Hovland for example (see
Chapter 1).
Experiment 2 v
Given the apparent importance of criterion of mastery as to the
type of transfer obtained on these tasks and the suggestion that
expert performance on a single task might inhibit more general
transfer (cf. experiments 1 and 2 of the thesis), the third
experiment to be reported in this appendix assesses the effects of
criterion procedures on transfer between two non-isomorphic state
space tasks, namely the MC problem and the SR problem. In
particular since solution time seemed to be the most important
index of this general transfer, subjects in this experiment, were
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run to a solution time criterion on one of the problems and then
transferred to the second non-iscmorphic problem.
Method
Task Materials
The two most difficult problems from experiment 1 were used in
this study, namely the MC and the SR task.
Subjects
Were 8 undergraduates of both sexes attending first year psychology
lectures in the Department of Psychology.
Design and Procedure
The mean solution times for the MC and SR problems after 7
antecedent prolems in experiment 1 of this thesis was 200
seconds. The subjects in this experiment were required to solve
each problem to a criterion of 3 succesive solutions of less than
200 seconds. Subjects were encouraged to improve their solution
times by "possibly reducing your thinking time or the number of
moves you make". They were given feedback at the end of each
attempt as to whether they had succeeded in reducing their solution
time.
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The subjects were divided into two groups one group solved the SR
problem to criterion and then went on to the MC problem, the other
group solved the MC first follwed by the SR problem. Both problems
were solved to criterion.
Results and Discusion
The mean solution times for the repeated presentation of both































1 2 3 4 5 6
Problea 1 attempts
1 2 3 4 5
problea 2
Appendix figure 2.1. Reduction in solution tine on each of t*o non-isoiorphic
problens solved to solution tiie criterion. Bracketed figures indicate nuiber
of subjects contributing to the uean.
Considering intra-problem transfer, T-tests on both problems for
both groups reveal that the reduction in solution time is
significant (p < 0.05). As can be seen by inspection however there
is little indication of inter-problem transfer and the slight
indication of negative transfer between the problem solved first
and the problem solved second is not significant when the first
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attempt solution times on each problem are compared with t-tests
(p > 0.05).
The results seem to suggest that deep exposure to a single problem
reduces the possibility of transfer to other problems It must be
noted however that this paradigm is a simple train and test
paradigm and that with a multiple problem procedure under similar
conditions would have been more illuminating in this respect.
Experiment 3
In experiment 1 of the thesis it will be recalled that it was
argued there that the best predictors of transfer were not the
structural relationships that existed between tasks modulo their
state-space decomposition^ but rather that the best predictor of
transfer appeared to be the relative difficulty of the problems
solved (determined by reference to the solution times of novice
subjects solving these problems), and also the number of problems
solved. This experiment assesses the effects of varying the number
and difficulty of antecedent problems on subjects' performance on




The 3 problems which proved most difficult for naive subjects to
solve (as indexed by solution times recorded in experiment 1 of
this thesis), namely MC, SR, and Rockets, and the two easiest
problems, namely cakes and shuntyards were used in this experiment.
Subjects
18 subjects of both sexes were used in this experiment., The
subjects were undergraduates attending lst-year lectures in the
department of psychology, University of Edinburgh. They were not
paid for their services.
Design and Procedure
Subjects were divided into three groups, group 2e received the two
easy problems followed by the MC problem, group 2h received the two
hard problems followed by the the MC problem, and group Ih were
subdivided, half received the SR problem followed by the MC
problem, and half received the MC problem first followed by the SR
problem. The performance of the naive subjects solving MC in this
group was pooled with similar data from experiment 2 to provide a
mean measure of naive performance on this task against which to
compare the effects of different antecedent conditions.
From the above then it can be seen that groups 2e and 2h recieved a
set of 3 problems to solve in a prescribed order, while group Ih
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received a 2 problem set to solve in a prescribed order. But
subjects did not simply solve 3 and 2 problems respectively,, rather
they solved their respective sets of problems repeatedly until a
criterion performance of two succesive solutions of 200 seconds or
less had been reached on the MC problem. This procedure allowed
for an analysis of the effects of interpolating problems between
repetitions of the MC problem. Subjects were given the same
insructions as in experiment 2 and tested under similar conditions.
Results and Discussion
Tdble 3.1 presents meansolution times for subjects in each group on
their first attempt only at solving the MC problem.
2 Hard
antecedent
330 395 395 130
Appendix table 3.1. Solution tine (secsl on the first atteipt at
the H.C. problea for the 4 experimental groups.
T-tests on these data suggest that only 2 hard antecedent problems
significantly reduced the difficultyof the MC problem (p < 0.05),
the solution times of groups 2e and lh does not differ
significantly from that of naive subjects (p > 0.05).
Mc Only 2 Easy 1 Hard
antecedents antecedent
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The effects of interpolating problems between successive solutions
on the MC problem can be assessed by comparison to simple
repetition to criterion on the MC task alone as was investigated in
experiment 2. This comparison is presented in figure 3d.
The most striking affect is that the 2 hard non-iscmorphic
antecedent problems produce a level of performance on the MC
problem comparable to that of 2 antecedent solutions of the the MC
itself. In contrast 2 easy antecedents produce no such effect and
the group with 1 hard antecedent problem falls neatly between these
two. As can be seen the final performance level on all groups is
comparable but in terms of the number of attempts to reach
criterion, group 2h were best with 6 attempts to reach criterion,
thus equalling the performance of subjects solving MC alone. Group
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Ih required 7 attempts while group 2e required 9 attempts.
These results suggest that the number and difficulty of antecedent
problems is a good predictor of the extent of transfer to the MC
task as suggested in experiment 1 of the thesis.
Experiment 4
A Further Experiment with Inference Problems
In the discussion of experiment 4 in the body of the thesis, it was
argued firstly, that functional criteria are the determining
factor in the subject's choice of strategy, and secondly that pari:
of a subject's problem solving skill is the ability to determine
what type of problem solving strategy is optimal given the
functional demands of the problem solving situation. In this
follow-up study evidence is provided that allcws these points to
be elaborated.
This experiment takes the 3 groups of subjects frcm experiment 4
into a new experimental condition in which they are required to
solve the determinate problems frcm experiment 4 • but this time
with a partial question perspective. Thus for group 1 the
problems have not changed but the functional perspective is
different, for group 2 both the problems and the functional
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perspective change, and for group 3 only the problems change since
in experiment 4 they solved indeterminate problems.
Thus in comparing these 3 groups under these different
circumstances it will be possible to assess the extent to which
subjects are sensitive to changes in the functional demands
associated with these inference problems and secondly to assess the
extent to which functional rather than structural criteria
determine the generality of expertise developed in experiment 4.
Method
Task Materials
Subjects in this experiment solved the 32 determinate problems as
used in experiment 4. In this experiment they were presented with
the partial perspective questions as used for group 3 in experiment
4.
Subjects
37 of the 40 subjects that took part in experiment 4, returned I
week later to act as subjects in this experiment.
Apparatus
As in experiment 4 problems were presented using an Apple II
microccmputer which also recorded subjects' premise reading times
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and question answering times.
Procedures
The procedures were identical to those of experiment 4 except this
time all subjects made regular protocol reports throughout the
session. 6 protocol reports were taken frcm each subject after the
1st, 4th,9th,17th,24th, and 32nd problems.
Table 4.1 presents the frequency of protocol reports falling .into
the categories of elimination and image formation reports. The
subjects are group on the basis of the experimental condition that
they had experienced in experiment 4 of the thesis.
week 1 experience
Gp 1 Gp 2 Gp 3
Image -formation 50% 50% 30%
Elimination 50% 50% 70%
Appendix table 4.1. Percentage of protocol reports for the two
basic strategies as a function of Keek 1 experience.
As can be seen the group differences are snail but there appears
to be a higher frequency of elimination reports for the group that
experienced the partial perspective in experiment 4„ Of interest
is that subjects who had previously experienced experimental
conditions associated with the use of image strategies, while still
rraintaining a proportion of image reports, show a strong tendency
towards the use of elimination. This suggests that even when
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subjects have a fully legitimate problem solving method readily
available they will nevertheless an attempt to seek out the most
optimal methods available. In this experiment 32% of subjects
using an image strategy failed to show a shift towards the more
optimal elimination method.
This suggests that the ability to recognise that existing methods
are non-optimal and the ability to shift to new problem solving
methods in the light of changes in the functional demands made on
the subject may be a significant dimension of problem solving
expertise along which people differ.
This analysis of the protocol reports suggests a number of things
that might be expected to emerge in the analysis of premise
integration time. Firstly given the higher incidence of
elimination in group 3, then this group may show faster solution
times that the other two groups as in experiment 4. However since
the majority of subjects in the other blocks abandon the slower
image method in favour of elimination it may be that although group
3 may have a faster solution time in the early blocks of problems,
this advantage may disappear in latter blocks. Figure 4.\
(overleaf) shows the premise integration times of the three groups












Figure 4.1. appendix. Preiise integration tise as a function of problei
blocks for subjects grouped on the basis of week 1 experience.
By inspection it' can be seen that, as anticipated, group 3
initially solve the problems much faster than the other two groups,
particularly group 1. By comparing the times of these two groups
on their first block of this experiment with that of their last
block on experiment 4 (see figure 5.2.4) it is striking that both
groups are performing at almost exactly the same levels across the
two experiments. This is evidence for the transfer to this new
experiment of previously successful problem solving methods. As
can be seen from figure 4.1 however, all groups quickly converge on
a very fast solution time as the number of problems solved
increases. What is surprising is the relatively fast solution
times for group 2 even on the initial block. It will be recalled
that it this group that not only experienced a change in functional
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perspective between weeks 1 and 2 but also a change in the
problems from indeterminate to determinate as well. It might, have
been expected then that they would have been slower than group h
On the contrary they appear to perform consistently better than,
group 1. Thus it would appear that there is an asymmetry of
transfer from determinate to indeterminate problem strucures.
An analysis of variance on these data reveal in fact that there is
an effect of group just failing to reach significance (F^ ^ = 2.2^
p = 0.0600 ). This was so even when groups 1 and 3 were
considered in isolation (F^ 24 = 2.6; p = 0.0526), there was
however a significant effect of practice blocks, (F^ = 7.07; p
< 0.0001), and a significant group by practice interaction „ This
interaction supports the suggestion that the groups converge over
practice blocks and if group differences on early blocks were to
be considered in isolation, group effects may emerge.
Taken together the results of the premise integration time analysis
and the protocol analysis suggest once again that functional rather
than structural criteria are the major factors in determining the
nature of the representational space that subjects adopt.
Furthermore, even subjects that have a valid problem solving
method based on previous experience with this type of problems
will, nevertheless shift away from such methods when the functional
perspective changes so as make then less than optimal. The effects
of functional perspective appear to overide any advantages that
might have been conferred upon the subject by virtue of prior
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experience to structurally identical problems. Finally the ability
to track changes in the functional demands that the experiment
places upon the subject and make appropriate adjustments to the
problem solving method, appears to be a factor that might
distinguish between good and poor problem solvers. A further
analysis of solution times comparing static with more fluid problem
solvers may prove illuminating in this respect.
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APPENDIX C
SUMMARY TABLES FOR THE MAIN
ANALYSES OF THE THESIS
I
Experiment 1! Anova 1.1 (c-f tab 1e 3.1. 2)
source S. S D.F. M.S. F. F.
mean 5375510.63 1 5373510.63 257.46 0.0000
1 group 138666.95 1 138666.93 6. 64 0.0219
error 292305.30 14 20878.95
set 197899.13 1 198899.13 6. 19 0.0261
2 SxG 307230.01 1 307230.01 9.61 0.0078
error 447663.73 14 31973.98
practice 181205.90 3 60401.97 1.26 0.3005
3 PxG 6178.71 3 2059.57 0. 04 0.9880
error
SxP 4118.77 3 1372.92 0.03 0.9914
4 SxPxG 10715.27 3 3571.76 0.09 0.9659
error 1693029.56 42 40310.23 0.09 0.9659
Experiment IS Anova 1.2 (c-f table 3.1.2)

































Experiment l: Anova 1.3 (c-f. table 3.1.. 2-)




































































Experiment l: Anova 1.3 (c-f table 3.1.7.)
source s. s D. F. M.S. F. P.
mean 1893720.02 1 1893720.02 124.25 0.0000
error 106690.86 7 15241.55
set 5986.89 1 5986.89 0. 27 0.6210
error 156715.48 7 22387.93
ractice 107203.30 3 35734.43 1.77 0.1839
error 424263.32 * 21 20203.01
SxP 3792.17 3 1264.06 0. 07 0.9730
error 355606.95 21 16933.66
Exper1 men t 1 I Anova 1.6 (c-f ■f 1 gure 3 .1.2)
source S. S D. F M.S. F. P.
mean 2699449.00 1 2699449.00 156,70 0.0000
position 84535.36 1 84563.56 4. 91 0.0686
error 103358.69 6 17226.45
set 173056.00 1 173036.00 79. 03 0.000 I
SxP 66693.06 1 66693.06 30. 46 0.0015
error 13138.19 6 2189.70
p rob1 em 4 10388. 12 3 136796..04 13. 81 0.0001
Pr x Ps 67115.8123 3 22371.94 2. 26 0.1164
error 178250.81 18 9902.82
Pr xS 351468.12 3 117156.04 10. 30 0c 0004
Pr xSx Ps 124673.31 3 41558.44 3. 65 0.0323
error 204783.31 18 11376.96
Experimen t 1: Anova 1.7 (c-f •f 1 gur e 3 . 1.3)
source S. S D. F. M.S. F. Pc
mean 5151.13 1 3151.13 82. 03 0.0000
group 2. 53 1 2. 53 0. 04 0.8438
error 879.09 14 62. 79
practice 261.75 7 37. 39 0. 38 0.5221
PxG 620.34 7 88. 62 2. 10 0.0510
error 4145. 16 98 42. 30
Experimen t i: Anova 1.8 (cf tab 1e 3.1 . 4 )
source S.S D.F. M. S. F. F.
mean 2475.06 1 2474.06 173.31 0.0000
position 49. 00 1 49 . 00 3. 43 0.1134
error 85. 69 6 14 . 28
prob1 em 808.94 7 115.56 9. 43 0.0000
POSxPROB 186. 5 7 26. 64 2. 17 0.0000
error 314.81 42 12. 26
- 7.'
Experiment 1: Anova 1.9 (c* table 3.1.4)
source S.S D.F. M.S. F. P.
mean 2293.03 1 2295.03 260.12 0.0000
position 26.28 1 126.28 2.98 0.1351
error 52.94 6 8.82
problem 228.09 3 76.03 4.23 0.0198
POSxPROB 161.34 3 53.78 2.99 0.0581
error. 323.31 18 17.96
Experiment l: Anova 1.10 (cf table 3.1.4)
source S.S D.F. M.S. F. P.
mean 504.03 1 504.03 58.23 0.0003
position 22.78 1 22.78 2.63 0.1559
error 51.94 6 8.86
problem 256.84 3 83.61 8.94 0.0008
POSxPROB 25.09 3 8.36 0.87 0.4730
error 172.31 18 9.57
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Experiment 2: Anova 2. 2 (cf figure 3.2.1) /














6 . 3 0.0001
Experiment !2! Anova 2.3 (c-f -figure 3.2.1)















Experiment 2:: Anova 2.4 (ci -figure 3.2.2)




























Experiment 2: Anova 2.5 fcf -figure 3.2.3)
source S. S D.F. M.S. F. P.
mean 133981.13 1 135981.13 42. 76 0.0000
error 34979.04 11 3179.93
prac tIce 24480.29 5 4896.06 5. 80 0.0002
error 46422.54 55 844.04
Experiment 2! Anova 2.6 (cf iigure 3.2.3)
source S.S D.F. M.S. F.
P.
mean 134371.00 1 134371.00 371.43 0.oooc
error 3617.70 10 361.77
practice 864.48 5 172.90 0. 64
0. 657!
error 13154.85 50 263.09
Experiment 2! Anova 2.7 (c-f tab I e 3.2,.3)
source S.S D.F. M.S. F. P.
mean 7436.13 1 7436.13 191.10 0.0000
group 1 . 04 1 1 . 04 0. 03 0.8720
error 778.26 20 38. 92
prob1 em 1322.00 1 1322.00 61 . 34 0.0000
PxG 1 . 82 1 1 . 82 0. 08 0.7741
error 429.66 20 21.48
Experiment 2: Anova 2.8 < c* tab 1 e 3.2. 3)
sourc e S.S D.F. M.S. F. P.
mean 4621981.73 1 4621981.73 83. 83 0.0000
group 1204.64 1 1204.64 0. 02 0.8340
error 1102431.66 20 55121.58
'
probI em 82270.64 1 82270.64 1 . 89 0.1849
PxG 7512.27 1 7512.27 0. 17 0.6826
error 872459.66 20 43622.98
- 5 -
Experiment 3: Anova 3.1 (c+ tab 1e 6.3 and -f i gur e 6 . 1)
sourc e S.S D.F. M.S. F. P.
mean 14326460.86 1 14326460.86 214.70 0.0000
group 303976.70 1 303976.70 4. 56 0.0417
error 1868409.00 28 66728.89
set 239378.74 1 239578.74 CDOxCO 0.0002
SxG 1252019.99 1 1252019.99 99. 20 0.0000
error 333397.68 28 12621.35
practice 1096317.31 15 73087.82 7. 59 0.0000
PxG 80018.15 15 3334.34 0. 55 0.9086
error 4043162.61 420 9626.58
SxP 135472.33 15 9031.49 1.10 0.3537
SxPxG 254937.88 15 16997.19 2. 07 0.0105
error 3447684.49 420 8208.77





















Experiment 3: Anova 3-3 (cf figure 3.1.11
source S.S F. P.
mean 1816598.53 1 1816598.54 • 85.68 0.0000
error 318014.53 13 21200.97
practice 229450.13 15 13296.68 2.38 0.0014
error 1336583.78 225 3940.37
Experiment 3: Anova 3.*V tcf figure 5.1.1)
source
mean
S.S D.F. M.S. F. P.
39975.00 1 3997500.39 82.53 0.0000
error 726560.36 13 48437.36
practice 277757.86 15 18517.19 2.28 0.0052
error 1829715.39 223 8132.06
- G -
Experiment 4: Anova 4.1 (cf -figure 5.2.2)
source S. S D. F. M. S. F. P.
mean 18256886.25 1 18256886.25 506.14 0.0000
group 26810.52 1 26810.52 0. 74 0.3975
error 829632.66 23 36070.98
practice 319173.06 3 106391.02 13. 93 0.0000
PxG 40212.63 3 13404.21 2.01 0.1207
error 460389.52 69 6672.312
IDE 156276.01 3 52092.00 12. 29 0 o 0000
I xG 2367.01 3 789.00 0. 19 0.9055
error 292569.66 69 4240.14
Pxl 73989.97 9 8221. 1 I 1 . 65 0.1019
Px IxG 34662.00 9 3851.33 O (D 0.6396
error 1028606.62 207 4969.11
Experimen t 4: Anova 4.2 (cf fIgure 5. 2. 3)
sour ce S. S D.F. M.S. F. P.
mean 390671936.16 1 390671936.16 307.61 0.0000
group 9187542.88 2 4593771.44
3. 62 0. 0373'
error 4451386.78 35 1270039.62
prac tice 4906296.79 3 1635432.26 16. 76 0.0000
PxG 1102836.46 6 183806.08 1 . 88 0.0904
error 10246094.57 105 97531.85
i i gure 1364678.19 3 454892.73 10.35
0.0000
FxG 1065046.00 6 177507.67 4 . 04 0.0011
error 461497.137 105 43952.16
PxF 871271.95 9 96807.99 2. 19 0.0228
PxFxG 911634. 18 18 50646.34 1 . 14 0.3037
error 13932079.79 315 44292.32
Experiment 4: Anova 4.3 (c-f -f i gur e 5.2.3)
source S. S D.F. M.S. F. P „
mean 328334680.43 1 328334680.43 242.28 0.0000
group 90868.89 1 90868.89 0. 07 0.7979
error 32523854.00 24 1355160.58
practice 1902119.35 3 634039.78 7. 59 0.0002
PxG 98957.67 3 32985.89 0. 39 0.7572
error 60167881.69 72 83566.41
■f i gu r e 1577419.55 3 525806.51 12. 93 0.0000
FxG 263117.55 3 87705.85 2. 16 0. 1007
error 2928896.17 72 40679.11
PxF 481066.00 9 53451.77 1 . 37 0.2355
PxFxG 395781.67 9 43975.74 1 . 13 0.3448
error 8429177.95 216 39123.97
— *i -





































Experiment 4: Anova 4.3 (cf -flgare 5.2.6)
































































































































Experiment 41 Anova 4.6 (cf -figure 5.2.6)
































































































































Experiment 4: Anova 4.7 (cf -figure 5.2.6)






























































































































A Classification and Detailed Analysis
of Some Example Protocols
This appendix presents example protocol reports from three of the
experiments in the thesis. These reports have not been chosen at
randan, they have been chosen to highlight the classification
processes outlined in the body of the thesis. The reports are a
cross-section, sane of which fall easily into the classificatory
schema and seme which do not fit so well. The protocol reports are
presented in the order which reflects the importance that was
placed on them in the body of the thesis. Thus protocols from
experiment 4 are presented first, followed by those from experiment
3, and finally those from experiment 2 with the ToH problems.
For each of the experiments, a short summary of the procedures is
presented, followed by an account of the classificatory schema for
that experiment. Each of the categories into which the protocols
are classified is described in sane detail. This is followed by the
protocol reports themselves. The protocols are presented on the
left of the page while on the right, the category into which the
report is assigned is noted down. Where necessary, the protocols
are underlined to indicate which part of the report is responsible
for its assignment to the category in question.
- 1 -
EXPERIMENT 4: Representation, Strategy and Expertise
Summary:
In this experiment, three groups of subjects solve thirty-two
5-term inference problems. In group 1, the problems were fully
determinate (eg. A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E) and for each problem subjects
were required to answer two comparative questions (eg. is A>B?). In
group 2, subjects received the same questions but their problems
were indeterminate (eg. A>B, A>C, C>D, D>E). In group 3, subjects
received the same indeterminate premises as group 2, but instead of
receiving two comparative questions after the premises, they
received a single superlative (ie. Who is tallest?) before they
received the premises.
Subjects provided a varying number of protocol reports throughout
the session. For the reports presented below, the number
corresponds to the problem immediately before the report was taken.
In this experiment, whenever a subject reported using same form of
mental image, he was explicitly asked to say whether this was a
dimensionalised image, and if so, he was asked along which axis and
in what direction the items were arranged. Subjects in the
indeterminate groups were asked whether they noticed any ambiguity
in the premises (cf. Ch. 5, pp. 153-154 for details).'
- 2 -
The categories:
This experiment was concerned with a very constrained set of
questions concerning the protocols, and the answers to these
questions were self-evident in the protocols. The protocols are
categorised according to whether seme form of ELIMINATION or seme
form of IMAGE strategy was used.
Subjects reporting the use of an image are classified as to whether
the image was GLOBAL or DIMENSIONALISED. 'Global' refers to reports
which simply mention "making a mental picture" without specifying
whether this was seme concrete image of the premises themselves, or
the people described by the premises, rather than a spatial array of
the names. In contrast, 'dimensionalised' refers to reports which
specify explicitly, that the subject was ordering the items of the
premises along seme dimension and in a particular direction, such as
"Forming a mental picture of the tallest to smallest, from left to
right". Reports of using a 'dimensionalised image' fall into 4
sub-categories (L/R, R/L, T/B, B/T), according to whether they
report ordering the items (starting with the tallest) from left to
right or vice versa or frcm top to bottcm or vice versa. There was
no difficulty in determining which of these various categories the
protocols fell into.
ELIMINATION, refers to reports in which the subject uses his
knowledge of the question (group 3 only) to guide his search for
relevant premise information. Because of the particular problem
forms used in this experiment, a subject using this strategy is able
- 3 -
to discover his answer after readinq only two of the four premises .
Subjects using this strategy do not report retaining all of the
itens in any form of image, rather they report remembering only "Who
is tallest" and pay "only slight attention to other available info."
Because of the great detail in subjects' reports of this strategy,,
there is no problem of classification. It must be pointed out that
the elimination reported in this experiment is NOT the same as that
reported in experiment 3, the distinctions between the two forms is
made clear in the discussion of that experiment.
In addition to the main distinction between image and elimination,
two other minor categories have been used, these are REHEARSAL AND
MNEMONICS. 'Rehearsal' refers to reports often occurring in
conjunction with image reports (cf. discussion of experiment 3), in
which subjects report making an image and then verbally rehearsing
the items. 'Mnemonics' refers to subjects who, instead of
remembering the narres in full, instead just remember the initial
letters.
Finally, for groups 2 and 3, it is noted whether they recognise that




SUBJ: N.M. (GP. 1 det/ccmp)
1: Put them in order using the whole
name Tall -> SHORT, LEFT -> RIGHT
slotting names in order.
16: Rehearsal of names.
17: Task beccming easier - although
no experimenting with a new
method- stick to the same mental
image of names L -> R,Tallest ->S.
32: By the last [question] task much
easier faster presentation and
less verbal recall providing
allowed to give response
immediately.
SUBJ: F.M. (GP. 1 det/comp)
1: Forming a mental picture of the DIMEN. IMAGE: L/R
tallest to smallest from left to
right.
16: Same method as before. DIMEN. IMAGE: L/R
17: Same method as before. DIMEN. IMAGE: L/R





SUBJ: N.W. (GP. 2 indet/ccmp)
1: Can't remember order —
9: Full names, kept tallest at DIMEN. IMAGE: T/B
the top shortest at the bottom














TALLEST DIMEN. IMAGES T/B
+ REHEARSAL










Concerned as to what the
experiment is really for.





Still remembering the same way.
SUBJ: C.C. (GP. 2 indet/ccmp.)
1: I tried to memorize and picture GLOBAL IMAGE
the situations presented.
4: Same processes used; also a bit —
of lucky guessing.
8: The shorter one in my mind is at DIMEN. IMAGEs L/R
the left while the taller one is
at the right. When asked the
question which one is shorter or
taller, I automatically see the
taller one first.
9: TALLER -> SHORTER DIMEN. IMAGEs L/R
Sue Kate Mary Jane +MNEMONIC
I'm now picturing people I know
and am now associating names
with these people.
12: I'm repeating each statement REHEARSAL
presented and comparing the -fGLOBAL IMAGE
two girls side by side, and
also attempting to compare
the last statement to the one
- 6 -
presented. At the end I try
to picture them as a group in
order to make camparisions
more easily.
16: Because most of the names were —
unfamiliar this time (ie.
couldn't associate them with
friends), I used more
memorization than before.
17: I'm still using the method of REHEARSAL
comparisons of names with +GLOBAL IMAGE
faces I know. I am also using
repeating + memorization of
those names I can't picture
(ie. I've no friends of the
name IAN so I tried to
memorise it.
20: No difference. GLOBAL IMAGE
+ REHEARSAL
24: A lot easier for me to picture
and rsnember the size order when
put "so and so is TALLER THAN"
GLOBAL IMAGE
+ REHEARSAL
25: No difference though (I'm
concentrating a bit less)
GLOBAL IMAGE
+ REHEARSAL
28: No difference (though the names
made it easier in this one)
GLOBAL IMAGE
+ REHEARSAL
32: No difference. GLOBAL IMAGE
+ REHEARSAL
SUBJ: S.O. (GP. 3 Indet/sup)
1: Remember who is tallest.
Only pay slight attention
to the other available info.
ELIMINATION
16: Same. But wait to make sure
other statements are same type.
ELIMINATION
17: Can work out the answer from the
first statement therefore ignore
the others.
ELIMINATION
32: As before wait till after 2nd





1: Emma, Helen, Kate, Pat, Ruth
If question is "Who is tallest"
+ 1st statement is Emrra is
taller than.. then I remember
Emma as being the tallest so
far & I go on to the next
statement. If no one else is
taller than Errma then she's the
tallest.
16: The first two statement always
involves the same name i.e. Emma
is in both. I decide who is
tallest or shortest from the 1st
2 statorients and if that name
is not mentioned again in the
3rd and 4th then he or she is
the tallest/shortest.
17: Use strategy as above.
32: No ambiguity. Purely tried to
answer question so ignored names





EXPERIMENT THREE: Three and Five- Term Transfer
Summary:
In this experiment two groups of subjects solved 32 inference
problems. Subjects in group 1 solved 16 three-term series problems
such as:
Alan is taller than Bob
Carl is shorter than Bob
Who is the tallest?
- 8 -
These were followed by 16 five-term series problems such as;
Alan is to the left of Bob
Carl is to the right of Bob
Edward is above David
Carl is to the left of David
Who is leftmost?
In group 2, subjects solved the 16 five-term problems first,
followed by the 16 three-term problems. The problems were presented
by an APPLE II microcomputer. Premises were presented simultaneously
for 12 seconds in the case of three-term problems and 24 seconds in
the case of five- term problems. Premises and question were
presented separately, the computer logged the time taken for
subjects to answer the question. Subjects were told to answer the
problems as quickly as was consistent w/ith a high degree of
accuracy.
All subjects in both groups were required to provide 12 wrritten
protocol reports of how they solved the problem. These were taken
after they had provided the answer to their, 1st, 4th, 8th, 9th,




As with experiment 4 above, the protocol reports were analysed
according to 6 categories. (see chapter 5, pp. 127-134 and figures
5.1.2 & 5.1.3). The first two of these - GLOBAL IMAGE! and
DIMENSIONALISED IMAGE refer to subjects' use of seme form of spatial
image device. Qnoe again, this is indicated in the protocols, by
specific reference to pictures or images or by reference to the
placement of items in space. The two categories are distinguished by
the fact that the second includes reports of "ordering" the names
along a spatial dimension such that the ordering of the items along
that dimension is in seme way analogous the relational properties
described by the pemises; For example the "topmost" or "leftmost"
place in the spatial image, is reserved for the "tallest" or
"smallest" person and so on.
By and large, it is a straightforward matter to decide whether these
image strategies are being employed, but one particular difficulty
worth note are the reports of 'list formation'; Here subjects report
rehearsing a list of the itans in order of height starting with the
tallest (subj:21, below for example). It would seam that such a list
has the characteristics of a dimensionalised image in as much as the
ordering of the list is an analogue of the relational properties
described in the premises, but it appears to be a verbal rather than
imaginal strategy. Pending further enquiry, this list-formation
strategy is categorised under VERBAL REHEARSAL rather than
dimensionalised image. Finally we must note that with a small number
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of reports, while it is clear that the subject is using seme form of
image device, it is not clear whether it is a dimensionalised image*
(see subj:32, report number 1; for example).
In contrast, category three- REHEARSAL is a straightforward category
to score, since subjects explicitly use the term "rehearsal" or
"verbal rehearsal" or "verbally recite".
The fourth category - SCANNING refers to a strategy a few subjects
adopt in which they do not simply read the promises in the order
presented. Instead, they read the first premise and then search the
other premises for information which can be integrated directly with
that obtained frcm the first premise. Thus the reading order for
the problem A>B, D>E, B>C; wauld be 1,3,2. This usually occurs as
part of the strategy for forming a dimensionalised image as below;
"start with 2 names located in space then look for others to put in
the space directly before or after them." Because three-term
problems only have two premises, this category of report is confined
to subjects solving the five-term problems.
The fifth category- ELIMINATION, is to be distinguished from the
elimination reported in experiment 4. Unlike experiment 4, subjects
in this experiment do not use their knowledge of the question they
are asked to guide their search through the premises for the correct
answer- how could they since they are asked the question after
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reading the premises? Rather, they use a modified image device to
remember only the end-anchor items. This is a valid strategy in
this particular study because, although subjects do not know what
question they will be asked, they do recognise that they are only
being asked superlative questions and thus are only being
interrogated about end-anchor items. While somewhat rare among our
subjects elimination is an easy category to spot.
The final category- others, is a bin category for any other
strategies that subjects use systematically. By and large these are
mnemonic strategies such as remembering only the initial letters of
the names and so on. One sub-category; MNEMONIC; VISUAL, refers to
reports of scanning the promises back and forth. But unlike the
SCANNING category above, subjects are not searching for a particular
item, rather they appear to be using a visual rehearsal procedure







4: Picturing a list in order
8: Picturing a list of names in order
of height
9: Repeating verbally an ordered list
12: Repeating a verbal list of the
names in either ascending or
descending order depending on the
layout of the information given
16: Construct a list of names








17: Picture the names in space
20: Spatially locate places for names
verbally repeat list of names
placing them in spatial position
in a certain order.
24: Start with 2 names located in
space then look for others to put
in the space just before or after
them, then repeat the list
and look for another in the list
then I add the names which cane
above or below the list
25: Same















32: Same: scan all sentences first







1: Sorted out order of height and
then recited this order in to
myself repeatedly
4: Same as before Sorted out order
of height recited tallest 1st then
2nd tallest 2nd and so on in to
myself repeatedly.
8: Same strategy used as before
recite tallest 1st in to myself.
9: Recite tallest name 1st followed
by 2nd tallest + then 3rd tallest
in to myself
12: As before read through sentences
and establish who is tallest then
recite 2nd tallest + then 3rd in
to myself








17: Total confusion- I'm hopeless
with left and right!!!!! However,
seared to remember Barry was
above someone else so plumped
for him
20: Work out order of names from left
to right + try to quickly note
other name and whether above or
below. Main strategy to remember
L->R name sequence.
24: Same as before but as reciting





25: Same as before - no change REHEARSAL
+0THERS: VISUAL
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28: Same as before REHEARSAL
OTHERS: VISUAL
32: Verbal rehearsal strategy scan
sentences back and forth at end
whilst reciting devote most






1: Place people 's name in space
according to relationship
described read once, place and
rehearse the arrangement.
4: No change except a little more
rehearsal of names (since so
many being thrown out at me!) If
the same names were being used I





8: No change yet, but considering
only remembering the outside names
so less names to remember. This
is because I now know the limited
no. of questions being used!
9: Now remembering top, bottom, right






12: This methods easier to remember
names with, I think I'm getting
faster.
16: Originally I was reading the
lines from top to bottom fitting
into space, somewhere in the
first few I changed to take first
name, attach second to it, scan
for any other occurrence of first
name etc. ie. taking one name and
attaching others to it rather
than having say 2 pairs of names





17: By visual representation of
height as steps tallest being
top step etc
DIMEN= IMAGE
With only 3 names don't need to
rehearse
20: No change. With lots of waving
of arms (perhaps its the sign
language I've been learning
recently)
24: No change. With having to tag
names onto the left, need more
rehearsal of names can't just
add onto the end of the list
25: No change at all
28: Since rehearsal time quite long,
started playing games, eg. Ann,
Clare, Emma initials = ACE but I
still remembered Ann Clare Emma.
32: Getting more visual again, rather
than envisaging a list, envisaged
statements separately considering









1: Picture of relationships
4: Try to construct an image of names
in a line
8: Try to work out farthest positions
far left far right top or bottom
etc. and remember.








12: Try as I read to slot people into
a position from left to right then
drop middle names. Lastly note
who is above or below each other.
DIMEN. IMAGE
+ELIMINATION
16: Remember people at extreme left +
right and person above as a set of




17: A visual presentaton of Tallest
at the top to smallest at the bottom
20: Solved the same way- remember only





24: Still a mental picture of height






28: Same DIMEN. IMAGE
+ELIMINATION
32: Lost concentration- repeated
relationship "shorter" made a
mental diagram more difficult to




1: I worked out the problem by GLOBAL IMAGE
placing the names in a shape each
sectioned off frcm the others and
all spatially different.
4: If there were letters used in DIMEN. IMAGE
alphabetical order it might be
easier to remember which position
they were in, as sometimes it is
easy to remember which one was at
the bottom etc because their
position on the screen but
difficult to remember the names.
I also find that when the question
refers to the odd man out eg.
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Bob to the left of Jim
Tom to the left of Bob etc
and then: John Below Bob
- This is easier than saying who
was positioned to the right the most.
I like to arrange the names in my
head in linear fashion.
8: I find that I read lines 1 and 2
and then search for a name that I
have seen in these in line 4 (as
line 3 is usually completely
different) Line 4 links up 1 and
2 and lastly I read line 4.
9: I use mental imagery always
- never vocal- I don't seem to
rehearse in my head because I
can't remember names well. The
names can be associated with
friends or enemies who have them.
Eg. personal friend Mike- So I
anticipated a question which would
be answered with the name Mike ie.
Who is rightmost and then when the
question 'Who is leftmost' came up




12: There are two variations of the
task. The easier of the two is the
one where line 2 follows on frcm
line 1 eg. Tom is to the left of
Henry Jim is to the left of Tom
16: I feel I am improving at the task SCANNING
because I look for the line that
follows on from line 1. This is
either line 2 or line 4.
3-term
17: I visualised the three girls
standing side by side in order
of height.
20: Sometimes if the names can be put
in alphabetical order according
to their height I do this









32: Sometimes I use thinness of OTHERS; MNEMONIC
letters to remember tallness.
eg. Jim is taller than Mary
letters are fatter therefore
she looks shorter
EXPERIMENT: 2 Minimum Solution Paths and Transfer
In this experiment, two groups of subjects were required to solve 6
ToH isomorphs, followed by the MC problem and the SR problem. One
group- the shallow group- solved each of the 8 problems twice. The
other group- the MSP group- solved each of the 8 problems
repeatedly until they had produced a solution in the minimum number
of moves possible. Half of each group were asked to provide written
reports of how they solved the problems. They were asked to
consider which problems or which parts of problems they found
particularly difficult and why. They were asked to consider what
they learnt about the problem that allowed them to overcame these
difficulties, and whether they could formulate any useful hints that
would enable others to solve the problems. They were not asked to
recall specific moves or move-patterns, neither were they informed
of the structural affinities that existed between the problems.
They were not informed before hand, exactly when they would be asked
to provide reports. In fact they were asked to provide reports




The protocols were analysed with respect to 4 categories (see
chapter 3: pp. 82-84 and tables 3.2.4 & 3.2.5). The first of these
was the RECOGNITION OF STRUCTURAL RELATIONS. This takes two forms;
whether the subject gave any report of recognising that the
ISOMORPHS were related in some way, and whether they recognised
that the NON-ISOMORPHS were different from the iscmorphs in seme
way. As can be seen frcm the protocol reports this is an
uncontentious category to evaluate, most subjects giving a fairly
unambiguous report such as "very similar to the parking lots". It
must be noted however that few subjects actually report explicitly
what it is that makes the problems similar. They certainly do not
describe this similarity in terms of state-space equivalence or any
other structural abstraction. Note also that a report such as
"same principle as the first", does not qualify for this category
since it is not clear whether the subject means that the
problems, or his solutions are constructed on the "same
principle".
The second major category is STRATEGY REPORT. The sub-category of
RANDOM/TRIAL AND ERROR was not difficult to score since protocols
were only so-classified if the subjects actually mentioned trial
and error or making moves at random. But note that on several
occasions subjects report making moves at randem at first, and
later forming a plan. In these case subjects score in the 'trial
and error' category and the 'others' category.
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For the sub-category of STRUCTURALLY MEDIATED STRATEGY, there was a
strict criterion. To be so classified, a report had to show evidence
that the subject had recognised the recursive nature of the
problems. Thus it was not adequate simply to say; "I built them
up in a sequence in the middle slot" or "plan ahead two or
three moves" or "need to get blue to road B first". While any
problem solving strategy based on understanding the state-space
invariances of the ToH must incorporate all of these aspects,
these reports do not identify the characteristic feature of such
strategies namely, that the problem is decomposible into
sub-problems all of which are solved in the same way: In order
to solve the 4-ring ToH for peg C you must first solve the
3-ring ToH for peg B and so on (cf Simon 1975). Ccmpare the
above cited reports with that of L.P; "got to get the last one to
where you're trying to get them all. "So you got to get the second
to last one to the middle," and later "now I can see that the
sane principle applies throughout the stack..."
The third category- RECOGNISE TASK-SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES- was
something of a 'hotch-potch' of reports. Essentially, anything
which referred to a characteristic of a problem's surface
structure form qualified as a member of this category. Thus;
"shape of boats [meant] I felt [they] needed to placed the right
way up" and "more difficult...[because ].. small cylinders were
hidden", constitute good examples.
Finally, the fourth category- OTHERS- mainly consists of
- 21 -
reports which indicate some form of strategic problem solving
which was not structurally mediated and was not just trial and
error. Thus there are many reports of "planning 2 or 3 moves
ahead" (indication of seme form of depth first search perhaps),, and
"I had to go through every move.." (exhaustive search) and so on.
Example Protocols:
REPORT CATEGORY
Subj : M.J. (MSP Group)
1: Computers
No set moves, rather plan ahead two OTHERS: PLANNING
or three moves with a goal in mind. -^STRUCTURAL STRATEGY
ie. number 4 to the bottom, next
number 3 to the bottom and so on.
3: Galleries
Same principle as the first, only OTHERS: PLANNING
was more sure of planning ahead.
I could not remember set moves but
recognised them as correct when
they came to mind.
6: Rockets
Same principles as other. By now RECOG. DIFFICULTY
I can remember set moves. This game +CTHERS: PLANNING
was more confusing as I had remembered
moves as big to the last, medium to
middle etc, and the reversal of size
order added confusion and involved
conversion. Also more difficult to
plan moves because difficulty in
"seeing ahead" ie. small cylinders
were hidden. Also the problem was
unrealistic.
7: Missionaries and Cannibals
Seemed to be a quite different problem. RECOGNISE DISSIM.
Developed a plan, strategy with time. CTHERS: PLANNING
Difficulty was the problem seemed to
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be quite new and time needed to solve.
Solved by planning ahead two moves.
Seemed to be only one possible
ccmbination of moves at each stage.
SUBJ: C.S. (MSP Group)
1: Wedding cakes
Clear bottom of discs to move onto STRUCTURAL STRATEGY
goal.
3: Parking Lots
Lane C had to be left nearly clear,
so only could be used temporarily
in order to let A become reversed
ie. yellow had to get to yellow
[c?] whilst everything else was in
B in right order. A was only one
that that could use all 3 as it was
blocking more than others.
6: Harbours
Similar to previous. Shape of boats: RECOG. SIMILARITY
I felt needed to be placed right way +RECOG. DIFFICULTY
up. Could almost sense when gone
wrong. Difficulty sometimes in
getting right ships to arrive at
right place. Have got to get D and
North unblocked by moving the others
much in the same way as lorries
start by moving B to either and
progress from there.
7: Missionaries and Cannibals
Problem of outnumbering whilst at RECOG. DIFFICULTY
bank- reluctance to move 2 people
back seemed to egg on error. Once
a pattern could be seen fairly
simple- 1st stage easy as could
only move cannibals, but difficulty
after that.
SUBJ: L.P. (MSP Group)
1: Parking Lots
You could tell when you'd don't it
wrong but forgotten how I did it




Unlike the rockets you can see these
so it helps. Very similar to the
parking lots. Got to get the last
one out to where your trying to get
them all. So you've got to get the
second to last one to the middle.
6: Wedding Cakes
Same as before but now I can see STRUCTURAL STRATEGY
that the same principle applies
throughout the stack. Moving disks
alternately (to alternate places)
and then bringing them back
together again.
7: Missionaries and Cannibals
Don't think its the same. Didn't
try to relate it because didn't
think it did. But perhaps I should
have thought about it more.
Important to remember you can bring







SUBJ: P.S. (NON-MSP Group)
1: Computers
I roriembered how I started off the OTHERS: MEMORY
experiment from the first time +TRIAL AND ERROR
although the first moves were trial
and error. I also remembered that
the first time I built them up in a
sequence in the middle slot which
is what I tried to do the second
time.
3: Harbours
After the first time I was able to
see a pattern and form a 'plan'
which I followed the 2nd time. The
first time, moves were made at






Similar to previous ones. Initially
moves made at random, organised plan
evolved. Haven't remembered moves
but do remember the start neccessary
to solve the problem and try to
work towards that. Might eventually
develop a strategy. I could tell





7: Missionaries and Cannibals
Much harder than others. Pretty much TRIAL AND ERROR
trial and error until the last
couple of moves where I could see
seme kind of strategy.
SUBJ: A.M. (NON-MSP Group)
1: Parking Lots
The first few moves I made at TRIAL AND ERROR
randan, I thought I might have to
begin again but actually I don't
think it makes much difference in
the first few moves. After that you
could see there were moves that
would get you stuck, but I wasn't
particularly organised about what
I did.
3: Computers
I thought it had things in common RECOG. SIMILARITY
with both of the other two I did +CTHERS: PLANNING
beforehand. You just had to
remember what you were eventually
aiming at and make sure not to block
yourself so that you had a large
number to move and nowhere to put
it. You maybe had to think two
moves ahead but I wasn't organised.
6: Art Galleries
This seemed pretty similar to the .RECOG. SIMILARITY
other ones but since I got stuck OTHERS: PLANNING
this time and had to start again
— .I'm not so sure! It was the
same principle though, looking
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ahead so that you didn't make
useless moves that would block
what you wanted to do next. I
discovered on the second go that
I couldn't make a different first
move and still succeed. May be
that was just me not the game
though.
7: Missionaries and Cannibals
That was difficult!! I'd done puzzles OTHERSs PLANNING
like that before and I knew there
was a strategy but I couldn't
remember what it was. Couldn't
even remember what I'd done when I
tried it the second time. I had to
go through every move before I did
semething to make sure that no
missionaries would 'get eaten' and
still have someone to row the boat
Each step was a one-by-one move-
too much mental strain if you
started looking ahead!
SUBJ: D.M. (NON-MSP Group)
1: Wedding Cakes
The first 3 or 4 moves were totally TRIAL AND ERROR
random until I grasped that it was tOTHERSs PLANNING
necessary to think more than one
move in advance to save myself
getting into time wasting
situations. I think 2 or 3 moves in
advance would be sufficient. Once
I had grasped this and done a few
more constructive moves ie. they
were intended to get me towards the
goal and not just move the pieces
around, it became easier because I
knew what kind of moves I was
looking for. So the second time
round was easier, apart from one
point in the middle where I lost
the thread of my thought and had to
start from the beginning again, ie.
work out what my previous moves had
been aimed at, and what I had




Solving of this puzzle by the
lessons I learned in doing the
first one (the second one was
helped by that as well). For seine
reason, however, I was aware of
taking longer and making more
mistakes on this one. Perhaps it
took me a while to realise that it
actually was the same as the others,
meaning that, to start with, I made a
few random time wasting moves. Once
I got into the routine of it, it was
OK: I didn't learn the moves by
heart, I just learned the sequence
necessary to move ahead and carried
on using that. The second time
around I am concious of making one
mistake, after about 50 seconds. I
realised immediately that I made a
wrong move and moved the piece back
to its original position. A hint
would be: don't panic! and perhaps
use seme time before starting to
move to actually work out the way
you are going to move them. Ie.
plan ahead right from the start and
not from about move 5 onwards,
which I have been doing so far. It
is tempting to get the "feel" of
the pieces by moving them around a
bit before you start actually
making constructive moves, like a
warm-up. This would apply to all







Again I learned from the earlier OTHERS: MEMORY
problems. At least I felt like I +RECOG. SIMILARITY
did, but the first time round, at
least I made a lot of mistakes and
took a lot of time. The reason for
this was I didn't listen carefully
enough to the instructions and so
started moving the pieces to places
suitable for ending up in the east
canal rather than the west. This
probably wasted about 30 seconds
and 10 moves. Perhaps I'm getting
to the stage of having such a number
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of similar problems to do that I'm
blase as far as listening to
instructions is concerned:
carelessness stemming from over-
confidence and boredcm.
7: Missionaries and Cannibals
The one before this was really easy
but this one was very difficult for
seme reason. Probably because there
were 6 pieces to deal with instead
of 4. I was moving at random nearly
all the time, except at the end of
the first time and at the very end
of the second time I worked out
what I should have been doing. I
couldn't remember this though: too
complicated to learn in just one go,
without taking longer. The illegal
moves represent a failure to look
ahead. I don't know why I didn't,
but it slowed me up.
REC0C4, DIFFICULTY
+RECOG„ DISSIMo
FERIAL AND ERROR
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